Eric Wiland     


 

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

University of Missouri-St. Louis

551 Lucas Hall

 (314) 516-5495

wiland@gmail.com



I work primarily on topics in ethics and practical reason.

I investigate problems in practical philosophy by thinking about people who have various cognitive and motivational flaws, especially those who recognize that they have such flaws. Obviously, I know almost nothing about how to make a webpage.  

 

Publications:

Reasons, Continuum (in press).

Psychologism and Non-Psychologism about Motivating Reasons, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (in the medium future).

"The Incoherence Objection to Moral Theory", Acta Analytica 25 (2010), 279-284. 

"The Limits of Maximization: Actions, Decision Procedures, and Meta-Decision Procedures", The Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2010).

"The Ethics of Terror and Torture", Review Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (2008), 139-52.

"On Indirectly Defeating Moral Theories", The Journal of Moral Philosophy 5  (2008), 384-93.

"How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 275–301. 

"Intentional Action and 'In order to' ", Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (2007), 113-18. 

"Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism," Ratio 18, (2005), 352-60.

"Trusting Advice and Weakness of Will," Social Theory and Practice 80 (2004), 371-89.

"Some Advice for Moral Psychologists," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003), 299-310.

"Psychologism, Practical Reason, and the Possibility of Error," Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 68-78.

"Stories, Autobiographies, and Moral Inquiry," Journal of Social Philosophy 34:2 (2003), 188-98.

"On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden," Analysis 62:4 (2002), 296-9.

"Theories of Practical Reason," Metaphilosophy 33:4 (2002), 450-67.

"Advice and Moral Objectivity," Philosophical Papers 29:1 (2000), 1-19.

"Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument," Journal of Medical Ethics 26:6 (2000), 466-8.

"Good Advice and Rational Action," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:3, (2000), 561-9. 

"A Fallacy in Korsgaard’s Argument for Moral Obligation," The Journal of Value Inquiry 34:1 (2000), 103-4.

"Personal Identity and Quasi-Responsibility," in Moral Responsibility and Ontology, ed. Ton van den Beld, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), 77-87. 

"Is there Ethical Knowledge?" Southwestern Philosophical Review 14:1 (1998), 63-8.

If you want copies of any of this stuff, just email me.