Title: Fault injection attacks on cryptographic devices and countermeasures
Speaker: Israel Koren, Professor of ECE, Umass Amherst

Abstract:
Numerous schemes for extracting the secret key out of cryptographic devices using side channel attacks have been developed.
One of the most effective side channel attacks is through maliciously injecting faults into the device and observing the
erroneous results produced by the device. In some extreme cases, a single fault injection experiment has been shown to be

sufficient for retrieving the secret key.

In this talk we describe several fault injection attacks on symmetric key and public key ciphers and outline countermeasures
that have been developed to protect cryptographic devices against such attacks. We then show that some of these

countermeasures do not provide the desired protection, and even worse, they may make other side channel attacks easier to mount.

Short Bio:
Israel Koren is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and a fellow of the IEEE.
He has been a consultant to companies like IBM, Analog Devices, Intel, AMD and National Semiconductors. His research interests include

Fault-Tolerant systems, secure cryptographic devices, VLSI yield and reliability and Computer Arithmetic. He publishes extensively and

has over 200 publications in refereed journals and conferences. He is the author of the textbook "Computer Arithmetic Algorithms,"
2nd Edition, A.K. Peters, Ltd., 2002, a co-author of the textbook "Fault Tolerant Systems," Morgan-Kaufman, 2007. He co-founded in 2004

and co-organized the annual workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography - FDTC, which has become the main conference

for presenting new fault injection attacks and countermeasures.