An Examination of Desire by: Sam C. Sims  The philosopher Michael Stocker has charged that a “moral schizophrenia” is induced by modern ethical theories: schemes influenced by Kantianism and Utilitarianism cause “a split between one’s motives and one’s reasons” (66). Genuine love, affection, and other integral components of human relationships are denied to their adherents (66). A Utilitarian agent is not motivated by love in performing a loving action. Modern ethical theories have failed to account for motivation, an important component of ethical behavior (72). For Stocker, this dissonance presents a problem: motive is valuable and merits reflection (72). He correctly asserts that possessing the right motive is essential to acting morally. However, his notion of self is inadequate. In order to build a valid agent-centered theory, we need a correct notion of agency. The purpose of this essay, then, is to refine Stocker’s claims to obviate potential criticisms from philosophers. Stocker uses hedonistic egoism to exemplify what he calls “moral schizophrenia” (68). According to Stocker:
For me to reap the full emotional reward of a love-relationship, my motives must be genuinely and completely loving. This sequence poses a dilemma for the egoist. He wants to maximize his pleasure, but in order to do so, he must not want to maximize his pleasure. (Or, at least, he must want something more than pleasure for himself.) To illustrate this point, Stocker proposes a classic thought experiment:
To live in a way approved by egoism, one must become a subliminal egoist. But in becoming a non-cognizant egoist for the sake of egoist, Stocker says, the agent still would not be acting authentically when performing a caring action. I would like to challenge Stocker on this point. Love is a complicated thing and difficult to analyze. To say, “Adam loves Elle” could mean many different things: “Adam desires that Elle is happy,” “Adam desires that Elle and he not part,” and/or “Adam desires that Elle not be harmed.” Additionally, it could mean “Adam desires that Elle be treated with respect,” “Adam desires that Elle succeed in her endeavors,” and/or “Adam desires that Elle loves Adam.” Love appears to be, or at least involve, a cluster of desires regarding and for the sake of the beloved. Its composition is not the subject of this essay. This essay will instead focus on Adam’s desire for Elle’s happiness. Simply put, if Adam loves Elle, then Adam desires Elle’s happiness. (Or well-being, or flourishing, or whatever.) At this point, it is important to identify Nagel’s distinction between motivated and unmotivated desires (Schueler 16). Motivated desires are those that “reduce” to other reasons.1 For instance, my desire to go into the kitchen could be motivated by my desire to eat. My desire to go into the kitchen is motivated. Because my desire to eat is not motivated by another desire, it is called an unmotivated desire. It does not reduce to some other reason, even though it is caused by a physiological drive. Now, Adam desires that Elle is happy. If he is an egoist, his desire probably falls at the end of this chain of reasons:
The first two propositional attitudes cause the third. However, only the first is said to motivate the third. Clearly, in this example Adam’s desire for Elle’s happiness is not authentic. His love for her is disingenuous because it does not reduce to such an expression. Conversely, if Adam’s desire is unmotivated, caused instead by some natural tendency to care for Elle’s well-being, his desire is authentic.  The same reasoning applies to Utilitarianism. If Adam holds a unique belief that is independent of Elle, then we would not describe his desire as an expression of love. It seems that Adam’s desire is authentic only if it is an unmotivated desire. It must at least reduce to some other loving, unmotivated desire.3 Returning to Stocker’s thought experiment, it seems that the egoist who forgets his ethical commitments does not authentically love. Adam is an egoist. He knows that to maximize his own happiness is to have an unmotivated desire for Elle’s well-being. Therefore, he relinquishes his egoism to have such an unmotivated desire. At first glance, we see that there is a causal chain from Adam’s egoist beliefs to his desire for Elle’s well-being or happiness. However, there is not a chain of reasons leading back to these beliefs because his desire is unmotivated. Either his desire is authentic, or the previous conclusion is incorrect. This dispute can be settled by more thought-experiments: 1.) Suppose that Elle has a daughter named Ava. As a good Utilitarian, Elle trains Ava to have character traits that dispose her to maximize utility. Ava, however, does not believe in Utilitarianism. Later in life, Ava meets a guy named Lawrence, and they start seeing each other romantically. Because of Elle’s parenting, Ava has developed certain positions and cares deeply about Lawrence’s happiness (a set of unmotivated desires). 2.) In a parallel case, Adam1 and Adam2 designate the same living body with fully functioning brain and nervous system before and after an injury. Adam1 is an egoist whose normative beliefs prevent him from forming an unmotivated desire for Elle’s happiness. (He does have a weak, motivated desire, though.) One day, Adam1 slips on a banana peel, hits his head, and has a concussion. He wakes up as Adam2. His belief in egoism is gone, and, by blind luck, a neural structure has been replaced by a profound unmotivated desire for Elle’s happiness. 3.) In an alternate storyline, egoist Adam1* realizes that having an unmotivated desire will maximize his happiness. Therefore, he chooses to undergo a brain surgery in which his egoism-neural-structure is removed and a love-for-Elle-structure is inserted. After surgery, Adam2* wakes up to find he really cares about Elle. 4.) Most realistically, Adam struggles with egoism: for selfish reasons he wants to shed his egoism. He sets out to eliminate his beliefs in egoism and to train himself to care about Elle for her own sake. For years, Adam struggles with cognitive dissonance and his own natural tendencies. Initially, he merely goes through the motions with little sincerity behind his pretended altruism. By the time he finishes, he seems like a different person. He genuinely cares about Elle, and he no longer believes in egoism. In fact, Adam has an unmotivated desire for Elle’s happiness. This desire was not always unmotivated. When Adam was younger, it was motivated by his egoism. However, as Adam’s egoist beliefs faded away, this desire did not fade with them. Instead, it became independent of them. I argue that these four cases are the same in every morally significant way. In the first case, the desire is untainted because the Utilitarian beliefs are held by someone other than the agent, Ava. They are held by the agent’s mother, Elle. Ava simply acts out of her own natural tendencies. Adam2’s character is also created by an external force, making the first and second cases similar. Adam2 desires authentically; however, Adam1 does not. In terms of what is morally significant, then, Adam1 and Adam2 are separate agents. The third case differs from the second only in so far as Adam1* pursued the change. However, Adam1*’s character is like Adam1’s, and Adam2*’s character is like Adam2’s. Therefore, we shall conclude that Adam1* and Adam2* are also separate agents. The fourth case differs from the third only by the amount of time over which the change takes place — a morally irrelevant factor. Therefore, we can say that the fourth case is like the third, the second, and the first. If Ava’s love for Lawrence is genuine, then so is Adam’s love for Elle. It seems my earlier conclusion still stands. In order for an ethical belief to taint a desire, the two must be connected by a chain of reasons, not merely by a chain of causes. Stocker’s implicit assumption that a desire is tainted if it is caused by the agent’s flawed belief system rests on the notion of a single, unified self. This notion has been called into question in philosophy of mind by such thinkers as Nagel, Parfait, and Dennet (Nagel, Parfait, Dennet). An agent-centered theory is, I still believe, the best way to approach ethics. However, such a theory needs to be built upon a sound theory of the self.§ Works Cited Dennet, Daniel. (2007). The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. In B. G. Shapiro, Arguing about the Mind. New York, NY: Rutledge. Nagel, Thomas. (2007). Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness. In B. G. Shapiro, Arguing about the Mind. New York, NY: Rutledge. Parfit, Derek. (2007). Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons. In B. G. Shapiro, Arguing about the Mind. New York, NY: Rutledge. Schueler, George Frederick. (1995). Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Stocker, Michael. (n.d.). The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories. Reader. Further Reading Brian Braman, Meaning and Authenticity: on the Drama of Authentic Human Existence Frisbee Sheffield, Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire G. F. Schueler, Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action |
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