Social movements have been commonly defined as societal efforts to alter the status quo and cultivate social change. Often such movements have taken place over the course of many years and therefore have a significant basis in the institutional activities of civil society. As a result of extended engagement with the current powers, they usually conflict less violently with the state. Additionally, they are more often connected to the morals and values of the people (Bayat 18 - 20). Charles Tilly highlights two concepts important to the study of social transformation. The first is the opportunities awarded to society, or the ways in which its current situation allows for social mobilization. The second is suppression, obviously the opposite, which hinders this progress (as quoted in Bayat 18).  Antonio Gramsci argued that true revolution is not primarily about winning the state, but instead by winning over society. Before leadership transitions are possible, the group will have to exercise leadership within society (Gramsci as quoted in Bayat 21). Despite intense suppression, the Society of Muslim Brothers, the Muslim Brotherhood, has expanded its opportunities and this leadership within society is precisely what is seen occurring within Egyptian society today.

For the past 30 years Egypt has witnessed the emergence of a nonviolent social movement that is entirely Islamic (Abdo 199).  Starting during Sadat’s presidency the public has begun to see Islam as a new civilized entity. By the 1970s it was clear that this emotional connection to Islam was largely outside of state control (14). By the time Mubarak assumed power, it had grown into a significant social movement. The regime’s message to this Islamic revival was at times “over reactive… aggressive” and at others “tolerant and compliant;” because of this “schizophrenic policy toward religion” the movement has only spread more completely throughout the population without the control of the state (14). In a Criminal and Social Studies, survey 90 percent of young people stated that they thought Islam’s spread would solve problems across the social and political spectrums (28).

As the 1990s wore on, many Egyptians chose a gradual Islamic social movement in place of a more radical one (36). Perhaps because the movement was fundamentally Islamic, or perhaps because radicals had tried and failed, by the turn of the century this gradual Islamic reform was one that had reached all levels of Egyptian society.  Due to its peaceful nature, this progress has largely escaped the international spotlight. The west somehow “failed to notice that the one nation long considered an outpost of democracy and secularism in the Arab world” was quietly being “transformed into an Islamic order” (12). Even though the regime did not mirror the change and become more Islamic itself, this sort of societal change, instead of the “high-profile threat of violence at the hands of Islamist militants,” is commonly regarded as the greatest threat to the modern secular state (43).  It takes root within the people and has the potential to extend from the societal to the political realm. Currently neither the regime nor the international community has any control over this societal change within Egypt.

As societal mobilization grew, the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly emerged as the group that represented these desires of society.  It came to represent the growing discontent felt within the majority of the Egyptian population (Stacher 2002, 415). The Brotherhood, undoubtedly an Islamist organization, has members who are motivated to effect political and societal change by seeking an Islamic system of government (Hatina 3, 4). As their tie to this societal movement grew, so did the political possibilities of the movement. Abdo describes most change within Egypt as happening “slowly, indirectly and subtly, until a sledgehammer suddenly comes down (Abdo 74). As Mubarak’s policy has become increasingly secular and opposed to religious growth, it has become apparent that he is simply perpetuating growing religious sentiment and dissatisfaction with his regime.  The majority of Egyptian citizens are frustrated with the lack of integration of faith and political society (200). As the Brotherhood continues to provide the only outlet for the frustrations of an increasingly distressed society and the regime remains oppressive, it may only be a matter of time until the sledgehammer comes down on the political regime. Although it has been argued that the moderate and mainstream Brotherhood does not desire revolution, it seems clear that as we study Mubarak’s response to this movement, nothing short of compliance will stop societal change from permeating the political sphere (Hamid 3).

Civil Society in an Authoritarian State

The Muslim Brotherhood looks remarkably different today than from its early years; its history can best be split into two eras: pre and post 1981. The Ikhwan of today has emerged since the assassination of Anwar Sadat. However, to understand its origins and the international hesitancy to engage with it, a brief historical excursion is in order. Husan al-Banna created the al-ikhwān al-muslimūm with six other Egyptians in 1928 in a time when society within Egypt was increasingly becoming less traditional and conservative (Yokota 149). Initially, the society was created for the reforming of the mind and was extremely apolitical (Munson). However, as the society grew in membership and hostilities with the pseudo-colonial powers of the British increased, its leaders demanded socio-political reforms. The group became notorious for the “secret” violent arm that was responsible for the 1948 retaliatory assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi (Fahmy 83). The state responded by murdering al-Banna, and while his legacy lives on, 1948 marks a significant change motives and tactics of the group (Munson).

Since this time the organization has had bipolar relations with the state, oscillating between friendly contacts and the mass imprisonment of members. During times of persecution, its leading members supposedly reflected on the government’s strength and the “difficulty of staging a revolution” and to have reformed their ideology and tactics appropriately (Rubin 34, 37).  According to some scholars, the modern period for the Brotherhood began in 1971 when Sadat released many of its leaders and began friendly relations with the group (Rubin 29). However in 1981, “after Nasser’s failed socialism and Sadat’s troubled opening with the West, Egyptians were yearning for a return to the country’s more permanent national identity, Islam” (Abdo 84).  It was at this point that the Brotherhood began to capitalize on this unique societal opening. During Mubarak’s reign, the Brotherhood has transformed from a “limited movement of militants to a broad-based populist revival” (Abdo 45). 

Its ideology and role in society are both a continuation and departure from the ideas of their forefathers. Criticism and debate has arisen over many issues ranging from the organizations religious ties to whether or not its commitment to democracy is sincere. Some historians and political scientists cite examples of similar groups that promoted democracy and reneged on their pledges once in power (Brooke and Leiken). It has been argued that it is possible that the Brotherhood is simply seeking mass support and eventual rule within Egypt, at which point it will fall into authoritarian ways (Yom 20). The best way to evaluate this theory is to examine the actions of the organization, especially as they have become increasingly politicized over the years.§