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August 3, 2011
Prudential says acquisition helped 2Q net income
Associated Press
NEW YORK -- Prudential Financial Inc. said Wednesday that its net income rose slightly in the second quarter, boosted by recent acquisitions.
For the three months ended June 30, the Newark, N.J. company said it earned $831 million, or $1.68 per share for its financial services business. That's compared with $798 million, or $1.70 per share, in the year-ago period. The lower per-share results in the latest quarter reflect an increase in the number of outstanding shares.
Not including one-time charges, such as acquisition costs and claims from the Japan earthquake and tsunami, the company said adjusted operating income was $1.71 per share for the quarter. By that measure, analysts on average expected a profit of $1.55, according to FactSet.
On Feb. 1, the company bought AIG ( AIG - news - people ) Star Life Insurance Co. and AIG Edison Life Insurance Co. Prudential said the acquisitions resulted in adjusted operating income of 5 cents per share in the quarter.
Total revenue in the quarter was $10.15 billion, up 32 percent from $7.68 billion. Revenue from premiums rose to $5.51 billion, up from $3.81 billion. Policy charges and fee income rose to $1.04 billion, from $888 million. Net investment income increased to $2.53 billion, from $2.11 billion. Asset management fees, commissions and other income rose to $1.08 billion, from $871 million.
Total benefits and expenses came to $9 billion, up from $7.1 billion....
CONTINUED AT: https://sites.google.com/site/thecatbirdsnest11/prudential-says-acquisition-helped-2q-income
November 11, 2010
Prudential Issuing $1 Billion
In Stock To Fund AIG Buys
MarketNewsVideo.com
Prudential Financial has begun a public offering of
its common stock to help purchase two AIG subsidiaries.
Prudential said Citi , Bank of America , Merrill Lynch , UBS , and Barclay's Capital will serve as joint bookrunning managers for the offer. The underwriters will have a 30-day option to buy an additional 15% of the offered amount of common stock from the company...
CONTINUED AT...
Prudential To Buy AIG Units For $4.8B
Source: emii.com
People & Companies in the News
Prudential Financial Group is acquiring two of AIG’s life insurance units for $4.8 billion, The Wall Street Journal reports. The U.S. life insurer will pay $4.2 billion in cash and take on $600 million in debt, which the company is expecting to repay with resources from the two Japanese units it is acquiring.
The deal for AIG Star Life Insurance and AIG Edison Life Insurance, which have combined assets of $47.6 billion, will give the insurer a Japanese operation with $128.4 billion of assets. Prudential will finance the deal, which is expected to close in the first quarter of 2011, by a $1.3 billion stock sale and $1.2 billion in senior notes. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Securities are advisors on the deal....
May 24, 2010
The Treasury's AIG Back-up Plan
MarketNewsVideo.com
British papers report government is reviewing plans to float Asian life insurance business, in case Prudential deal falls through.
Full AIG Chart at
The Treasury department is reportedly taking another look at prior plans to float American International Group's Asian insurance business, AIA, in case the sale to the U.K.'s Prudential ( PUK - news - people ) falls through, British newspapers reported over the weekend.
The Sunday Times reported that a back-up plan has been in the works for two weeks, ever since U.K. regulators asked for changes to the bid. The Independent said AIG ( AIG - news - people ) asked advisors Morgan Stanley ( MS - news - people ) and Deutsche Bank ( DB - news - people ) to re-do the analysis they had done as potential underwriters of a float.
May 22, 2010
AIG Executives Won't Face
Criminal Charges
By AMIR EFRATI, Wall Street Journal
Federal prosecutors will not bring criminal charges against current and former American International Group Inc. executives for their role surrounding financial contracts that nearly brought down the insurer about two years ago, according to people familiar with the matter.
The decision brings to a close a criminal investigation that, while mostly under wraps, was widely followed. The September 2008 bailout of AIG was one of the biggest and most shocking of the financial crisis, as trading by a noninsurance unit brought down one of the most iconic financial companies world-wide.
The probe focused on Joseph Cassano, who headed a London-based unit of AIG called Financial Products, people familiar with the matter have said. Other executives at the unit, Andrew Forster and Tom Athan, also were targets of the investigation, these people said.
"The system worked," said lawyers F. Joseph Warin and Jim Walden of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, who represent Mr. Cassano, in a statement on Friday. "The large group of federal agents and prosecutors was diligent and professional throughout the investigation, and our client is grateful that they did their jobs by following the facts to the end."
David M. Brodsky and Richard Owens of Latham & Watkins LLP, who represented Mr. Forster, said Friday that "the facts were stronger than the emotions surrounding AIG's problems," and that they knew they could convince prosecutors "that our client at all times acted in good faith."
A lawyer for Mr. Athan wasn't reached to comment, nor were representatives for the Justice Department and AIG.
The probe focused on whether the executives deceived investors and the firm's outside auditor about AIG's financial exposure from contracts known as credit-default swaps that were tied in part to mortgages, the people familiar with the matter said.
As of last fall, the Justice Department had been planning to ask a grand jury in Brooklyn, N.Y., to consider indicting Mr. Cassano, people familiar with the matter have said. But after a series of meetings with the targets of their probe, prosecutors obtained information about Mr. Cassano's disclosures to AIG senior executives and AIG's outside auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. That changed the course of the investigation, these people said. PricewaterhouseCoopers said it wouldn't comment on client matters.
Mr. Cassano, who lives in London, is no longer at AIG. Mr. Forster still works at the firm. Mr. Athan until recently has been at AIG but his status wasn't confirmed Friday night.
The Securities and Exchange Commission hasn't ruled out bringing a civil-fraud lawsuit for securities violations, people familiar with the matter said.
About 15 government representatives have been involved in the investigation, including prosecutors from the Justice Department's fraud section in Washington and the U.S. attorney's office in Brooklyn; lawyers from the Securities and Exchange Commission; and agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, people familiar with the matter said.
AIG Financial Products entered into insurance-like contracts with other financial institutions that ended up being financially disastrous for AIG. When the mortgage market imploded, AIG had to hand over tens of billions of dollars worth of collateral to financial institutions that had entered into the contracts, known as credit-default swaps, with AIG. These collateral calls nearly felled the company and led to a massive government bailout that has generated intense public outrage and political scrutiny.
The Justice Department so far has had little success proving there was criminal wrongdoing at financial companies amid the financial crisis. In the first and only securities-fraud case against Wall Street executives in the wake of the credit crisis, two former hedge-fund managers at Bear Stearns were acquitted at trial after being accused of misleading their investors before their funds collapsed.
But efforts continue. Federal prosecutors in Manhattan are currently probing whether any large Wall Street firms misled investors about complex, mortgage-related derivatives, people familiar with the matter have said.
http://online.wsj.com/
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GOOGLE FOR MORE OF THE AIG GANG
MARSH & McLENNAN
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
April 27, 2010
AIG Gets The Hook From KBW
MarketNewsVideo.com
The valuation is looking a little too plump, and AIG catches a downgrade.
American International Group Inc
This morning Keefe Bruyette & Woods downgraded shares of AIG to underperform as the firm sees minimal value in the common shares. KBW feels the current capital structure does not leave much value for the shareholders of common stock and has lowered its price target to $6.
Shares of AIG ( AIG - news - people ) were trading sharply lower Tuesday morning, off about 6.5% so far....
AIG FED FRAUD…
Straight from JUDGE NAPOLITANO & RON PAUL !
March 5, 2010

SEC Charges General Re Corporation for
Role in AIG and Prudential Accounting
Frauds
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 2010-10
Washington, D.C., Jan. 20, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged General Re Corporation for its involvement in separate schemes by American International Group (AIG) and Prudential Financial, Inc. to manipulate and falsify their reported financial results.
Gen Re agreed to pay $12.2 million to settle the SEC’s charges. In addition, in a non-prosecution agreement announced today by the Department of Justice in connection with a related criminal investigation of Gen Re’s transactions with AIG, Gen Re agreed to pay $19.5 million to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Consumer Fraud Fund. Gen Re also agreed to pay $60.5 million through a civil class action settlement to AIG’s injured shareholders. Gen Re previously forfeited to the government approximately $5 million in fees it earned for its participation in the scheme with AIG.
“Gen Re arranged to sell financial products to AIG and Prudential for the sole purpose of enabling those companies to manipulate their accounting results and mislead investors,” said Andrew M. Calamari, Associate Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office.
The SEC previously charged AIG with securities fraud and improper accounting, and the company settled the charges by paying more than $800 million among other remedies. The SEC also previously charged AIG former chairman Maurice R. “Hank” Greenberg and former chief financial officer Howard I. Smith, as well as former senior executives of Gen Re for their roles in connection with the scheme with AIG. The Commission separately charged Prudential with securities laws violations in 2008.
According to the SEC’s complaint against Gen Re, filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, a foreign subsidiary of Gen Re entered into two sham “reinsurance” transactions with AIG in 2000 to improperly allow AIG to reverse the declining reserve trend and falsely report additions to both loss reserves and premiums written. Senior officials at Gen Re helped AIG structure the two sham transactions. The contracts show reinsurance transactions that appeared to transfer risk to AIG, but the transactions did not transfer risk.
The SEC further alleges that Gen Re separately entered into a series of sham reinsurance contracts with Prudential’s property and casualty division from 1997 to 2002. The contracts had no economic substance and purpose other than to allow Prudential to build up and then draw down on an off-balance sheet asset or “finite bank” parked with Gen Re. As a result of the sham transactions, Prudential improperly recognized more than $200 million in revenues in 2000, 2001, and 2002. Gen Re received fees totaling $8.1 million for structuring and executing the scheme with Prudential.
In determining to accept Gen Re’s settlement offer, the SEC took Gen Re’s remediation efforts and cooperation into account. Among the efforts SEC considered: Gen Re’s comprehensive, independent review of its operations conducted at the outset of the government’s investigations the results of which were shared with investigators; Gen Re’s substantial assistance in the government’s successful civil and criminal actions against individuals involved in the scheme with AIG; and Gen Re’s internal corporate reforms designed to strengthen oversight of its operations. Those reforms entail dissolving a subsidiary involved with the AIG transactions, appointing an independent director to its Board of Directors, forming a committee consisting of senior managers to review and approve complex transactions, requiring legal review of proposed finite or loss mitigation contracts, and fortifying its internal audit functions and underwriting rules. The settlement is subject to court approval.
The Commission appreciates the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in this matter.
# # #
For more information about this enforcement action, contact:
Andrew M. Calamari Associate Director, SEC’s New York Regional Office (212) 336-0042
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-10.htm
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CONTINUED AT...
http://sites.google.com/site/thecatbirdsnest/home/general-re-s-vampires
January 7, 2010
Tim Geithner's NY Fed told AIG to keep
quiet about $105bn paid to banks
Tim Geithner's Federal Reserve Bank of New York urged American International Group (AIG) to remain silent on $105bn (£65bn) of payments made to banks including Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank at the height of the financial crisis.
By James Quinn, US Business Editor
Tim Geithner's Federal Reserve Bank of New York urged AIG to remain silent on $105bn of payments made to banks in the financial crisis
The New York Fed, under Mr Geithner's leadership until he was appointed US Treasury Secretary in January 2009, instructed the troubled insurer to withhold details of the payments from the American public, which bailed out AIG by as much as $182bn at its financial nadir.
According to a series of emails obtained and made public by Congressman Darrell Issa, AIG had planned to inform investors in a regulatory filing published on December 24, 2008, that it had paid counter-party banks owed money at a rate of 100 cents on the dollar. The banks were owed the money for credit-default swaps they had entered into, mainly on behalf of clients.
However, according to the emails, an official from the NY Fed crossed out the reference ahead of publication, and there was no mention of the payments, which came to light five months later, in the filing.
"It appears that the New York Fed deliberately pressured AIG to restrict and delay the disclosure of important information," said Congressman Issa.
Publication of the potentially embarrassing emails comes two months after it emerged that it was the New York Fed that was behind a decision to pay the banks in full, rather than at a discounted rate.
"Our position has always been that if AIG's securities lawyers determine that AIG is legally obligated to make a particular filing or disclosure, then that is what AIG must do," said a spokesman for the New York Fed.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/insurance/6948020/AIG-told-to-keep-quiet-about-payments.html
* * *
RELATED STORIES
Tim Geithner comes under fresh pressure over AIG revelations
Geithner called to explain AIG bailout secrecy
AIG continues to be headache for Tim Geithner - Jan. 7, 2010
The 15 Most Hated Companies In America
Posted: January 5, 2010 at 9:01 am

Customers, employees, shareholders, and taxpayers hate large corporations for many reasons. 24/7 Wall St. has looked at many of these issues to choose the 15 most hated companies in America. We evaluated each company based on five criteria. First, employee impressions, using research firm Glassdoor and other services, were reviewed. Second, we considered total return to shareholders from these companies over one-year, two-year and five-year periods, compared to the broad market and other companies within the same sector. Several firms on our list are not public. Third, customer satisfaction numbers and reputation figures were analyzed from a broad array of sources, including Consumer Reports, JD Power, the MSN/Zogby poll, Vanno, and the University of Michigan American Customer Satisfaction Index were examined. Fourth, brand valuation changes were also reviewed based on data from Corebrands, Interbrand, and Brand Z. Finally, the views of taxpayers, Congress and the Administration of these companies were considered where applicable.
24/7 Wall St. analyzed data on hundreds of companies to produce this final 15...
Several companies which seem to belong on the on this list due to recent news, particularly Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) and AT&T (NYSE:T), are not there. Goldman was inundated by negative publicity because taxpayers and Congress are concerned that the bank’s pay packages are far too generous. But, Goldman has done a very good job for most of its customers. Its stock has nearly doubled over the past year. Goldman’s employees, particularly those who are rich because of their tenure at the firm, are great supporters of the bank...
Here is the list in rank order starting with AIG, the most hated company in America:
1. AIG (NYSE:AIG) is the most hated company in America. Taxpayers despise the firm because it received nearly $180 billion in government aid. AIG has fired enough people and operates under such pressure to turn around its operations that employee morale is understandably low. The firm’s brand is worth so little that some of its divisions have aggressively begun to market themselves under names other than AIG. Vanno’s company reputation index puts AIG as No. 5585 among the 6075 firms that it measures. AIG’s market cap lost over 99% of its value during the last two years, virtually wiping out the firm’s equity investors. CEO Robert Benmosche pressed for a rich pay package while his predecessor worked for $1...
http://247wallst.com/2010/01/05/the-15-most-hated-companies-in-america/
11-17-09
The authoritative new narrative describes how, while bailing out insurance giant AIG last fall, a team led by Geithner failed nearly every step of the way.
Instead of bargaining with AIG's numerous counterparties to resolve its billions of dollars in souring derivatives contracts, Geithner's team ended up paying top dollar for toxic assets -- "an amount far above their market value at the time," the report notes.
"There is no question that the effect of FRBNY's decisions -- indeed, the very design of the federal assistance to AIG -- was that tens of billions of dollars of Government money was funneled inexorably and directly to AIG's counterparties," the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program said.
Wall Street firms like Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Wachovia got full value for their derivatives contracts with AIG, and taxpayers got the bill. In total, $27.1 billion of public money was transferred to companies that did business with AIG.
Throughout the bailout of AIG, the report says, the New York Fed failed to develop appropriate contingency plans; failed to properly assess the impact of its decisions; and generally engaged in negotiation strategies that were doomed to fail.
Then, after Geithner's team paid off AIG's counterparties on Wall Street, it imposed "onerous" terms on the troubled insurer, the report says.
"[T]he decision to acquire a controlling interest in one of the world's most complex and most troubled corporations was done with almost no independent consideration of the terms of the transaction or the impact that those terms might have on the future of AIG," the report finds.
Geithner, now the nation's chief financial officer, just didn't bargain hard enough with Wall Street's biggest companies, the report concludes:
[T]he refusal of FRBNY and the Federal Reserve to use their considerable leverage as the primary regulators for several of the counterparties, including the emphasis that their participation in the negotiations was purely "voluntary," made the possibility of obtaining concessions from those counterparties extremely remote. While there can be no doubt that a regulators' inherent leverage over a regulated entity must be used appropriately, and could in certain circumstances be abused, in other instances in this financial crisis regulators (including the Federal Reserve) have used overtly coercive language to convince financial institutions to take or forego certain actions. As SIGTARP reported in its audit of the initial Capital Purchase Program investments, for example, Treasury and the Federal Reserve were fully prepared to use their leverage as regulators to compel the nine largest financial institutions (including some of AIG's counterparties) to accept $125 billion of TARP funding and to pressure Bank of America to conclude its merger with Merrill Lynch. Similarly, it has been widely reported that the Government, while arguably acting on behalf of General Motors and Chrysler, took an active role in negotiating substantial concessions from the creditors of those companies.
Meanwhile, the Fed was attempting to keep the details of AIG's counterparties hidden from public view -- another big mistake, according to the report:
The now familiar argument from Government officials about the dire consequences of basic transparency, as advocated by the Federal Reserve...once again simply does not withstand scrutiny. Federal Reserve officials initially refused to disclose the identities of the counterparties or the details of the payments, warning that disclosure of the names would undermine AIG's stability, the privacy and business interests of the counterparties, and the stability of the markets.
After public and Congressional pressure, AIG disclosed the identities. Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve's warnings, the sky did not fall; there is no indication that AIG's disclosure undermined the stability of AIG or the market or damaged legitimate interests of the counterparties. The lesson that should be learned -- one that has been made apparent time after time in the Government's response to the financial crisis -- is that the default position, whenever Government funds are deployed in a crisis to support markets or institutions, should be that the public is entitled to know what is being done with Government funds.
While SIGTARP acknowledges that there might be circumstances in which the public's right to know what its Government is doing should be circumscribed, those instances should be very few and very far between...
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/16/aig-bailout-government-ov_n_359919.html
Who Is A.I.G. And Why Should You Care?
By Mike Ruppert (2001)
Posted on September 16, 2008 by dandelionsalad
Dandelion Salad
An Investigative Series, By Mike Ruppert, 2001
Speaking Truth to Power
Tuesday, 16 September 2008
["It is in our national interest that A.I.G. survive," says former AIG Chairman, Hank Greenberg. But just who and what is AIG? And why is it important to know? This is Part One of Mike Ruppert's 2001 investigative series on an enormous player in Wall Street's drug money laundering scam. Drug money, Ruppert has demonstrated, has kept the markets from crashing for many years. Now however, it appears that "plunge protection" is in over its head, and no amount of laundered cash can prevent the inevitable that is taking place before our eyes, namely, the collapse of A.I.G. and the U.S. financial system itself.--CB]
Reprinted from FROM THE WILDERNESS
Carlos Lehder
[Part One of a Multi-Part Series]
by Michael C. Ruppert
[© Copyright 2001, Michael C. Ruppert and From the Wilderness Publications. All Rights Reserved. Part I ONLY may be copied and redistributed for non-profit purposes only. All subsequent parts may be copied or distributed only with express written consent of the author. ] ...
This series is dedicated to Mark Swaney of the Ozark Gazette for his intellectual courage and tenacity; to John McGlaughlin, the straightest and toughest man who ever honestly carried a badge; to Celerino Castillo III, with a heart bigger than his beloved Texas; to all the young men and women, mostly minority, who are serving up to life in prison for crimes that don’t remotely compare to those of Carlos Lehder, and to all the innocents in Colombia who stand at the brink of the next Vietnam War.
———–
But perhaps most importantly it is about the lies that the American people tell themselves each day as they drown in a sea of denial, worried about their pension plans, investments and careers, needing to deny the fact that the so-called war on drugs is a flimsy house of cards that consumes millions of innocent lives every year. It is a story about the lies told by the major media that chooses to ignore the reality of hard documentation about CIA involvement in the drug trade. If there is a common thread to this story it is the fact that lies make us all hostages of our own fears and failings. Eventually these lies entangle us to the point where even the slightest movement becomes impossible and, being unable to move, we sink and we drown – all the while looking for someone else to blame.
Denial is not a river in Egypt.
Carlos Enrique Lehder Rivas, aka Carlos Lehder, is the stuff of which legends are made. Legends are sometimes good, sometimes bad. As is the case with most legends there is a beautiful woman involved. There is also intrigue, crime, violence, corruption and betrayal. But legends, when examined closely, almost always tell more about the civilizations that create them than they do about the one who carries the name. Carlos Lehder is not a Colombian legend. He is an American legend. It is America that created him. America that made him rich. America where he began his criminal life. America where he was imprisoned and America that, it now appears, has set him free. It is America’s shame that Lehder’s freedom, if established, and alleged employment by the U.S. Government, are hidden behind lies told, not by Lehder himself, but by the American government to its own people.
In 1979-80, reportedly with the assistance of the CIA and legendary drug smuggler Barry Seal, Lehder co-founded the Medellin Cartel with Pablo Escobar and brothers Fabio and Jorge Ochoa. As celebrated on CNN and by recent books like Killing Pablo (Mark Bowden, 2001), Pablo Escobar was gunned down in a hail of Colombian bullets directed by U.S. intelligence in December, 1993. The Ochoas have faded into the jungle-like vortex of Latin American lore although an October 1999 Reuters story indicated that Fabio Ochoa had been arrested (again) in Bogota. Word of his promised extradition to the U.S. has been hard to find. Carlos Lehder remains the only cartel head to have ever been extradited to, then tried, convicted and sentenced to life plus 135 years in, the United States. Prosecutors agree that Panamanian strongman General Manuel Antonio Noriega – against whom Lehder testified in return for a reduced sentence of 55 “non-paroleable” years in 1989 – was merely one of Lehder’s employees.
Other new material indicating that Lehder, after his 1987 arrest and extradition, provided information to the DEA that assisted in Escobar’s downfall has been characterized by his prosecutor, former US Attorney Robert Merkle, as nearly worthless. “That’s BS. We didn’t need his help to get Escobar,” says Merkle.
As disclosed in this first of a series of special reports, I have now amassed a sizeable body of documents, records, witness statements and even a tape recording of Lehder’s alleged wife indicating that Carlos Lehder is a free man who has kept his money, who travels the world freely and who makes a mockery of any notion that he might be a federally protected witness – hiding to ensure his safety or the safety of his family. One telling clue to Lehder’s apparent lack of fear is the fact that he is listed by name in 411 directory assistance in La Fayette, California, just outside San Francisco. My researcher, while looking for other information, came across the listing and sent it to me. I was able to confirm it as a listing for the Carlos Lehder – not a coincidence – through confidential sources who know Lehder’s self-professed wife, Coral Marie Talavera Baca Lehder. And I have spoken to Coral by calling her at that number myself. Mrs. Lehder was, until June 22, a manager for the insurance giant AIG in San Francisco.
[Subsequent segments of this special series will focus on investigations into allegations of money laundering by AIG with and through the Arkansas Development Financial Authority in 1987 - the same year Lehder was originally captured].
I had lunch with Coral two days before she resigned. When I called her San Francisco office the following Monday, June 25, a company receptionist told me that she had, “Gone to Cuba.”...
Just hours before this issue needed to be at the printer’s, an e-mail arrived indicating that Lehder’s current attorney (I do not know the name) had just stated that Lehder was definitely in prison, answered the phone promptly when called there, had never been married and had allegedly stated that he had never heard of Coral Baca — by any name. She was a fraud. At the same time I have been told that the attorney may not identify himself to me and probably will not make Lehder available for an interview. This possible attempt by unnamed sources to delay publication of this story will be thoroughly investigated for Part II of this series.
“I’ve been speculating for years that Lehder was free Why am I not surprised? If Lehder is out of jail I would be extremely disappointed. It would send some very bad signals. It’s pretty tragic. There’s a lot of kids in jail for the rest of their lives — I’m talking kids — and a lot of them are minorities for insignificant drug offenses compared to what he did,” says Lehder prosecutor and former US Attorney Robert Merkle. According to various news sources at the time of his arrest in 1987 Lehder, then 37, was reported to be worth between $2.5 and $3 billion. Throughout the early 1980s his airstrip at Norman’s Cay in the Bahamas was receiving cocaine flights from Colombia, every hour on the hour, and transferring the loads to smaller planes for distribution throughout the US.
Pittsburgh-Post Gazette reporter Bill Moushey, who has perhaps spent more time tracking Lehder than any American journalist, wrote in 1996, ” In it [a 1987 federal detention order] the U.S. government says Lehder and others were responsible for assassinating Colombia’s Justice Minister in 1984; for the 1985 armed attack on Colombia’s Supreme Court building that killed 11 justices and 84 other people; for assassinating two newspaper editors in Colombia and 26 other journalists; for shooting the Colombian ambassador to Hungary in 1987; and for a long list of murders of police officers, informants and other government officials.”...
I have since talked nearly a dozen reporters, prosecutors and others connected to the case. At the same time that they protest that they have received Christmas cards, letters and even phone calls from Lehder indicating that he is still in prison they all – every one of them – have confessed their secret suspicions of a charade intended to fool them and hide a very dark secret. And all of them, without exception, agree that if Lehder is walking free it is time to find him and tell the American people about it.
Days of Glory – Days of Shame
I first became aware of Carlos Lehder’s possible freedom in the Spring of 1997, not long after I had confronted CIA Director John Deutch on television and stated that there was direct proof of CIA involvement in the drug trade. Dick Gregory, the comedian, later told me that he had learned first hand that my confrontation with Deutch, and Deutch’s poor handling of the situation, had cost Deutch a certain appointment as Secretary of Defense the following month. I was something of a small-time celebrity afterwards. At that time, however, those of us like retired DEA Agent Celerino Castillo, a Bronze Star recipient from Vietnam who has devoted his life to exposing CIA drug connections in the eighties, stood downstage from Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Gary Webb whose August 96 Dark Alliance series in The San Jose Mercury News had inflamed the nation with its allegations of direct CIA connections to the Contras in Nicaragua and drug trafficking in LA....
On June 28, 1998, just about two weeks after Webb’s book Dark Alliance had been released I was invited to attend a fund raiser at the Beverly Hills home of Producer Jamie Otis and organized in part by Patrick Fourmy who did the videography and arranged hotel accommodations. The purpose of the “gala” event featuring Webb as a speaker, was to raise funds for “citizen’s tribunals” to be conducted by the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. I had just finished reading Webb’s book and found it to be ground-breaking and well documented. In the first pages of Dark Alliance Webb wrote about his first meeting with Coral Talavera Baca, the woman now known as Mrs. Carlos Lehder....
Earlier, on page 4, Webb had written that Coral worked for a law firm. What he did not report was that the law firm was solely devoted to legal work for AIG and that AIG had long standing ties to the CIA. Rather than reporting that Talavera was engaged to Lehder — which he claims he could not establish — Webb wrote in Dark Alliance that she was the “girlfriend” of convicted San Francisco Bay Area drug dealer Rafael Cornejo.
The night of June 28 and the following day can best be described as surreal. Coral and Webb arrived together and she stood by him as he spoke that night. She looked more elegant than Webb had described and she was truly stunning. Fourmy, who was busy with cables and cameras kept pointing her out and saying, “she’s engaged to Carlos Lehder. I introduced them.” Fourmy spent much time that night with crime writer and author Joseph Bosco who made a strange statement to me towards the end of the evening. “Gary Webb should be ashamed of himself for what he did to Coral.” I have been unable to find out what Bosco meant.
Fourmy, Bosco, Castillo and Coral were all staying at the Beverly Garland Howard Johnson’s in North Hollywood California. Although I was briefly introduced to Baca [I use the names Talavera and Baca interchangeably to reflect how she was addressed in various settings] just before she left the event in a taxi cab, and didn’t quite know what to say, it turns out that she was more forthcoming in a conversation with Castillo. Just days after the event Castillo called me and told me what she said that night and the following day. He has since reconfirmed those statements for this story.
“I remember that I was introduced to her by Fourmy,” says the retired DEA agent who has served in Peru and Central America. “She said, straight out, that she was engaged to Carlos Lehder I couldn’t believe it! What was she doing here? I asked her, ‘What’s Carlos doing now?’ and she said, ‘Oh, he’s out of jail and selling drugs to the Russians for the CIA.’...
Robert Merkle — “I know that Lehder, right after he was arrested, tried to cut a deal directly with [then Vice President George H.W.] Bush and the FBI – which conversations I was excluded from There’s a lot of stuff that went on that was questionable I’ve been speculating for years that Lehder was free but I figured he’d be in Germany or some tax haven with his money, which he still has. One of the major things that was a red flag in terms of indicating that he made a deal was that Lehder wasn’t required to turn over his assets. There was essentially nothing seized in that case and the guy made millions of dollars. If I’m a U.S. Attorney or an Attorney General and the only member of the Medellin Cartel to be prosecuted in the US, facing life plus 120 years in jail, wants a deal, the first thing he’s going to talk to me about is money. What banks? Where are they located?”...
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In June, 2001 I traveled to San Antonio Texas where I met Castillo and obtained a copy of one of his “Baca” tapes. He says there are others he is holding as “insurance against any challenges against me” and that the one he provided me has had certain sections of the conversation removed for the same reason. [Beginning in August 2001 I will place selected excerpts of this tape, converted to MP3 format, on the From The Wilderness web site at www.copvcia.com. -- See Investigation Notes at the end of this story.] Having spoken to her on the phone several times since January 2001 I instantly recognized the voice on the tape. It was definitely the Coral that I had met....
A Paper Trail
Far from being silent about Talavera’s relationship with Lehder I had written about it in January of 1999. I had been puzzled as to why no one in “the anti-CIA drugs movement” seemed to think it noteworthy. It was known to at least a dozen people that I was aware of. It was “sticky” to me, oozing with a kind of dysfunctionality found in families that conceal child abuse.
Information developing around the then pending Clinton impeachment had led me to suspect an alliance between the Medellin Cartel’s genius of transportation and Arkansas’ genius of money and political power, Bill Clinton. [See Parts II and III of this series.] My writing on this subject (available at www.copvcia.com) had drawn an angry January 7, 1999 letter from Talavera’s attorney. I made a correction stating that at the time of the Dark Alliance stories Talavera was probably not married to Lehder when she went to Webb but that she was indeed his fiancée. What I found interesting in the letter was that Baca’s attorney, David Secrest, had written, “We also demand that you immediately take all steps necessary to respect Ms. Baca’s privacy and anonymity, as did the Dept. of Justice and the CIA in their respective reports.” Why were those agencies been deferential to her? If she was a fraud, couldn’t they discover it? My only error, since scrupulously corrected for this story, was in not seeking her comment before writing. I could have.
I stand by that story and no lawsuit has ever materialized. [The letter may be viewed at www.copvcia.com .]...
Other documents, in particular an undated two-page “Report of Investigation (Law Enforcement)” from the U.S. Treasury Special Agent In Charge, San Francisco District Office (possibly the IRS), appeared credible but remained unverified. The “Treasury” report, which was later to become very important to this story was, in November 2000 — after seven phone calls, a fax, a Fedex package and much delay, evaluated by Treasury Dept. spokesman John D’Angelo. He told me, “I have not been able to figure out what this report is. I can’t figure it out. Things don’t match. It looks like something that was used at one time.” That decidedly unsatisfying response had come after Treasury spokespersons had advised that I contact each of Treasury’s component agencies (IRS, Customs, Secret Service and the ATF) for comment. Of course, each of those agencies had referred me back to where I had started.
What was so compelling about the Treasury report was that it contained a wealth of information on the Lehders that was to be subsequently confirmed by Talavera herself. More damning is the fact that in June 2001 I secured confirmation from a confidential source close to the Lehders that the document was authentic. Then, a former senior paralegal who had worked on Lehder’s appeals efforts (speaking on condition of anonymity) found it to be possibly authentic and “consistent with other government documents I have reviewed in the case.” Just to be sure I asked the paralegal for a place to check the paralegal’s credentials vis a vis Lehder. That was instantly provided and credible confirmation was instantly given. “Kincaid,” as I have named the source, had worked for a law firm representing Lehder and knew him personally.
The Treasury report stated that in 1987 (when she was 23) — the same year that Lehder was captured and would have begun hiding his assets — Talavera had founded a “Bohemian” company called Capital Investment Group (CIG) with an initial capitalization of $10 million. By 1997 the estimated worth of CIG was listed as $132 million. In financial parlance a “Bohemian corporation” is a company founded by two parent companies, located in two different countries, in yet a third country. This is usually done for the purposes of avoiding regulation by tax or legal authorities. The first thing I had done after receipt of this document in the summer of 1999 was to ask my researcher to pull the files on Capital Investment Group at the Secretary of State’s office in Sacramento and send them to me.
Among other things, the Treasury report says that Carlos Lehder was an employee of the Treasury and a free man.
Another document, typeset like a news story but well sanitized to remove the publication name or date was titled “Beauty And The Beast.” It read, “Just three days after the birth of her son, Carlo Rafael, the lovely Coral Lehder, adorned the arm of her husband, one-time Medellin cartel cocaine kingpin Carlos Lehder, during St. Jude’s Children’s Hospital annual benefit where Mrs. Lehder was honored for her exemplary work with underprivileged children.
“When asked to comment on the recent birth of his son, Mr. Lehder coyly remarked, “Once again it appears I have received a lot of quid [gesturing to his wife] for very little pro quo. America, where anything is possible. Even a beauty like that loving a wretch like me,” The quid pro quo statement rang a bell. I checked my files and found a June 15, 1996 story by reporter Bill Moushey that quoted prosecutor Merkle as stating that Lehder “received a very large quid for a very small quo.” Sources familiar with Lehder and his speech patterns have indicated that he has never been this eloquent and never uses Latin. But could he have been taking a subtle, mocking swipe at the man who had tried to put him away? In the quote the Latin grammar was butchered. He should have said quo, instead of pro quo.
On the lower right hand portion of the page a photo of a reclining Coral bore the caption, “There’s a lot more to being good looking than make up and prettiness. There’s a lot more to being a woman than that. When I look in the mirror, I just want to like myself. And if I like myself, then I look good.” — Coral Lehder....
Still the faked documents forced me to put the investigation on hold. It was not until January of 2000, when the fax machine received an unsourced newspaper photo caption stating that Talavera had served as a technical advisor on the movie Traffic, that I reached out to Talavera directly to find out what the hell was going on. The Traffic clip had particularly offended me because I had been meeting and talking during the preceding weeks with the personal manager (Patrick Dollard of Propaganda Films) for Traffic’s director, Steven Soderbergh. I knew that Coral had nothing to do with the film. Arriving with the Traffic clip was another document the government already knew I had and knew that I knew was a fake.
So, in January I contacted Coral to ask about the documents. I wanted as much to know who had sent them and why as to find out whether they were real. That contact led to a number of private conversations in which I was satisfied that the sender had intended personal harm to Coral and possibly to me if I published them. Lacking the ability to further authenticate those documents that I believed to be accurate, I assured Coral that I had no intentions of going to press or discussing personal information she had revealed in helping me check them out. I have since learned that several other journalists had received many of the same documents and withheld them for the same reasons. Curiously, however, none seem to have received the Treasury report.
It was during this period that I first learned of Talavera’s employment by the American International Group (AIG) in San Francisco. She had given me contact numbers at her San Francisco office and sent e-mails and faxes so indicating. Included was a February 13, 2001 fax sent unsolicited to me and author Peter Dale Scott, PhD, Professor Emeritus at UC Berkeley. The cover sheet had a letterhead in the name of Coral Marie Talavera Baca and showed a street address at Two Rincon Center. This is the address of the AIG building in San Francisco. The cover sheet showed a return e-mail address of Coral.Talavera@AIG.com. This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it The heading read, “RE: Penthouse article re: Carlos/Atlantic Monthly article.”
The message on the cover sheet said, “Dear Peter and Michael: Attached please find The Atlantic Monthly article regarding the CIA, which I am passing along for your pleasure. I got a good chuckle out of it hope you both do also. It’s nice to know that others find humor in the CIA’s incompetence. — Regards, Coral.”
[NOTE: This document, the Treasury report, and other on-the-record e-mails concerning this investigation and confirming a June 20 lunch date for Talavera and me can be viewed on my web site at www.copvcia.com . Go to the section for this series of special reports and, from the Table of Contents, click on "Support Documentation."]
Coral Reinsurance
In the Spring of 2001 I was checking my e-mails when I opened one from a colleague that immediately caught my attention. It was titled “Google Search for AIG + Goldman + Harvard.” Several themes immediately sprang to mind. First, I was aware that Coral was a manager at an American International Group (AIG) legal office in San Francisco. Coral’s name was the same as the subject of the story attached to my e-mail. Secondly I had, through my newsletter From The Wilderness (FTW), been writing for many months about the roles played by Goldman Sachs, its past President, Robert Rubin (former US Treasury Secretary) and The Harvard Endowment in the massive looting of Russia — to the tune of as much as $300 billion — during the 1990s. [This tragedy has been compellingly documented by journalist Anne Williamson. Information on Williamson's writings can be found at www.newsmakingnews.com. Her forthcoming book on the subject, Contagion, is to be published in serial form by SRA Associates in London.]
The extract attached to the e-mail described a suspicious relationship in 1987 between AIG, the Arkansas Development Financial Authority (ADFA) and Goldman Sachs, then headed by Rubin, to found an offshore (Barbados) reinsurance company named Coral Reinsurance. (Reinsurance is simply the insuring of one insurance company by another to spread risk).
According to a confidential Goldman Sachs stock placement memorandum dated December 1, 1987, which I have since obtained, Coral Re, as it is known, was founded by AIG. All potential investors, including the State of Arkansas’ ADFA, were bound to return or destroy the memorandum if they did not participate. Coral Re was clearly an AIG progeny and ADFA has been voluminously linked to allegations of drug money laundering in the 1980s. Moreover, there are also longstanding published links, some confirmed by CIA documents, between drug smuggling, Barry Seal, the Contras and the Medellin Cartel. All of those links joined at the Mena (Arkansas) Regional Intermountain Airport. [These subjects will be discussed in detail in Parts II and III of this series.]
This was something I had to investigate. I was aware of AIG/CIA ties dating back to the early fifties. From reading the full text of a 1995 story entitled Gray Money by journalist and mechanical engineer Mark Swaney I learned that the CEO of AIG, Maurice (Hank) Greenberg had also been a candidate to become CIA Director in 1995. Greenberg is also the former Chairman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
In a number of e-mails, phone conversations and one face to face meeting Talavera consistently denied that she, her husband Carlos Lehder, or their good friend, fugitive financier Robert Vesco, had any connections of any kind to Coral Reinsurance. Notwithstanding that my investigation into that possible connection continues. If she is officially labeled as a fraud what then does one make of her denials about Coral Reinsurance? Of AIG as her confirmed employer? On June 12 she e-mailed, “Carlos is in no way, shape or form had/has anything to do with Coral Reinsurance and or AIG’s involvement in same.
“Let me save you the next question. Robert Vesco had/has nothing to do with the above either. [I had never mentioned to her that I knew about Vesco.] Let me go one step further. No one that I know had/has anything to do with Coral Reinsurance and/or AIG’s involvement in same.
Coral later agreed to meet me for lunch on Wednesday June 20, across the street from her San Francisco office. Before leaving for San Francisco I had occasion to speak to an AIG spokesman, Michael Murphy of Bermuda, said by many in the insurance business to be Hank Greenberg’s right-hand man. To my question regarding Coral’s status as the wife of Lehder Murphy responded, “I asked her the question whether that was her past and she said that she really preferred not to discuss her personal affairs in a company situation. I didn’t want to pry into her life.”
The Russians Are Here
I went up to San Francisco a day early. With the Secretary of State documents in hand I went to see what I could find out about Capital Investment Group (CIG). Its address, 601 Gateway Blvd. is a new, large, approximately ten story office building near the San Francisco airport. The incorporation papers showed that CIG had been there for at least three years until their corporate filings ceased in 1997. I poked around until I found someone on the building staff who had been there in the mid 90s.
“Oh yeah,” said the building employee who asked that I not use his name. “I remember the Russians. There was Boris and Vladimir and Natasha.” He laughed. “Real thick accents. They treated the eighth floor like it was Russian territory. Everyone knew about the Russians. The FBI came and were investigating them. They said they might be KGB.”
The employee remembered one other thing. “They had so many extension chords running into so many computers that they blew the fuses in the building six times a day. Everyone was complaining about them. They left in 96 I think. I have no idea where they went after that.”
Doing Lunch
Don’t laugh. The name of the restaurant where Coral and I had lunch was The Red Herring. I stood waiting for her out front at noon. She came across Steuart Street wearing a black dress and pearls. She was and remains every bit as lovely as I had remembered. But during the lunch, I found her to be more elegant than vixen, more intelligent than bimbo, more loyal to her husband Carlos Lehder and much more “savvy” than Gary Webb’s description had led me to expect. She declined to answer any on-the-record questions about the status or current activities of her husband or her family. The purpose of the lunch was to thank me for not publishing the faked documents and to discuss Coral Reinsurance.
Coral repeated all of her earlier categorical denials of any involvement with Coral Reinsurance. The same went for Carlos and Vesco. She stressed that Lehder had absolutely nothing to do with the drug business any more. A question about Capital Investment Group’s possible involvement got her agitated after I told her what I had discovered at Gateway Blvd. the day before.
“The last thing I need is to be connected with any Russians!,” she said. “My Capital Investment Group is in the Bahamas. I fund an orphanage with it. That’s all,” she said. I produced a copy of the Treasury report and she went through it line by line looking for information about CIG. While not confirming that report was authentic she did not dispute any information it contained with one exception. She confirmed that the aliases of Coral Marie Talavera, Coral Marie Baca and Coral Marie Lehder were correct. The date of birth was correct. The relationship with Lehder (the employee) and Talavera (the subject) was at least 18 years old. She breathed a sigh of relief to read the information showing Capital Investment Group having been founded by her in 1987 and agreed with the statement that she and Lehder were the only shareholders. An entry indicating that in 1995 she had been instrumental in negotiating Lehder’s release from the Bureau of Prisons drew a nod. She made no comment about the fact that the report showed that she had been investigated by the FBI, Department of Justice, Department of Defense and the CIA by means of traditional investigation, “wiretaps” and informants.” She also did not question the fact that the report showed her and Lehder as having multiple residences in Oakland California; San Francisco; Boca Chica, Florida; Salinas Ecuador; and Great Exuma, the Bahamas. Her net worth was conservatively “estimated” at $7,369,024.
The only item on the report she disputed was a statement indicating that she might possibly be Lehder’s adopted daughter. That made her angry.
Turning back to Capital Investment Group she said, “Capital Investment Group is my company. But I work for AIG. My company has nothing to do with these Russians. This Coral Reinsurance is a good story. You should go after it.” I remembered that in an earlier conversation where she was giving me on-the-record quotes about her non-involvement with Coral Reinsurance she had said that reinsurance was a great way to launder money.
Coral told me that she was planning on leaving AIG in December. That, she said, had nothing to do with my work on Coral Reinsurance. We then talked about the painful experiences I had had many years ago when, as a young policeman in 1976, I had fallen in love with a female CIA agent and come across evidence of CIA involvement in the drug trade. My refusal to go along with her work cost me the relationship and my attempts to expose CIA wrongdoing had cost me my career. I remarked that my lover had been every bit as beautiful as Coral. I had been left with an obsession that had lasted for many years. As we left the restaurant Coral turned to me sympathetically and said, “Who knows. Maybe one day there’ll be a knock at your door.”
As I shook her hand goodbye I answered, “I’ve worked through that… I would be immune now.”
During the lunch I mentioned the fact that someone connected with Carlos’ defense (Kincaid) was trying to reach him and I mentioned the name. This is the senior paralegal who has given me information for this story. After the lunch I sent an e-mail to Coral saying that I had given the paralegal Coral’s office number and that she would be calling. I had no wish to interfere with attorney-client privilege.
The following Monday Kincaid called me at my Sherman Oaks office and told me that Coral had resigned on Friday, two days after our lunch and gone to Cuba. An immediate call to the receptionist confirmed this. Coral was gone.
Official Responses
The FBI — A spokesman for the San Francisco Office of the FBI stated that he is unaware of any such (wiretap or e-mail) investigation.”
The Department of Justice — Asked on June 28th to state whether or not Carlos Lehder is still in prison and/or a member of the Witness Security program or whether he was an employee of the U.S. government, spokeswoman Susan Dryden stated that she would look into it and have someone call me back as soon as possible. As of press time a week later, no one has called me back.
The Treasury — After three phone calls and voice mail messages resulting in no response, Treasury spokesperson Tasia Scolinos stated on June 29th that she did not know the John D’Angelo whom I had spoken to last November and did could not find the material I had sent him then. I found this strange since she gave me the same phone number I had used to reach D’Angelo and she had replaced him. She asked me to write a detailed request for the information I was seeking (which I did) and send her another fax of the document (which I did). She then suggested that, because the document had been stamped “Sealed by the Court” that I visit each court house in the San Francisco Bay area to see if I could find the file. She would consult an attorney at Treasury and get back to me. As of press time I have received no further response.
Question: If, after this story breaks, the Department of Justice holds a press conference and invites CNN and TIME into a prison to interview and photograph Carlos Lehder, will anyone believe that he will still be there the next day?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: – Special thanks to: Mark Swaney, Al Giordano, Lois, Lara Johnson, Linda Minor, Dave Hendrix, Marc Harris, Kincaid, and Peter Dale Scott.
See Fed nears a deal to take over ailing AIG
http://dandelionsalad.wordpress.com/2008/09/16/who-is-aig-and-why-should-you-care-by-mike-ruppert-2001/
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American International Group (AIG)
Company Snapshot:
Before it collapsed, AIG, as measured by asset value, was the largest insurer in the world. But in September 2008, after its credit rating went down, AIG was caught without enough collateral for the credit default swaps it had sold to banks around the world, and was forced to accept a massive federal bailout package in order to forestall a collapse. As the size of the company's debts have grown, the U.S. government has readjusted the terms of the bailout, and gradually begun to take over parts of the company. A confidential AIG memo leaked to the press warns of systemic risk if AIG collapses, and pegged the notional value of its derivatives exposures at $1.6 trillion.
Number of employees worldwide: 116,000 (2007)
Chief executive officer: Edward M. Liddy (since 9/17/08)
2008 Global Fortune 500 rank: Not ranked (9th in 2005)
Net Income: $ US 8.9 billion
Total revenue: $ US 110 billion Corporate accountability
Accountability overview:
AIG's recent troubles started in the mid-2000s, when it was the target of a series of fraud investigations that ultimately led to the forced resignation of Maurice Greenberg, the company's CEO and chairman for nearly 20 years.
An investigation initiated by New York's attorney general eventually resulted in a $1.6 billion fine ($1.15 after taxes) for AIG, and in criminal charges for some of its executives. The February 9, 2006 settlement resolved allegations that AIG. had participated in bid-rigging schemes and paid insurance brokers to steer business its way, used fraudulent insurance transactions to bolster the quality and quantity of its earnings and underreported to state insurance departments the amounts of workers' compensation premiums it had collected, on which it owed taxes. In 2005, it restated its financial results for five years beginning in 2000, a period when improper accounting inflated the company's earnings by more than $3 billion. (Gretchen Morgenson, "A.I.G. Apologizes and Agrees to a $1.64 Billion Settlement," New York Times, 2/10/2006).
Greenberg's successor, Martin Sullivan, was forced to resign on June 15, 2008, after the company's stock began plunging on news of the company financial losses. On September 17, 2008, Sullivan's successor Robert B. Willumstad, who had chaired the board of directors since 2006, was quickly forced to step down. As one condition of a federal bailout of the firm, Edward M. Liddy replaced him.
By the end of 2008, AIG had borrowed at least $127.7 billion -- or 84% of the $152 billion the Federal Reserve had allotted to the company. (David Goldman, "AIG Bailout $127.7B and counting," CNNMoney.com, 12/30/2008) Analysts say the company plans to sell as many assets as it can to pay off the loans.
The federal government demanded a nearly 80% share of the company in exchange for high-interest loans. It also insisted on the firing of the company’s CEO (even though he had only been on the job for three months).
Although most of AIG's businesses were widely considered to be sound, the cancer that caused the company to collapse was initially located in a 500-person unit called AIG Financial Products, where a handful of traders reportedly sold trillions of dollars of credit-default swaps (essentially unregulated insurance policies) on piles of U.S. subprime mortgages. Companies contracted with AIGFP to provide insurance on a wide range of securities. Under the policy, if a bond didn’t pay, AIG would make up the loss.
The trouble began when AIG's Financial Products' London unit decided to insure “collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs -- pools of risky mortgage loans). The ratings agencies had initially graded many of these CDOs as highest quality, thereby allowing AIG to treat them as low risk bets for which it did not have to set aside much collateral. ). In 2008 as the housing bubble popped, the ratings began to be downgraded, and the company's collateral requirements rose rapidly.
AIGFP's London office did not have to abide by American insurance reserve requirements. Thus, derivative clerks and salespeople in London could sell as many products as they could write, without having to worry about the consequences. According to a Village Voice investigation the president of AIGF, "a tyrannical supersalesman named Joseph Cassano ... was an executive at Drexel Burnham Lambert" during the 1980s. Drexel was the brokerage firm where Michael Milken engineered the junk bond crisis. Cassano followed the lead of Howard Sosin, a former DBL trader who (as Michael Lewis later reported) "claimed to have a better model" for trading interest rate swaps. Sosin left AIG in 1993, taking $182 million with him.
Traders at AIGFP kept 30 to 35 percent of the profits (versus the 20 percent that is typical for hedge funds) without having to spend time raising money to post as collateral. (AIG traders had essentially unlimited capital on tap from the parent company.) After Sosin left, Tom Savage took over as CEO, with Cassano as deputy. Former traders described Cassano as a control freak and "bully" whose "judgment was clouded by his insecurity." Although AIG's rating dropped from AAA to AA the day after Hank Greenberg was forced to resign, Cassano continued to grow the company's business. According to one employee, by then the company's consumer loan piles were 95 percent U.S. subprime mortgages, and once they realized it, "AIGFP executives ... were shocked by how little actual thought or analysis seemed to underpin the subprime-mortgage machine: it was simply a bet that U.S. home prices would never fall." Shortly after 2005, Cassano and AIG decided it would no longer shoulder the risk for other banks, and the big Wall Street firms "solved the problem by taking the risk themselves," thereby keeping the "machine" going another two years.
Revenue from premiums for derivatives at AIGFP rose from $737 million in 1999 to $3.26 billion in 2005. "Cassano reportedly hectored ever-willing counterparties to "play the power game" -- in other words, gobble up all the credit derivatives backing CDOs that they could grab." (The Voice also reported that Cassano has retained ace white-collar crime attorney F. Joseph Warin.)
Although AIG executives had assured investors that AIG’s operations were nearly fail safe, when the housing market collapsed AIG suddenly found itself unable to raise enough money to cover its rapidly growing collateral obligations. After the company suddenly found itself teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, with no private investors willing to come to its aid, government officials quickly intervened, fearing that an AIG bankruptcy would cause the world’s financial system to collapse.
After the first bailout, it was revealed that AIG did not even know all of the CDOs it had insured. According to the Washington Post, Gerry Pasciucco, the Morgan Stanley vice chair hired to close the division, estimated that it had $2.7 trillion worth of swap contracts and positions, 50,000 outstanding trades, and 2,000 counterparties (firms involved on the other side of those trades).
At the end of December 2008, the Washington Post published a three-part, in-depth investigation into AIG Financial Products that explained the history of AIG Financial Products and the critical role it played in the company's downfall. (See Part One: "The Beautiful Machine", Part Two: "A Crack in the System" and Part Three: "Downgrades and Downfall")
A telling Excerpt:
"Financial Products unleashed techniques that others on Wall Street rushed to emulate, creating vast, interlocking deals that bound together financial institutions in ways that no one fully understood and contributed to the demise of its parent company as a private enterprise. ... The bailout stands at $152 billion and counting -- almost 10 times as large as the rescue for the American auto industry...Many of the most compelling aspects of the economic cataclysm can be seen through the story of AIG and its Financial Products unit: the failure of credit-rating firms, the absence of meaningful federal regulation, the mistaken belief that private contracts did not pose systemic risk, the veneration of computer models and quantitative analysis."
On March 1, 2009, Baseline Scenario updated its AIG bailout timeline.
In short: September 16: The Federal Reserve gave AIG an $85 billion line of credit at a high interest rate in exchange for warrants on 79.9% of AIG's stock. October 8: The Federal Reserve authorized the NY Fed to "borrow" $37.8 billion in "illiquid" securities from AIG in exchange for the equivalent amount of cash. November 10: Treasury invested $40 billion of TARP money in AIG for preferred stock paying a 10% dividend. Some of this was used to pay back the Fed's high-interest line of credit, now reduced to $60 billion. The same day, the Fed created AIG RMBS LLC with a $19.8 billion loan and $1 billion from AIG. The money was used to buy residential mortgage-backed securities from AIG. Under the terms outline by the Fed, AIG will take the first $1 billion in losses. The money paid by the Fed for the securities was used to reduce the earlier NY Fed loan. In a similar manner, the NYFed created AIG CDO LLC with $5 billion from AIG and a $30 billion loan from the fed, to buy collateralized debt obligations from third parties that had purchased "insurance" (i.e., credit default swaps) from AIG. March 2: Treasury announces that the $40 billion in shares will be converted to a class where they are not required to pay a dividend. Treasury also promises $30 billion more in cash in exchange for a third (Series F) class of stock. In addition, AIG puts two life insurance subsidiaries -- that it presumably couldn't sell on the open market -- into separate trusts for the Fed to purchase, with the money going to pay down the earlier credit line. In addition, AIG will securitize certain life insurance policies, and sell those to the Fed for $8.5 billion. In addition, AIG will get better terms on the first $40 billion in preferred stock.
Why not let AIG fail instead of continuing to fiddle with the terms of the bailout? Those who have looked at the situation closely seem to all agree that the US Government cannot let AIG fail because of fear that it would be the first domino to collapse in the globalized financial system. Why? Because a huge part of the company's credit-default swap business was devised to allow banks to make their balance sheets look better than they were. (Unlike many of the Wall Street investment banks, AIG didn't specialize in converting subprime mortgages into pooled securities. Instead, it sold credit-default swaps, which acted as a form of insurance for those securities. And because credit-default swaps were not regulated (for a variety of reasons, including the fact that there is no federal insurance regulator), AIG did not have to put any capital aside in reserve, as long as it maintained its AAA rating.
Specifically, AIG sold credit default swaps (CDS) to banks in the European Monetary Union (EMU), where banks used them to exceed their balance sheet reserve (leverage) requirements. Without the CDS, it's likely that many large EMU banks would be insolvent, leading to a massive meltdown. AIG is therefore considered by many to be a keystone to the world's financial structure. The systemic risk presented by AIG's failure explains why it keeps getting propped up.
“There isn’t a great deal of confidence we can take AIG’s word at face value,” Bill Bergman, an analyst at Morningstar Inc told Bloomberg. “AIG shares trading this close to zero suggest there are real losses out there, and if there’s no value for shareholders, taxpayers may be taking some very significant losses.” (Hugh Son, "Liddy Pleads for Forgiveness as AIG Rescue Unravels," Bloomberg, February 26, 2009).
As of March 2009, the company had so far refused to disclose the counterparties that economists, including Nouriel Roubini, have suggested are the real recipients of the bail out, and government spokespeople have suggested that the Trade Secrets Act prevents them from revealing that information. (See Joe Nocera, "Who's Really Being Propped Up in the A.I.G. Bailout?," NYTimes, 3/2/2009)
According to an investigation published by Michael Lewis Vanity Fair, 8/09, insiders at AIG Financial Products had very different perceptions of what went wrong than that portrayed by the media. E.g., AIG's problems were "clearly broader" than the credit default swaps sold by traders at AIGFP. For instance, the mortgage-insurance unit in North Carolina (United Guaranty) "had taken on all sorts of silly risks in the past two years, lost several billion dollars, and replaced their CEO. There were the fund managers at AIG, the parent company, who had blown nearly $50 billion on trades in subprime mortgages...there was a pattern: all of this stuff had happened since 2005, after an accounting scandal forced CEO Maurice "Hank" Greenberg to resign." Because Greenberg had basically built the company, after he was forced out new management (in his view) wanted to continue to grow and so turned a blind eye to all sorts of risks.
After the story broke that A.I.G. Financial Products had shelled out $450 million in bonuses, President Obama announced that he was looking for a way to get the money back. Then A.I.G.'s new CEO Ed Liddy went to Washington to testify before Congress. After that, A.I.G.F.P. employee Jake DeSantis published his letter of resignation (sent to Liddy) in the New York Times, which explained that most of the employees receiving the bonuses "had nothing to do with the large losses."
Weak Oversight at the SEC
Apart from the credit default swaps that it sold to banks, AIG also sold a financial instrument called 2a-7 puts that allowed money market funds to invest in risky bonds instead of in the safest commercial paper. AIG agreed to buy back the bonds if they went bad. The SEC approved the arrangement, according to the NY Times' Joe Nocera.
Tax issues:
A former Senate staff aide wrote in the L.A. Times: "My sleaziest encounter with a lobbyist occurred in my Finance Committee office. One lobbyist, whom I did not know, somehow got 15 minutes on my schedule to describe the unbearable suffering AIG was being forced to endure by some corporate tax provision or other that he wanted to get repealed or amended or some such. I feigned interest, nodded a lot, maybe let a hint of sympathy into my eyes, and said nothing. If he told his masters that I was anything other than noncommittal, he was lying. ...The next day one of my assistants rushed into the office. She had just opened an envelope addressed to me, and was shaking as she handed it to me. It was from AIG's lobbyist -- a letter thanking me for the meeting and a check made out to my boss' reelection campaign. ... I hand wrote a harshly worded version of "How dare you?" on the lobbyist's letter and sent it back to him with the check." (Lawrence O'Donnell Jr., "Good lobbyists, good government," Los Angeles Times 1/13/2006)
On March 23, 2005 the New York Times reported that federal and state insurance regulators were investigating AIG's use of offshore tax haven subsidiaries to manipulate its own books to reduce its liabilities. AIG treated two companies -- Richmond Insurance and Union Excess Reinsurance, reinsurers that, according to regulatory filings, do business solely with A.I.G. -- as separate entities, as a way to offload some of its own financial risk. Two top executives - Howard Smith, the chief financial officer, and Christian Milton, the vice president for reinsurance - were both dismissed for refusing to cooperate with regulators investigating a transaction between A.I.G. and General Re. (Lynnely Browning, "Investigation of A.I.G.'s Deals Moves Offshore," New York Times, 3/23/2005).
Tax Justice Network investigator Lucy Komisar reports that AIG operated a scam that allowed its clients to cheat on their taxes by offering off-shore reinsurance policies and "management facilities to run the captives in offshore Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Luxembourg -- where corporate and accounting records are secret and taxes minimal or nonexistent." Greenberg's son, Evan, was the head of Ace Ltd., a Bermuda insurer.
Environment and product safety:
AIG has been a vocal supporter of the Superfund tax, and has opposed efforts to weaken the Superfund bill if it doesn't contain such provisions.
Anti-competitive and consumer protection:
Under Maurice Greenberg, AIG was active in the campaign for "tort reform" --i.e. attacks on the rights of American citizens to seek redress through the courts. "The battle for tort reform must be fought state by state," Greenberg told one industry gathering, suggesting that insurers would refrain from investing in states that had not restricted access to civil justice. "AIG is participating in a campaign that is publishing newspaper advertisements highlighting the states with the worst tort systems." (David Casey, Jr., "Perspectives from the front lines," Association of Trial Lawyers of America, 11/1/2003).
Political influence (national and international):
Post-Bailout Lobbying
On October 10, 2008, Propublica reported that after the government took an 80% stake in AIG, the company nevertheless continued to spend money to lobby states against new controls on the mortgage industry. (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by comparison, shut down their lobbying operations immediately after being taken over).
The Village Voice reported that "the day before AIG reaped its initial $85 billion bonanza, (then Treasury secretary Hank) Paulson met with his [Goldman Sachs] successor, Lloyd Blankfein, who reportedly argued that Goldman would lose $20 billion and fail unless AIG was rescued."
Social responsibility:
The California Junket Scandal
After receiving an $85 billion bailout, the company spent $440,000 for a week-long sales conference at the Pointe Hilton Squaw Peak Resort in California, including $200,000 for rooms, $150,000 for meals, $23,000 for spa charges, and $7,000 in golf fees. Company officials explained that the resort had been booked long before AIG received the taxpayer-funded bailout. AIG CEO Edward Liddy told Larry King that the conference was not an executive retreat, but Josh Bernstein, an ABC reporter in Phoenix caught top executives, including company president Art Tambaro, on camera. The Washington Post listed the incident as one of the top 10 scandals of 2008.
Other SEC Enforcement Matters
On July 9, 2007, the SEC announced a favorable jury verdict against former Brightpoint executives who allegedly executed a sham insurance policy issued by AIG that was designed to allow Brightpoint to write off losses as covered by insurance. The complaint alleged that the policy masked a round trip of cash between Brightpoint and AIG, rather than real insurance. As a result of the scheme, Brightpoint's pre-tax net income for 1998 was overstated by 61%. (For the original litigation release, see http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18340.htm.)
On November 30, 2004, AIG agreed to pay $126,366,000 (including disgorgement and penalties) to settle SEC charges that it facilitated fraud at PNC Financial Services Group Inc., aiding and abetting violations of reporting and record-keeping provisions of those laws. AIG's wholly owned subsidiary AIG Financial Products Corp. allegedly offered to create a special purpose entity (SPE) for its clients, where they could transfer troubled or other potentially volatile assets, thereby keeping them off their books. The same day, the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice announced that it had reached a deferred prosecution agreement for criminal charges against AIG and two of its subsidiaries.
On April 5, 2006, FINRA fined AIG affiliate American General Securities more than $1.1 million for brokerage violations.
On June 8, 2005, FINRA fined six AIG subsidiaries a total of $12,730,000 for brokerage-related violations.
In September 2007, AIG Financial Advisors Inc. (Arizona) agreed to pay a $15,000 fine associated with allegations that it allowed a prohibited individual to be affiliated with the firm.
Offshore Scams
AIG formed Coral Re in the offshore jurisdiction of Barbados during the 1980s, in order to park its subsidiaries' uncollectible reinsurance balances, thereby helping those units avoid charges. At the time, AIG claimed Coral Re was not an affiliate, even though AIG managed the reinsurer, and sold its stock to prominent U.S. businessmen. Coral Re later ceded its contracts to Gen Re's Cologne Re Dublin unit, and in 2000, the Dublin company's CEO, John Houldsworth, included the business in a deal with AIG that is now at the center of a large criminal case. (See Douglas McLeod, "Ghost of Coral Re returns in Gen Re fraud trial," Business Insurance, 2/18/2008) CrocTail subsidiary information
croctail_subsidiary_panel:
History
"AIG's roots went back to 1919 and Shanghai, where founder Cornelius V. Starr built a business around a lucrative, relatively untapped insurance market. Starr's company later received an unorthodox boost when he worked with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services during World War II to create an intelligence unit that gleaned information from insurance documents." (Robert O'Harrow, "The Beautiful Machine," Washington Post, December 29, 2008).
Starr's successor, AIG former CEO Maurice Greenberg was a close confidante of former CIA director William J. Casey, who also worked for the OSS during WW II. Greenberg was himself under consideration for the CIA director post during Clinton's first term. According to journalist Wayne Madsen, AIG has been at the center of a number of CIA operations for decades. ("AIG is a 'special case'," Wayne Madsen Report, 9/23/2008)
In The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (Basic Books, 1983) author Bradley F. Smith shed more light on Cornelius Starr and the OSS: "It [a secret intelligence operation in China] was formed in April 1942, when [Bill] Donovan persuaded British insurance magnate C.V. Starr to let C.O.I. (Covert Operations Intelligence) use his commercial and insurance connections in occupied China and Formosa to create a deep cover intelligence network. Although the State Department was nervous about the operation, Donovan went ahead and, with the cooperation of the U.S. Army, bypassed the diplomats in operating the communications system. ...the Starr-Donovan connection worked in China at least until the winter of 1943-44."
Starr quickly added representation of other U.S. companies to his operations, and formed Asia Life Insurance Co. (ALICO) after being unable to find U.S. companies willing to assume the risk of offering life insurance, since there were no life-expectancy statistics available for the Chinese population. He opened an office in NYC in 1926.
In 1939 Starr moved his HQ's to New York, temporarily closing the Shanghai office owing to increasing political turmoil in Shanghai and around the world. The office was reopened after WW II.
1947: Starr reorganized the firm to revive war-torn operations and prepare for growth. A Philippine branch was opened, with Earl Carroll as head.
1948: The Asian firm was renamed AIA, and based in Hong Kong, covering Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Starr started to united his network of insurance companies with the creation of two Bermuda-based entities: American International Underwriters Overseas (AIUO), the parent company of all American International Underwriters companies. AIU provided for pooled business in stipulated percentages and shared assets that were kept overseas to meet local regulatory requirements.
1950: AIU closed its operations in China and opened new ones in Japan and German (to sell insurance to occupying troops).
1958: AIU was operating in 75 countries.
1962: Starr appointed Maurice Greenberg president American Home. Greenberg focused on broker sales, allowing the company to issue its own policies and maintain underwriting control. He also concentrated on commercial and industrial risks, and developed substantial reinsurance facilities. Greenberg also initiated new products and services such as personal accident insurance, emphasizing deductibles.
1967: American International Group (AIG) was formed to hold shares of other domestic companies. Greenberg was elected president and CEO. Three years later AIU and its agencies and subsidiaries were taken in as wholly owned subsidiaries.
1976: AIG ceased writing policies for insurance companies it did not own. The company was organized into four divisions: the foreign general insurance division, the brokerage division of domestic general insurance, the agency division of domestic general insurance, and a life insurance division.
1979: AIG entered Eastern Europe, and established joint ventures with state-owned insurers in China and Yugoslavia.
1980: AIG entered into health-care services and acquired various Swiss real estate holdings.
1984: First ever decline in profits, owing to underwriting losses (including from a major hurricane). A special services division was established to underwrite risks of extortion, kidnapping, and ransom.
1987: Entered South Korea. AIG becomes the first foreign insurer listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Henry Kissinger was named chair of AIG's advisory board. AIG Financial Products Corp. -- the division that would ultimately be responsible for causing the 2008 federal bailout -- was created.
1988: AIG formed a Hong Kong venture to introduce American fast food franchises into Asia.
1989: AIG was listed on the London International Stock Exchange. AIG implemented a hazardous-waste-cleanup tax through a 2% premium fee assessed on all commercial and casualty and property policies, with insurers matching that amount. AIGlobal was formed to consolidate property, casualty, life and group insurance, and facilitate multinational corporate finance.
1990: Listed on Paris Stock Exchange and Swiss Stock Exchange. AIG Trading Corp. was created to engage in commodity transactions. AIG acquired International Lease Finance Corp., which engaged primarily in the acquisition of new and used commercial jet aircraft, and their leading to airlines.
1991: Greenberg appointed Tom Tizzio as AIG's president; remained as chair and CEO.
1995: AIG was licensed to operate a general insurance business in China. Also expanded operations in Central Europe and South Africa. AIU was the first insurer to arrive in Kobe, Japan, after the earthquake, providing damage inspection, claims adjustments, and emergency supplies. AIG Trading Group helped structure and acted as a risk principal in one of the most significant gold mining hedges ever completed.
1999: U.S. Treasury grants approval for AIG to operate a federal savings bank. AIG ordered to cease group insurance sales in China, since Chinese companies have a monopoly on such products.
2000: AIG commits $1 billion to General Atlantic Partners, LLC, an investor in internet technology businesses.
(Sources: Julie A. Mitchell, "Notable Corporate Chronologies," Third Edition.)
Other Information:
Greenberg's Downfall
On March 14, 2005 Maurice Greenberg was forced to resign over allegations that AIG had used a complex reinsurance deal to inflate its earnings. (Jenny Anderson, "In Clash of Titans, Chief of AIG Met His Match," NYTimes, 3/05/2005). New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer suggested that AIG and other insurance companies were engaging in "the same kind of cartel-like behavior seen in organized crime." (Monica Langley and Theo Francis, "Insurers Reel from Spitzer's Strike," Wall Street Journal, 10/18/2004)
The heated rhetoric was an indication of how politicized the case against AIG had become. The Wall St. Journal openly challenged Spitzer to indict Greenberg if he could substantiate his attacks on the famous executive. He later did.
Greenberg was replaced as chairman by Frank G. Zarb, who had been the head of Nasdaq when it was attacked by regulators for allowing market makers to engage in collusive practices that allowed them to widen spreads, and reduce competition. Zarb brought former SEC chair Arthur Levitt on as an adviser to the AIG board. Greenberg's son Jeffrey was also ousted as head of Marsh & McLennan.
AIG internal investigations discovered several questionable transactions that had been used to manage earnings. As a result, AIG announced a $1.7 billion reduction in its net worth on March 30, 2005, a a result of various accounting manipulations, including a secret $1.1 billion agreement to protect investors in Union Excess, a Barbados reinsurance company.
The company was embroiled in further problems after it was discovered that documents were being destroyed. "Starr International Co., which was controlled by Hank Greenberg, and which owned 12 percent of AIG shares, responded to Greenberg's dismissal from AIG by ousting the AIG directors from its board." (Jerry Markham, A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals, M.E. Sharpe, 2006).
More headlines followed disclosure that Greenberg transferred 2.3 billion AIG shares to his wife in order to protect his assets from lawsuits.
Another $1 billion in accounting problems was blamed on Greenberg, and Spitzer filed suit in May 2005 against AIG, Greenberg, and CFO Howard Smith. The existence of prominent outside directors -- including Richard Holbrooke, William Cohen, and Carla Hills -- failed to prevent the scandal.
Meanwhile, Greenberg was denied access to personal assets and files left at the company by its new management. The company turned over tapes to prosecutors.
In coordination with Spitzer and the U.S. Justice Department, the SEC settled charges against the company on February 9, 2006. AIG agreed to pay more than $1.6 billion to resolve charges related to improper accounting, bid rigging, and practices involving workers’ compensation funds.
The commission’s complaint alleged that AIG’s reinsurance transactions with General Re Corporation (Gen Re) were designed to inflate falsely AIG’s loss reserves by $500 million to quell analyst criticism that AIG’s reserves had been declining. The complaint also identified other sham transactions designed to mislead investors.
On April 8, 2005, the SEC obtained a protective order against Greenberg and AIG to secure documents related to the ongoing investigation.
On August 6, 2009, the SEC charged Greenberg and Hank Smith for their roles in AIG's accounting violations]. Greenberg paid a $15 penalty to settle the charges without pleading guilty. (See complaint filed in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Maurice R. Greenberg and Howard I. Smith, Civil Action No. 09 Civ 6939 (S.D.N.Y.) The SEC previously charged AIG in 2006 with securities fraud and improper accounting, and the company settled the charges by paying disgorgement of $700 million and a penalty of $100 million, among other remedies. Financial information
Major lines of business/segments:
Domestic Insurance: Largest U.S. underwriter of commercial and industrial insurance and #1 U.S. underwriter of Directors and Officers, Professional Liability, Workers' Comp, Surplus Lines, Environmental, Aviation, and other lines. Also #1 in life insurance and largest issuer of fixed annuities. Foreign: AIG is the most geographically diversified life insurance organization in the world, and the largest life insurer in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. It also manages the largest international property-casualty network in the world, including the largest foreign owned P-C insurance franchise in Japan, mainland China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Thailand. Aircraft: AIG owns the most valuable fleet of leased airlines in the world. Asset Management: AIG is the largest investor in corporate bonds in the U.S. For a description of the size of its operations, go here. Sources
Watchdogs and related campaigns:
http://www.crocodyl.org/wiki/american_international_group_aig
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