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PEES 2011-2012

Paris Environmental and Energy Economics Seminar



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The Paris Environmental and Energy Economics Seminar is a joint initiative of Université Paris 1-Paris School of Economics, Université Paris Descartes, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, Université Paris Dauphine, Agro Paris Tech, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Mines, Ecole de Ponts, CEA, CIRED, Climate Economics Chair and IFP School.

The seminar takes place every two weeks on Thursday, 4:30pm to 6pm, at University Paris Descartes, 5th floor, Salle des thèse, Building Jacob, 45 rue des Saints-Pères, 75006 Paris.

   

The seminar allows to present and discuss frontier research by French and foreign scholars on Environmental and Energy Economics.

Seminar coordinator: Anna Creti (UPOND, Ecole Polytechnique)


Organizing Committee: Jean-Christophe Bureau, Stéphanie Monjon, Julien Chevallier, Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, Stéphane Zuber, Matthieu Glachant, Pierre-André Jouvet, Frédéric Lantz, Nidhal Ouerfelli.

On the 31st of May, 2012


The speaker is Steve Salant (University of Michigan)

 "Experimental Departures from Self-Interest when Competing Partnerships Share Output ",

The paper is available below:




abstract :
When every individual’s effort imposes negative externalities on his competitors, com- petition results in excessive aggregate effort. This explains overfishing when competing on common properties, duplication in innovation tournaments, and excessive talent searches among competing sports teams. One way to curb these excesses is for subsets of competitors to form groups that share output or gross revenue. If the right number of groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort falls to the socially optimal level. By varying the cost of investment, we investigate experimentally whether individuals manage to form the efficient number of groups and to invest within the chosen groups as theory predicts. We show that while a theory based on self interest makes correct qualitative predictions, there are systematic departures from the point predictions. We find that deviations are always in the direction of the socially optimal level, which may be higher or lower than the predicted contribution level depending on the cost parameter and the group size. When groups are formed endogenously, subjects form output-sharing groups even for the cases when theory predicts that they should not, and manage to decrease inefficiency significantly by 50% to 71%

  Next weeks
  • 07/06/2012 : Wolfram Schlenker (Columbia University), tba.
  • 21/06/2012 : Thomas Olivier Leautier (TSE, IDEI), tba.


Disclaimer: Any views presented during seminars are solely those of the speakers and do not represent those of PEEES partners institutions.