Emre Ozdenoren

Welcome to my web page. I am a Professor of Economics at London Business School, and a Research Fellow at the CEPR. 

London Business School | Regent's Park | London NW1 4SA | United Kingdom

Direct line +44 (0)20 7000 8434 Email eozdenoren at london dot edu

CV

Working Papers

"Safe Assets as Balance Sheet Multipliers" (with Kathy Yuan and Shengxing Zhang).

"On the Fragility of DeFi Lending" (with Jonathan Chiu, Kathy Yuan and Shengxing Zhang)

Publications 

"Dynamic Asset Backed Security Design" (with Kathy Yuan and Shengxing Zhang) Review of Economic Studies, Volume 90, Issue 6, November 2023, Pages 3282–3314

"The Effects of Rivalry on Scientific Progress under Public vs Private Learning" (with Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer and Georgios Katsenos) Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 212, September 2023

"Profit Sharing and Incentives" (with Oleg Rubanov) International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2022, vol 83.

Uncertainty and Compound Lotteries: Calibration” (with Yoram Halevy) Economic Theory, 2022, 74, 373-395. 

"Willpower and Compromise Effect" (with Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Daisuke Nakajima) Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15. pp. 279-317

"Should I stay or should I go (out): The role of trust and norms in disease prevention during pandemics," with Toker Doganoglu,  Covid Economics, Issue 16, May 2020.

"Contractual Externalities and Systemic Risk" (with Kathy Yuan) Review of Economic Studies 84 (4), October 2017, Pages 1789–1817. 

"Trading Frenzies and Their Impact on Real Investment"  (with Itay Goldstein and Kathy Yuan). Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2), August 2013, Pages 566-582.

“Why Can’t a Woman Bid More Like a Man?” (with Yan Chen and Peter Katuscak), Games and Economic Behavior 77 (1), January 2013, Pages 181–213.

Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges” (with Steve Salant and Dan Silverman). Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(2) April 2012, 342-368

Learning and Complementarities: Implications for Speculative Attacks” (with Itay Goldstein and Kathy Yuan). Review of Economic Studies, 78(1), January 2011, 263-292. 

Coarse Matching with Incomplete Information” (with Heidrun Hoppe and Benny Moldovanu), Economic Theory, 47(1), May 2011, 75-104.

 “Durable Goods and Conformity” (with Chris House), RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), Summer 2008, 452-468. 

Feedback Effects and Asset Prices ” (with Kathy Yuan), Journal of Finance, 63(4), August 2008, 1939-1975.

Ambiguity Aversion, Games Against Nature, and Dynamic Consistency” (with James Peck), Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), January 2008, 106-115.

Sealed Bid Auctions with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments,” (with Yan Chen and Peter Katuscak), Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), September 2007, 513-535.

Subjective Recursive Expected Utility,” (with Peter Klibanoff), Economic Theory, 30(1), January 2007, 49-87.

Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity” (with Subir Bose and Andreas Pape.) Theoretical Economics, 1(4), December 2006, 411-438.

Intermediation in Innovation,” (with Heidrun Hoppe), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(5-6), June 2005, 483-503.

Auctions with Uncertain Numbers of Bidders,” (with Dan Levin), Journal of Economic Theory, 118(2), October 2004, 229-251.

Probabilistic Representation of Complexity,” (with Nabil Al-Najjar and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell), Journal of Economic Theory, 111(1), June 2003, 49-87. 

 “Completing the state space with subjective states,” Journal of Economic Theory, 105(2), May 2002, 531-539.

Maxmin expected utility through statewise combinations,” (with Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Peter Klibanoff), Economics Letters, 66(1), January 2000, 49-54. (Complete proof

Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors,” (with Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Peter Klibanoff), Journal of Economic Theory, 92(1), May 2000, 35-65. 

Older Papers

"Stock Market Tournaments" (with Kathy Yuan), May 2012. (This paper is under a major revision: here we apply the general framework that we have developed on contractual externalities to a setting where stock prices endogenously generate tournament like incentives.)