Abstract:  This paper empirically examines the role played by a technological change in Indian agriculture (adoption of High Yielding Variety [HYV] seeds) in the political mobilization of cultivators in Northern India in 1970s and 1980s. Using panel data from the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) from 1962-1989, I find that the districts that had the largest impact of the green revolution also had the biggest increase in the voteshare of the Janata party (a new rural party). This change is accompanied by a fall in political fractionalization. I hypothesize that technology adoption consolidates rural votes by aligning the policy preferences of previously disparate rural groups. I then look at public good provision to see if this substantive political change induced any policy changes. I examine the provision of schools as previous literature has documented the increasing returns to human capital with the advent of the new technology. I find that an increase in the voteshare of the Janata party in a district is associated with an increased proportion of villages in that district that have a school (primary, middle and high schools).

Abstract: Does the caste of the agent have any bearing on his interaction with a corrupt official? Using data from India, I find that lower castes pay higher bribes compared to high castes to obtain similar loan amounts. The caste network of an agent gives him access to influential people in society who can intervene with the corrupt official on behalf of the agent. This intervention has the potential to reduce the bribe paid by the agent. To test this idea I use a 1993 constitutional amendment, which reserved seats in local bodies for low castes. This exogenous change has the potential to increase access to influential people for low caste households. I find that low caste borrowers living in reserved villages pay significantly lower bribes than those living in unreserved villages. To further understand the channel through which this effect works I look at the interaction of the vote share of a low caste political party (the BSP) and the reservation status of the village. I find that in reserved villages located in higher vote share districts low caste borrowers pay lower average bribes than reserved villages located in low vote share districts.