I am interested by some traditional questions in philosophy (the foundations of morality and knowledge) and in social sciences (the origins of cooperation and folk beliefs). I think that these questions may benefit from researches in psychology (respectively, on the moral sense and intuitive modules) and evolution (mutualistic theories, evolutionary psychology). In the same time, my work is based on the idea that naturalistic approaches should be based in a greater extent on human sciences theories and data.

 

Morality

Starting from the contractualist logic of moral intuitions, I have proposed that morality has evolved by market selection and is based on a sense of fairness. I have argued that this theory may offer a better explanation of empirical data than some other evolutionary theories such as group selection and emotions-based theories. This theory has led to a series of experimental studies in cognitive psychology, developmental psychology and cross-cultural psychology.

Intuitions and reflections

Most naturalist theories of folk beliefs are based on intuitive processes (such as intuitive psychology or theory of Mind, intuitive biology, intuitive physics, etc.). By contrast, I propose, along with Dan Sperber, that folk beliefs are not produced by intuitions. They are rather held for epistemic reasons such as reasoning or trust in authorities or tradition, and are only indirectly based on intuitions. This reflective theory allows explaining some original aspects of folk sciences and religious beliefs (rituals, taboos, beliefs in supernatural agents).

Naturalism in human sciences

Using concepts such as massive modularity, metarepresentation, population thinking and the distinction between the evolutionary and the psychological level, I try to show that a naturalistic approach offers a better framework than rational choice theory or culturalism and has the potential to enrich the traditional toolbox of human sciences.