Back to Index Page Series in 3-d
1) Ostensively Kant is the king of the point series: The I think I, which is also the Think I Think. Consciousness is then the assertion that reality itself needs to be located within the self same series that individuality is. The pairing Rise and fall together. It is because I am, an am in making it is. 2) This I is therefore also an it, because it the sense in which individual empirical entities, including myself are formed or fashioned,. The place where all it s, all variants are held. The supreme idea of an idea in which all things are holdable. Is then the universal condition for perceptions to be a all in my mind. 3) A condition that is then itself expressed within both a deducible process of how it world must be made, and principles for that perceiving: Each will impose ten a variety of series of their own. 4) Apprehension and recollection, the gives the manner one is always moving beyond many impressions to the one and holding then one as itself multiform, and so in a multiplicity, might be summarised roughly as: Not this not this not… 5) Apprehension is that which always schematizes, and is always ahead of itself. Thence it operates in always running forward into and through others. It this running it creates a double sense of not, 6) Apprehension is the not addressed to the manifold of impressions: the not that allows one to be moving beyond them, and between them: 7) And ye it only makes this moves, and can only allow itself this note as in doing so, it not what it was, and changes it. It is the endlessly querying of what it was, the moments that it formed, and the constantly creating into the next. 8) It is the science then of the double negative; elements need to be surpassed, and moved beyond, while at the same moment it affirms tat all that it has created is nothing to it now: the next not needs to be. A force which might endlessly tumble into a world, and yet which would by itself loose sight of the colour and weight f that cinnabar even as it grasps it. 9) Recollection says as a series: This not this not this: A series of both endless adaptations and updates, but also of discrimination and complex interwebbed times zones. 10) To say this not this, is to affirm that there Is a reality, a constantly created this, which exists in a world, and needs to be held by that element that creates the world. This is, where others fail. 11) But at the same time, the very act of supposing this this is, rules out othering this: This is a statement then also of not this. All the this and the not then are held together to form a past, in which things are, and are in supposing that other things are not. 12) Impressions are then webbed into time: into a series of moving beyonds that also creates domains and ordering of heaccities. 13) At which point o course wider cognition enters in. Cognition as the direct agency of apperception has the role of gathering these impressions up, and knocking the living concepts into the series. What is This becomes then the giving or a shape a tree or form given layer upon layer: The not-ing of the this, becomes the quality of a thisness which even at the moment reached out into other places, and other times: Likewise the rhythm of he not this not is given ad order. The rhythms are drawn into reference with to a necessarily supposed outside. They are then made to conform to a schema where this not is either within the necessary order that creates the time in my mind (and so it causal); or according to how one has to understand the pre-existence of the concept one is grasping (and so as they express in their community its reality). 14) Ordering as categories knock then into the impressions a sense that could to be learned beyond their orbit. 15) That is Kant suggests the series by itself could never be enough, could never assert itself or its significance. Here must then be at some place else the rules which define how the knots and the this balance out, and form the impressions, form the moments into reconciled bundle of this or that. 16) Understanding coagulates reality, by drawing together the nots and the this, to form constellations; Different concepts represent then different and known senses of being not this, and this not , which all these sense, all these slices, binding together, and jointly redescribing the series: 17) The bewildering not this not this not this, becomes then given is as powers and forces, as constellations and coagulation, that together loop around the series, describing and animating it. 18) For the principles similar series or ramifications of this move are explored: quantity itself becomes then a series which runs These this these this : 19) It is it demands that one forms a unity (this out of these impressions, which then are given as unity (this these this); a unity in a moment, I a giving is then caught up as a singleton, as a simply there. 20) And yet of course at the same moment these this these, is spoken. Every coagulation of this’ is then also part in a these, part of making a many itself multiple and creating as such. Whence these itself becomes a reality. T s given in this and across these different sense of being this. 21) Understanding will then to totalities these this and this these: It holds then in a single series or part of an over all picture. They become the giving of a single these, or set of these, beyond every impression. 22) Or again a series of quality might be read as here no here no here…. 23) Here no here, is the giving in that first moment, in the quality of the element which as it is given reaches beyond that moment (and so anticipates it). To say here and now is the to be caught within a far wider picture a greater here, where that effect is already unpulling. The world becomes then a world of forces and their domains. 24) And yet at the same time it is to say no here no… A statement of doubt, where what is never simply there. I is rather even as it is giving reaching beyond what it was and filling the mind in other sensation: its no, its sense then of revoking what was, is itself a creative second no, a never having finished or ceasing o blend what one was, and runs beyond movement. 25) Understanding then blends this here and this no into a realty where things are and things mix one with the other to form elaborate e constellations. 26) The dual series and its master is then given a real power in Kant. He exploit in this categories the power of dual vocal series to say or oppose many thing. The categories then give the sense of this saying give the sense that o slice these series up, or arrange then in someway is to say something or create something. Their very bewildering perception is then created or refashioned into meaning. Thy become something more.\Or better the very simply construction on seeing two things at once is bound into a system where this two is made to relate one with other is a system o judgements and made the matter in some manner or other. 27) And yet of course this in a sense simply begs the very question. The problem which Ka set himself was after all to explain which the self as a unified whole was; that is why these series made the unties that they did why they drew one ton these concepts and not those one, in the name of a wider notion of consciousness. 28) What hen he ought to have been solving as the problem of where this unity comes from; hat is the exact sense that any sort or unity comes out of the equivocal series that clearly do not in themselves suppose any unit beyond their own supposition. That is they not actually suppose that a unity of the whole need to be formed. 29) On the contrary in a sense they articulate the lack of such a need. O perhaps he fact ht every articulation of unity is itself merely a part in a new and different series. 30) Kant indeed in has notion of ideas pictures up his ambivalence very well. The idea s something tat does not and never can formally exist: a logical principle of reason knocked into a world it remains forever distinct from. 31) Unities are therefore to be doubted as such: their position as which holds the series down, is complex, and never to be simply asserted or assume (even in a posteri manner). One cannot simply invent a medium to hold a middle in: Or better one can, and yet as the middle is always middle in another, one needs to respect the notion of that otherin itself. On cannot therefore simply assume that anther is an I and other. Or perhaps if one does one simply has o go the whole hog and allow in the sense of that another as integral part in an I(T)– that is genuine sense I am in another (IT) , I am an anothering it does not then form of itself unit, merely a statement of faith in a ‘means of a means’. 32) Or o put it another way – Kant’s hope that an I could be adequate to time flawed. The I is running towards time an supposing it as its own creation, cannot actually pull itself apart from the fact that time is the anothering of I. Te I it forms is then riddled with a cancer, that makes or break it, and forces it into saying many thing or opening on many other places: I might be an I but not as any I knows it; it is not the unifier, but rather than which is created in the surpassing of the one unity and the certain of another. This move always then being made against the backdrop of a death which can get rid of the entire series in the first place (as Deleuze notes so well). 33) Or to put it as Heidegger does: the problem wit the I think is that it does not formulate the idea of that U as anything beyond the thoughts that it has. The I think then asserts the unity of what is already there as if it were simply there all among, as if it were resent and at hand in that unity. And yet the nature of this being there, which at root would have to be different in nature and form to the being their of the tings created within it, it would have to be presenting a different sense, is not tackled. 34) Kant wants hen to get away with to terms in the sequence, when Heidegger says he actually needs three. He needs to say 9as he also does) I think something… 35) A series then reads also Something I think, and Think something I. The last of these two then give the problem, Heidegger suggests the something here is too vague and too slippery. Wit this something merely the stuff of the world, the element of the series themselves. If it is though the entire enterprise collapses, as the world was what was o supposed by the I: Or better it was what the I was creating or fashioning. 36) This then reveals the I think merely as actually saying Something I think something: and yet this ideal statement of merely the supposing that one exists within thought an as an act of thinking, in the being something, once again begs the question. it was this something that Kant was attempting to solve. 37) That is Heidegger says, if you judge a series but how it actually exists in a world where it I a part (even if that part is to animate a whole0, the one needs not two terms in the series and an indefinite third term, but rather three terms in the series. 38) The act of cognition needs then itself to be merely a term of these series, a part in it. It cannot simply assert that it has right to the whole, without the something of that whole gutting its reality. It needs rather to prove itself within being: Tat is it needs o prove t sense that it can comprehend the middle as that other, in which it is, and through which it is established. 39) The series of say quantity ought not to read this these this, so much as this is these (which forms a clear statement of totality ): and also These this is, as a statement of plurality, and is these this, as a statement of unity (poses as a question, or as something one needs to state and then run beyond). 40) To be within another is then the necessary bring that othering into the series Heidegger suggests. The fate then of being becomes the problem of how that other is bought it. Can it be bought in as something real and vibrant that My being is adequate to, or is it something beyond me something ultimately that unpicks being and would drag every attempt to master a series form within or without bootless? |