The miser of continua

 

For Kant the stakes really could not be higher. He sees Hume ha launched a double attack on two [principles e hold rather dear. On  the one hand Hume has savaged the notion of necessary continuality. That is things like causality the self age apparently become for  Hume merely contingent ideas. We might have then and yet we cannot now they are true or eve that they will continue. On the other hand. following Berkeley, and far more profoundly Hum has undermined the cased for truth, and replaced that truth with reality. Reality I not truth as such; perceptions do not tell us of the world. On the contrary they merely age ideas. What makes a perceiving different is the vivacity, tat is the natural volatility of the idea. It is the vivacity, the fact that certain ideas lie in the mind, vivid, clear and gregarious that marks the real. The entire duration of what the world really looks like is thereby ingested in questions of how these perceptions convey this vivacity to us. How itch then grows and changes or is challenged by their actions. How it givens us a world through their interaction. Kant's wants us the to return to the external and internal worlds, and to do so in the same breadth.

 The stakes here are of course very high. The human world appeared to remove from humanity the ability to meaningfully act. That is if one could not know what causes what or whether even tomorrows would happen the apparently the rhyme and reasons had fallen our of the world. Worse then thy one cod never know what the consequences of ones own action might be. one might act and noting happen One might not act and something happened, The entire algebra of actions and result is lost by the wayside of reality and the power of perceiving. Behind both of these moves is he desire to restrict or delimit the potentially anarchic power of being caught up in everything with the staid and stately powers of the continuum. The wired is not a perpetual creation, Kan claims but a necessarily order one thing following another. What is so important in this stately move, is the fact that the rules are then coming from inside and not imposed from without ( This Kant thinks he is getting from Hume). That is that where before their might have been continuum in time, but this comitial was something external to me . Its proven Nance remained either hidden or the product of logical argument (Spinoza therefore presents us with physical argument and Leibniz with a moral arguments to what the continuity of the unversed is, and why it must continue). But these arguments are the ones which Hume then savages. He from his own perspectives doubt they tell us anything much about the word itself. To defend the continual against that anarchy that Hume would impose for it although Hume would not think it was an anarchy), Kant feels then, famously he has  found these continues on internal mechanicanisms. They must then become real dynamic elements in the mind, and not thereby the product of eternal force’s e continual then becomes the continuo things to be in me, and not merely the element, the anathema of world as it forces me this way or that.

 

Kant’s aim is therefore as he understandings it to rethrone sense in the world To this end he wants to annex two features of Hume's reality to new world order. The twin elements being the extremes of the Hume system, extremes that Kant needs to loop around on the other to claim that the kind is the one single system. On the one hand Kant wants to take over Hue’s conception of vivacity, and warp it very considerably. vivacity had been theist in the eye of reality it was then the little jerk that made actual perceptions different form mere ideas. it then opened us out on a different would, on the and through the fat the world was different. As such or as part of this in heralded whatever ideas where also in the mind including them in its lights, communicating to those that followed its power. The light f vivacity was the echo of something beyond s me in my mind. And Kants wants none of it. He wants instead to insist that this light of the world is absolutely mine. It is then the light I give , the sense I give to the world. All the artistry and creativity of the moving light in vivacious eyes is replaced by judgement, transcendental imagination and schemata. It thereby becomes my own creative force. He force I impose upon a world to make it this or that .He is force that is middling that world, and making it mine.

On the other hand Kant wants to take on some of the idea that Hume thought were at the most marginal to creation, namely space time and the self. These ideas were merely logical rubrics for Hume ideas without content or real power, deals that happened in the mind as one of the last place or point that ideas cold, before they vanished into fantasy. The self was then an idea that always could exist always could be inferred (or even causation) or realized. It was the ultimate poster idea. If I saw it, then one might well be able to say that I am a self that sees. Likewise space and time are ideas of a continua which cannot be proved, and could not be deduced form the perceptions as such and yet is not contrary to them It is created then in their great empress n the mind. The mind ends perception together it conjoins (not synthesizes) them and forces them to be in the same basic rubric, and of the same basic world.

She self and space and time as empty rubrics clearly are important to Kant. Te wants the empty abstract reality they suggest (a reality that runs in counter to the noisy monad which is a self as it contains all thing deluze deliberately makes powerful philosophy in confusing this empty or full abstract status).  Kant then to take this abstract stats and fill it with the living breathing vivacity of the mind. The advantage of this I that he self as the perpetual final product of the perception can as it is always there claim to be the alpha and omega of this vivacity. It can claimant hen to already be there, already to be a apart of it. It can then claim that he paths of reality the vivacity treads where in fact already their already its own. It pre-and post existence then allows I to slide the reality of complex ideas in the post world into the precondition for reality in the first place. Reality is then only given as it is journeying towards what the self can contain. The position at the end is then revised. The end is merely an expression of the necessarily precondition for thinking in the firs place. The journeys then that reality takes in forming the final complex ideas are caught or trapped in the route defined in the necessarily self. A self imposed upon the system as its condition.

 The Transcendental I think and it adjunct of earth transcendently imagination, becomes the means by which a perception in a space called me is rendered opaque and becomes as a light. It is my imaginings which renders the magic In a strength Hume’s greatest attack is turned around Hume's great attack of the idea of the self was that it could not be perceived (as space and time could not), Kant in making his move has made this non appeal to perception the strength of the idea. Time ad time again he reminds us time cannot be seen, I must then he immediately argues be imposed upon the system. The mind is that organ that performs this imposition. It is that that which forces (transcendental imagination) reality to cohere to a certain series of structures.

 Thus far Kant has saved humanity but sacrificing reality, that is he has sacrificed the element of perceptions which lies beyond a me, and drive. And yet his move opens out a real trap. Kan is aware that one the strengths of Hume and the rationalists was they were ace of reality beyond he. His philosophy thought is not. On the contrary it appears on initial glance at leas that these realities have slipped away and become something rather different.  He thereof faces the problem of whether external realty really is at all. Here of course he has a real problem, Subsequent philosophical history was already sipping in the direction of thinking the world purely in turns of Humans and man. if the external is lost then God is also threatened. Kant therefore needs to insist upon the truth f the external world even is thirtieth cannot be grasped. Or perhaps he kind of and that is a technical term) on the level of human can grasp it at the movement. That is when a something imposed itself. when it tumbles from without into the mind the  there is something beyond be for a whisker present o me. And yet t can only be a whisker. Is truth s revealed, and then snuffed our to transformed and the agents or gremlins of schematisism get to work, making myself what I perceive. The true is then excluded to an alarming  (but not a final degree). It is I a sense really out their and yet this out their as a thing only give in the phenomena of the moment,

This double need for a truth that is real and yet utterly external imposes upon Kant the Locke and or Liebnizian algebra of a mind which is caught up in itself alone. That is the truth might be out there and yet it cannot be understood or viewed as such. The id itself alone, and the humean and Spinoza arguments that reality involves something else shining through are mere illusions. It s the mind stupid that matters (although only because of the truths of the moment)..

 In a sense Kant has n effect turned Hume of is head.  The fire of the realty for Hume was the bright power of vivacity to link up ideas, while the actual perception of the moment where merely as empty as simple ideas. One might then need something beyond oneself to see greens and yet one can deduced a missing shade green, once one has even enough greens. The ideas are held firmly is resemblance and made real through it. For Kant, in contrast reality becomes closest to revealing itself in the moment and the phenomena of the moment. There glistening in the moments and their manifolds is something the mind really cannot comprehend. The work they or running these moments through and holing them together lies elsewhere. IT lies in the mind of humans and their logical structure.  A sharp contrast this theory draw between everything in me, and the shadows of reality that lie within a me at varying moments.

Kant one of the great having ones cake and eating it moves of philosophy. Reality is out their or least truth is. t is revealed to us in the moment. And yet it need not trouble us with its difference. It need not then make a dreadfully difference to us. It merely breaks though, and then we do all the rest. It is us who mach that reality up to a reality, and measure it as we world measure a house or a peace of hand according to certain inbuilt rulers, The mystery of continuity is then imposed upon the anarchy of emergence What emerges is only allowed to be at all it coheres with what we are, and how we are. The formula is as we are conscious then the world must be a continuum which reflex impression of our consciousness. The images that tumble into the would, moment by moment are the images that need to pay the price of this continuing They must cohere in it. And as there is nothing I can expect in the universe (beyond God), this continua needs to be the product of my own mind. Kant rallies us then to the causes of humanity, continuum and truth.; All he claims and fall together, and as we must support the one, be ought to support the rest.

Well maybe…

 

So far, perhaps as so good, and yet at each and every point there are clearly problems. Firstly then there are assumption that Kant makes about the nature of space and time, assumptions he needs to make to allow then to perform the task he needs them to. Secondly there are deep issues with his take on consciousness (and it loop back into space that time); and thirdly the nature arguments (the principles) or reasoning are founded on assumptions that both Hume and Spinoza would deny or claim were better understood elsewhere or simply differently.  Kant blithe appeal to common sense is therefore no such thing. Each reservation will be briefly taken in turn.

 First and foremost here, is the claim that one can have one rubric for continua. This rubric is not (quite) although at times I is clear enough that Kant dos simply envisage time as it ere space. However At other times (f example when he is thinking about apprehension and recollection, and so as ideas being fashioned; or again when we is thinking about he difference between causally and community, and time is being sorted he clearly realize that time cannot simply work in the same way as space. In particular time does not pass in the same way. It is not  the one moves from and is done with, Unlike on remembers the shade of cinnabar then the notion of the cinnabar is lost. However this is as maybe, what is clear is that a every point Kant does sublimate the formation of time the need to build the continuity in space and I time as a whole. That is what we want ‘time’ the formulator to do is build or support or construct, a single axis of continuity. A boat slipping down a stream will then be understood in terms of the same basic continuum (even is how that continuum within we is defend) is the continuum of space is.

 The continua is then king. That is the idea that impressions need to be arranged in the mind sot there is no gap and no difference. Kant gives two main reasons for this continua. N the one hand he thinks it is simply self evident. As the clock ticking or the lines is rule. The very notion of space and time implies continua. On the other hand Kant insists that as ones self awareness, in the I Think, is a continuum, so that as I am alive an wake I am aware , then this continuum must be expressed within my grapes of the world itself. The continua of space and time are then the world warped into a me, the world as my own consciousness demands it to be.

 However this argument is clearly flawed in four ways Firstly there really is not reason why the continua of space and time need to be one and the same. They might be. It might be the case that one can talk o a single continua and conjoin it between consciousness, space and time, so that one moves effortlessly between them. t is possible, in the same way that god if possible o the world. I is even possibly likely. The trouble is that it is unknowable  I is merely an assertion. It was of course against just such assertions Hume wrote. Kant it then merely repeating the mind error (albeit at a different level) that the entire Hume project serves o destroy, and doing this while ostensively critiquing that enterprise.

Moreover Kant is importing an incredibly daring hypotheses here. He is no doubt aware as the next person that consciousness does vary. Consciousness is  therefore in a sense a entree property. One can be more or less aware of things. Consciousness can then be said to be arranged across a spectrum of awareness. Kant's gambit is though that this spectrum is quantities. That I there is only one type of being coconsciousness, and one can be more to less in and of it. This hypothesis is not one that is absolutely self evident. Indifferent ways both Hume and Spinoza would distribute it. Hume ties different consciousness to different passions. To be angry is to live , and be conscious of an angry world. On might latter as another self or as the cipher of all selves attempt to reconcile that angry world with ones normal one, but that is not to confuse the two. Spinoza by contrast argues that the exact level of by consciousness sis defined by the sense the outside is tumbling into the me. To be gripped by the outside is therefore to be gripped  by an anothering that change my notion of myself and the sense that I am forming an idea of what I am My very ability to hold down consciousness therefore is transformed or slips or moves sideways.

A simple assertion that he is and is always in the same sense, hides then behind philosophical bluster an entire galaxy of possible doubt. As Nietzsche noted doubts that prevent one every saying it is an I that is doing the thinking here. It is rather an it or better it is things that thing. On is caught up in addressing or being made in many thinking things in me. That is one is caught up in the though provocation of things, things that then force more to bark this way or that. It matters at this point in a sense where these nothings are. They might be within a me or without, I canto know (and Kant certainly does not know). All ht matter sis that any equation with a single simple me is utterly fruitless.

 In short consciousness cannot be assumed to support the continuities of time and space or better it is only the blanket and most vapid assertion of being that makes this move.. Kant’s move is hen in effect only possible because in the name of the same continuity, he bashed consciousness, space and time into the same hole. They are conjoined and every point they appear one and the same appears then to matter. All else is merle illusion. And Kantianism is born!.

 Secondly there is a deep problem  with Kant; methodology in the construction of these continua. He wants to claim that the reasons one needs space and time is that moments by themselves over a manifold but ‘not on that can be gathered in  single representation’. He wants then to argue that moment is  a sense are little nuggets of impression They are there in the mind here, then here then here, as the phenomenal thing in itself. This once again is fair enough, and yet would be a massive assumption about he nature of the thing it itself, and an assumption of the worst form. That is an assumption which ultimately reversed an order. To connive the moment time tumbles into the and as a sealed off now is to import the notion of the present, which ought to be the final product of time (and actually is). Kant therefore prefigured what we ought to find to prove his case. In the same vein it is not clearly anyway that the moment is merely a lump o nuggets. Aristotle for one does not think the movement is quite like other things: Nows mark only ends, not beginning or change; they are what I numbering number of time and not the numbered nimbler etc. assumption is a very great here.

Given these reservation one is entitles to ask exactly why Kant is analysing the world in this manner. Why does he do want or so assume that nature needs to belong to continua? In a sense the answer here is simple. H assumes than one can only understand the world f it belong to a stately almost a regal order. I it the order on a continuum he wants. He wants then to present a world that can always have a hierarchy, and always have a pattern. He wants ice little lawns of minds, with possibly fountains playing…The Romantic point it is course that one can always hack such gardens out of the min. one can indeed create a garden of pure reason, if reasons at s the ability to order the mind is really what one wants. An yet beyond the light walls of the garden will lie other howling darkens that endlessly revive round such brightness and threaten it with shadows and worse. That I the depth of Kant assumptions revealed that his king of reasons might be a island of thought set in the shadows of god knows what, but this island is not sure of its foundation. O the contrary the shadows inhabit and haunt it, and at times appear to be it foundations. A Fact that Kant could have us blithely ignore in the name of order and light.

Finally at movement of his analysis it is clear that Kant is very aware that time does not really conform to space: if the cinnabar disappeared form the mind then one really could not grasp time at all : He rationalised this by claiming restricting his use of time to mere empirical investigation. Time as long as it construed this way no doubt behaves itself, I will ‘belong o the conscious mind as so far as the conscious mind is investigating the  world and creating that domain of order. The moment though the conscious mind I not doing such (which it is not the majority of the time); that is the minute it is actually living then all sorts of nonsense and involuntary memory and passion is thrown up be times., as the mind is dragged this and that trough a succession of possible me’s. Moreover is a kind of a way Kant knows or comes to know this. The very premise of Beauty in the critique of judgement is that there exists an order the mind or understanding cannot quite grasp or understand. I a sense then ones deep memory is surely like that (Hume thinks do at least0.Across all ones memories all those echoes of a me, there exists patterns and orders that defy simple reasoning (I did this then that), and delight or terrify our minds. Time even in the Kantian system clearly does not behave itself.

Kant therefore in the first critique restricts himself to that time which gives one a pattern, an order pattern of the world. That time which I always bounded by present and the wrapping up of a world in a field of concepts an a certain degree of consciousness. In this he is bound up in that particular image of the thinker as empirical investigator redefining the truth of the world. An yet Kan should (as Deleuze notes) really offers us more than this He ought to be more than this. After all his philosophy has founded in inner sense not merely the notion of time, but always the understanding that the world must be at its mot intimate level caught up with what we are. Time is what makes us and the world in the one throw To hen restrict the kind of time one thinks to one that utterly behaves as of that world and that me were different (as they are for Locke, but not interesting for Hume) is then daffy. I is to misrepresent what one has found – that is the point I met up with another in me. A thought no doubt Kant did not want and yet one that he found none the less.

In a sense this last point is not real critique. To discover a new world, that of inner sense is enough. The fact that one then configures that world as an adjunct to the world  (to discovers it by mistake, while one was doing something else) is the normal condition for discovery… However the point remains. That Kant’s entire defence of oppressive and enforced continua is based upon the idea that one can form a relatively simply conjoin between elements of the inside, which then allows one to transcend the somehow flawed element of the outside. The outside would is reduced to the ash of moments, and deprived of moving reality. The inside world is configured as rich and diverse. Indeed it is richer and more diverse hand Kant wants (we quite likes though ashes and will need them at times to steady himself). This division is then carried into the way we wants to formulate time as it actually grasps this world in the principles of pre reasons. That is he wants this basic living and dead division to define how and why knowledge enters into the world. In doing so Kant has of course defined yet another type of being finite.  Am finite as a little ocean of live, which imposed upon the dead  weight of the other, the outer world, a mess of continua. I am the point therefore that continua spring from. Death is thereby moved out of me and into the world. I am finite in understanding it.

 Kant therefore pitched the thinker or community of thinkers against the dead weight o the world. He rallies continuity as the means, the ruler to measure and possibly animate that death. Time is then formatted as the Trojan horse in which continua leap, continua that give Kant the right to measure, or to invent a self, and us the right to contain difference in a single axis. The point is in each case, can the world be so safely removed from its own orbit. That is time up to this job of sterilising the reality of the world as Hume at leas understood it? It is not, or not entirely, then the entire temporal project (where time is understood as a single axis of difference) becomes more problematic that might have been expected. Here once again Kant matters, as he defines the axis within which the time as inner sense it pitched, A sense that forms the world, in continua, but defining difference to it, in certain steadying principles.  

It was Kant therefore who claims in the first of his principles that time and substance are one an the same. In makings can he hopes he has dented the proud name of ontology, whose substance is a mere name in the discipline of pure reason. Well perhaps. However the problem of substance properly understood as les about actually knowing or even being able to speculate about what the stuff of the universe actively was, and more about trying to understand how elements beyond us break into what we are. Kan still of course has those elements haunting his thoughts. His problem is (as will be seen preabilty in the principles) he is stuck between an account that wants to allow the other in at some level; Or perception have then a reality; and an account that wants to strip from that reality everything hat really matter about, all difference, all ability to actually revolutionise ourselves. Substance as Spinoza o Leibniz understood it was the name for his problem That is the name for understanding how oddities beyond any one mind tumbles into that that, as did so as that mind. A mind became thought, whose accedence’s or reference point lay point it.  Mind was then the sequence impressions, and was so in the knowledge that somehow those impressions where dragged beyond ourselves. Substance therefore names in a sense the fact that the continuities of the mind are not enough to grasp a world that might always erupt otherwise. The byname then an ambivalence in every system, the ambivalence that what one is thinking is merely a point at a time and in a place.

Substance therefore forms the opposite poll to Kant’s finite mind. That mind lived in a dead world, a point of life. Substance I the insistence that this point might be real enough, and yet it only it because at some point in matter something is breaking through into the mind, something which allows or even encourages that mind in is finite beatitude

Without this other as a breaking or becoming point in the system, Kant is in the First Critique caught between two elements. On he one hand he certainly wants the other to materialize in the I think. More hand that, he absolutely needs that mothering, as without it his thought will coalesce around idealism of one for of other. However the problem is that he cannot talk sensibly about this point on the contrary he is haunted by  dual need to reduce the moment to noting, to allow the loop of vivacity as I think in, and the desire to have something other than me. His answer is to specialize the moment, which becomes things that can be counted as any other (and so a crude continuity asserted0, a move then given the present, is on of the product of the system is hardly very convincing.

 This reliance of the presents moment is seen at is worse in the axioms of Pure reasons. Here Kant insists that perception of large objects ids a series in time. Apprehends, then hold image on image in ones mind, and finally reckons up those images into a thing. One moves therefore  unity to multiplicity to plurality. As one sorts out the world Which sounds all dandy, And yet this reckoning is of weird kind, What is reckoned up are these moment, these points of  impressions, which are given time or reckoned or counted according to a time, and as in that time they describe a form. The problem is then that these moment, are deprive of all power of their own, They entry into the mind as flickers which re held within the imagination, as it creates the idea of the past for itself. This move then follows the necessity of Kant's argument, he takes into the self the powers of the outside to defy perceptions.

And yet this move then surely catches Kant in a strained quandary. On the one hand he has moment which is where the outside ought to be as such. They are out grasping of the outside And yet these outside elements behave in a stable and fixed manner. They flicker, are apprendehend and are gone. On the other side we have the mirror of this flicker in the understanding, which orders these flickers in neat little patterns which reckons up the beans counted in this or and that And between then, one has a mystery – that is the silent art of imagination. This must below to be (as my understanding tells me that he outside ought to behave as it thinks it should), and yet cannot brave sensibly. IT holds thing in a confessed mess. I insists that everything is date and then allows that time to longer in the mind as time (the Bergsonian chiming of the clock). It does not then behave according in a quite normal and rational way (and it is not wonder Kant in other critiques uses it as the point to escape rationality from). I cannot behave and will behave.

Kant's critique then solves; The mystery of how we perceive by a wonderful conjuring trick. The conceptual world is nice and straightforward, Concepts really are present; the world beyond me is similarly easy, for this is the world of fleeting moment. It might be a bugger to get an impression of, and yet it ought to be table in and of itself. The problem is the world in-between, the world of the past. This I not quite normal ; this non normality is then signalled by the use of the word transcendental. It I transcends the moment and renders it open for the concept, but how it does this is hidden. In effect Kant then simply renames  problem he or better is simply insisting that a problem  is within us, which other substantial or empirical  views has allowed was beyond me. That is it is the point of Leibniz (and a different way Hume) that a I cannot but confuse movement with something of time and so with making a difference in the mind, then the part of time, the moments best in themselves contain an urgency for perceiving. Perception of reality (as oppose to simple ideas) are therefore necessarily going somewhere and doing something,  and I must understand or grasp them in the oddity of that fact. The imputes echoing perception were therefore in themselves echoing into a mind resolving it this way or that is a way that child be contained within a single moment, that is a fixed bolt, but rather has a echo across numerous succeeding pointers or minute perceptions. For Leibniz therefore the minutes perceptions (which one can probably follow Deleuze in saying had a differential aspect to them) echoes across one another, and included in their perceiving a least impulsion (a desire). The role of appercetion was  to inhabit this time with a sensible construction of its own. That is it is the nature, the power of perception that it lingers are:  moments are therefore never simple.

Now Kant who of course knows his Leibniz very well, to conjoin Leibniz idea of reckoning up in aperception, with Hume's lively ideas. The force of apperception then is freed to become the power of the past, the power of the vivacious thought which is now restricted to the immediate short term past. However in blithely asserting that this force is simply a art of he, Kant is in effect (following Nietzsche asserting that one perceives by means of a means that is he has not explained or comprehended anything, he has merely changed the names. Far worse that this in this assertion he has muddied that problem about otherness tumbling it. The point of substance one reality was that it troubled the mind. It was that othering, that making a difference. Kant has then in his move simply denied or occluded this trouble. More than that he does this in the name of sense (the concept wants  a world will behave itself and only apparent in moment); an yet this sense  this being sensible’ clearly (of Hume but also Leibniz) moves beyond the world we actually live in/ is a feature of that world that perceptions and temporalities are caught up within one another. Minds have to inhabit this catch up. It would then take pretty phenomenal understanding or argument to move one beyond it. Kant asserts that he as moved beyond it, and then neglects to give us this argument. He merely want the move to be self evidently the consequence of consciousness, which for earlier thinkers it clearly was not. The result is then a blithe assertion, which might render things superficially easy, but only does so because it claims that the actually difficulty is unsolvable or unthinkable and so must be ignored.

This last point might be OK  in the service of the concept. The concept might be worth sacrificing actually understanding what the world is for  might e. but this is in a sense then a moral choice (a point Leibniz of course new). However if the concept is worth sacrificing substance for (that is the problem of becoming) it is likely to be so only at those times a concept has a special power and value. It will not be universally so, The Critique of reasons is then a infinite kingdom founded on the moral criteria that concepts are worth sacrificing reality was we perceive it for, Or that knowledge as concepts give it to us is itself good. That is it becomes a moral matter about where a human being themselves from (and what they leave to others , and when and how). his refer of ethical concerns (which no doubt are present for Kant) then takes the first critique in a new direction (and one I will return to latter).

 

The anticipations perceptions then attempt to address that even deeper problem of what, exactly a missing a moment. Here Kant is clearly – the moment is the phenomenal thing in itself. it is the moment that something, some other element of reality tumbles into ones mind, from somewhere lese. This is all fine. It certainly explains neatly the oddity of qualities that cannot be simply quantify grasped. They are what he mind has with it from elsewhere, and grasp at once and in the moment. And yet o course here Kant needs to qualify the argument. Hume cold have this move, and yet separate out the relativity, the vivacity of this qualtive moment with the  mechanics of vivacity. The qualities of imagination in the moment where a simple idea, akin toady idea of the mind, and yet they were  vivid one. They had then a borrowed element, which was already going somewhere else and doing some thing else. The reality of realty lay not twitch the quality itself, which was a product of the mind, but in the extra liveliness that when with that quality. The effect what then for Hume that reality was always breaking is, and leading elsewhere for the mind.

 Kant has of course squeezed, by and large vivid ideas and the otherness that surrounds them from his system. The result I that the otherness breaks though, as both a quality and a flicker in consciousness. The quality’s then hat which demands the consciousness to create something, as opposed to nothing. It is the flicker of a being within the being conscious. So fat Hume would agree, but merely not the that his souls not make this element different from any simple qualitative idea. But the Kant needs to imply (and as times for sometimes argue) that this quality, this being something was in some was an anticipation of an quantities effect to be had. One feels in the brightness of a light source, it power an anticipation of the effect it will have in illumining our world. The moment, I then the folding another quality of the effect that quality has upon the world, The wrapping up into a being, the unwinding of that being within me.

This move is then vital to Kant as it will allow him to warp into the consciousness the liveliness of vivacity. The vivacity is this element from outside. It is of course one of Hume’s mantras that one cannot or better must notices where the liveliness goes. Kt by contrast wants to argue that consciousness gives one a necessarily answer to that riddle. Or better one would have concealed the answer within a restatement of the problem. More than I doing so one will have of course confirmed the superiority of the continuum of time over all comes .Whenever the eruptive moment of quality, was in then end merely an anticipation of the mind.

The problem of course is that this marriage does not work and Kant kind of does not really even pretend that it does, on the one hand he can certainly argue that a quality at a moment generates a feeling of reality: it gives us then  something n the world, and a knowledge that there is a something there It anticipates then the world of actual forms, in giving us the fact that  there is something somewhere beyond us all. O the other this anticipation sometimes is caught up in the unwinding thru mind into other forms or fixtures, and across a consciousness. The anticipation is then also true to a degree. In this case Consciousness does forecast itself. His problem  I though that they two anticipations do not really did up. Call it the same thing by all means, but do not pretend that they are tee same. This was after all Homes punt (it is the place he starts the treaties).

OF course with hindsight it is possible to defined continuum against Kant's failure here, by spiriting it from the idea of consciousness. It is possible as Bergson and Deleuze do to argue that the quality of the moment, is in fact a pinch of time understood in a direct grasp. All the waves lengths of light are coughing the same filter of being, and teatime. The same process then hoods true in the mind. The mind takes these pinhead prepuces them otherwise. The anticipations are then caught up in the time that pretends the consciousness mind, including it, and anticipating it. The continuity of time often pulled beyond the mind at this very point. All of which is well nod good, and veer far from whatnot would want. He wants his time to behave within consciousness and has not allowed himself this space. Nor in a sense can he, He clearly ant the difference something beyond me to be other that c=the continuum of time itself. He wants that difference to address a point beyond every possible me. He wants it then not to be so readily reconciled with inner sense. One grapes it therefore at the moment and in defiance to inner sense. All of which is good (and shows the Kant has understood Hume or that matter Spiiza0 an has used them to move beyond Leibniz .And yet he cannot have h supreme other, this point of eruption, and simply expect that point to tumble into the mind at the same point as the mind becomes consciousness. Or if he dos he would have o have a very good argument to illustrate it doing so, and argument to counter first Humes and the Spinoza’s very cogent account of the difference involved here. Kant seems talk in the fish critique any such argument. He merely asserts radiacal difference, and then assumes that assertion is enough to answer the problem ad carries on as if he has solved it all…

 Turning then (very quickly) to the analogies of time: Kant beings the first analogy with a glorious statement of this case. He claims that substance as I s really understood I the mind is one and the same with time. Here he is no doubt following Hume (and splicing him with Leibniz), Reality is nothing we can directly grasp: it is present to us only in the flicker of the moment, it must therefore only be given to us through the mirage of inner sense. Reality and ontology are them humbled Well maybe.

 They are only of course humbled if he task of substance was total us what was real in realty as perceived it. This was never Size for example aim. On the contrary, and inspire the of the rather vulgar reason often moistures on hi, he is veer interested in the different between what the mind perceives within a body that remains utterly distinct format, and was is reality. Substance is then the name for the slips of ear that allows one to move from the outside to the in, or even to understand the inside as if it were a power of the outside. Substance was then a problem or an axis of problem: was a way to contain the twin faces that there is something called a boy in which a me is, and something beyond the body witch contains it, and which caduceus be up God knows where. Substance was then an install move in the maelstrom. Spinoza of one is keen to insists that his move, this pointer in the storm is open, a and problematic. He insets therefore that it cannot be contained in a continuum or in any single representation (substance is other that single perceptive affects), and remains a hang apart.

 Or to give Descartes as a brief example. For hams two substances exist as a problem, and not a solution. They relate then to the problem of the two world we apparently live in .on the on had the physical world where everything appears ordered and casual, a world which we might only know in perception, and yet which we appear to master. On the other there in something, call it a mind or a mental substance, whose nature is really complex and difficult to characterize. And yet it is difficult inspire of the fact that it is this substance this thing that we actually are, and that we directly know. Substance then registered the paradox that what we are not, a and know apparently only in the oddest ads asset of forms, the real physical world. appears easily to manipulate, while that which is given to us to be bees next to impossible to understand or even delimit (one and or a mental substance is a problem without answer).

In short substance fort he great substance thinkers was no strange bogy many of continuity this might not matter in itself, save for the fact that the move to substance as time of course contains the entire theory of continuity within it. IT makes continuity appear as if it were the only possible solution to the problem. That s every other thinker is portrayed as a philosopher o continuity, and to have go its nature wrong. The idea that substance as the point matter becomes tricky, the point the me perceiving the world or within the world problem breaks through the mirage of simple consciousness and its grand apperceptions is simply ignored.

Likewise with Causality, Kant is guilty of vulgarizing other thinkers to a very great degree. He claims that the logical outcome of the Human poison is that anything, saying the son rising tomorrow might not happen, and that this non happening is a necessary abomination. Well maybe, Except that Hume does not say that. All Hume claims is hat the c that the sun has always risen does not mean it actually must one cannot infer reality from succession.  However the certainty of this expectation comes not from he the order of reception itself, but rather from he liveliness gained by ideas endlessly repartee, We know then the sun is going to rise, or better we cannot think but that it will, because of all he connections between all the time that it has. T is therefore burnt into brains in repetition and as an idea one cannot control or think but will happen. But if it did not for some reason, Hume argues then that could be fine. We would not loose the claim reality that we had. We could not loose then the claim to the lively perceptions hat had been hey would suddenly not become unreal for us. All that could have to happen would be hat a new reality would need to be bread between these expectations and the reality as now. This move might be tricky in itself, a and yet would always by possible (and would anyway natural happen: the failure of the lively idea would itself diminish see of it glamour in the face of othering reality: it would water down just as he seceding idea started o be born).

The lack of certainty of an exterior world as such dos nothing matter for hem as the conjunction that is the principle of causality insures that that reality that is burned heatedly within our mind, the vivacity of something beyond a me, is such hat what does happen will not destroy the mind.

 The hour of cause Kant rally feels is then not the hour for outrages causality. n the control it is in the logic of Hume argument that as I have a body, which has both vivacity ands simple idea within it 9as something disitnx0 causality will happen. What horrifies Kant is rather the fact that this dissention in reality, the simple qualities idea dent h vivacious is present and real. Hat I what horrifies him is the fact at my mind is, in the logicl of Hume actually patterned in a beyond to me (according to corporeal principle I also am)This is a horror as it implies there is not necessary internal unity to myself or my soul or anything I am. I is a moral scruple. His demand then that causality gives the mid unity is the demand that it finds in itself a principle to present whatever happens. That s the demand that it anticipates that Hume will be for it. E therefore claim he minds needs a principle of causality, a rule to pattern events for itself, an so finds an apriori and external category.

Hume would of course argue that his apriori was merely a watering down of whether said, that is it us as external and vivacity and yet weaker than it, in that it cannot be directly seen or aced on, it is a mere abstraction, where his idea as a real consequence of that Reality that really is given to us.

Likewise Spinoza would claim that Kant's critique was merely a vapid reposition of what he contended. At the end of book one of ethics, Spinoza develops a clear position that argues that causally I merely the price we  need to pay for perception. Perception is after all the me you in me of being. I grasp a you as a thing within a me; this being of you then comes from something beyond, it comes from an elsewhere to me. One might call it an priori category if one must. But then one does two to shut down al thought (or to made though falsely bow to the consciousness that is aware of this car gory). It is a little more hones Spinoza suggests to argue that this other is somewhere beyond m mind, in the world, a and yet I cannot know whether this beyond is of my body or the old. All I know is that something beyond to me is effecting me, for a while. The other element in this that can be known is that this other is often disrupted. The perception the dies and is replaced o becomes unthinkable, but another. What the can be concluded her eyes that his othering of that other is also in a beyond; and that there is something in this other prescient that makes the first utterly understandable. Causally is the point put me within which I am; but also the name for a stream of turned of time; that is I did think one thing, and the one perception within me caused that perception to be not graspable within a me. Finally, one might also argue that within a perceptions flow as I realties to that which is beyond to me, there age patterns. New perception not only precludes others, but also it brings in yet other perceptions To think he sun, is to think light and warmth or to think peters to think at another time Paul. Here is then a sense that perception as it is engrained in a somewhere beyond me has within itself its own ordering: or perception leads to another or rather is automatically caught up with other, so the mind goes from one to other.

Causality then has three different lives; essentially in the mind as we perceive it realties o a hidden othering; that is a point beyond us in which the other enters into a mind as something apart from our nature: The knowledge of the cause in the ‘third’ kind of knowledge- as it essentially is But it is also a common notion (the second type of knowledge); in that causes cross relate one with the other, and clearly do something, somewhere o each other or rather to the process soft that othering within me. As I am then within myself looking up them, as  hold them in commotion cantor something of this world beyond me. Filly, causes are in the fist type of knowledge, ordering or turning of the mind that is driven one way or other.

 The fact hen that there needs to be another beyond me for excepting to make any sense, has for Spinoza consequences of the body and on ones understand of the beyond, consequence that cannot be easily squeezed into a sing axis of cause nor should they be. Kant in has consideration of cause restricts himself to those in the conscious minds and as they realer to the body y, and therefore those that lack antsy principle of their own, and therefore it is no surprise to the Good Spinoza rat Kant needs simply import one, or invent one to make good this lack.

 I short older Pre Kantian throes of cause has merely asserted that a cause was the condition of otherness within me. This might be based on the difference between simple ideas and lively elements o between the difference elf ideas relating to the outside of the world, the outside of thru body or the mind as it is caught up in an out siding process. Kan of course does not real allow himself this move, One the contrary he must, and really must invert it. That s to make consciousness as his reading of continuum king he must Inver the pattern here. Causality becomes then a thing imposed upon the mind, a thing were one must go from A to B and not think about it. Reality, that is offering becomes then necessarily within the mind: One cannot reverse it (or perceive it0. I becomes imposed from a beyond; a boat must go down the stream, inspire of the fact that the ordering or perceptions could have allowed something else.

 Well maybe; but Hume would say that the liveliness soft ideas all went the going down the strum manner, while Spinoza would argue that the fowl within a stream and the bus where caught up in the same set of cause, which precluded stillness or would make it already a problem. I short thy wood both pullet he ideas of the what allows the difference out to the outside, and the conations one pays for perceiving the outside from he outside, and not feel the need to assert and owning of this differences.

 Here Kant would  no doubt protest thrift you look at the community of perceptions, where causes run one into the other , this argument of the puts side is not enough. That is in the community the same flow does not produce order so there eyes nothing within perception not make order matter. Hume can ignore this argument 9he holds the difference between simple ideas and lively elements to explain just this point: the difference between the vivacity going one way or being open). Spinoza would argue that actually these are perception ally different anyway. It is true that at a present one can inhabit man different perception in many different orders, and that if one follows the patter of the perception alone (and ignores everything else0 this would seem like a mirage of consciousness. But then would argue this is really notes they are to me. that is the point of a present is that element of it are given to be caught up in one another -  That is one gives the other without precluding that theirs existence or without forcing one you move from one idea to another. On the contrary to the perceiving mind as it is existing within a body all these element will appear to run together within a cause or a something beyond he. They wall not then have a necessary order one giving to the other: h order s given within my body, and within what I am doing. The different then is the difference of a body making a difference (and by this  mean hat bit o the body that relates to me, the body my mind understands0 in regalia to something beyond (such in reline to these difference appears the same0, and the difference being imposed unpin at boy The fact then that understand this as different is merely  consequence of where the mind is within the world.\ Spinoza might actually add here that it does not matter if the cause undertook herein the singular beyond is actually many lament. The point is that in reaction to its feet upon my body it is single as a point beyond me, a point having impress in many way, and according to the many things I know I am.

 Presents are then nods o elements beyond and single causes, or series of interlinked beyond that do not simple a mind to move this way o that. Ad once again Spinoza a would claim there is o need to invent more reality.

 O once again he might add, the only needs is if consciousness understood in its driest and most sterile form is held to be sole king. Such  reality would need all the hep it can get (although Spinoza might well join with Hume here, and wonder f apriori principles are really enough to support such a dry and dead beast as pure consciousness)…