3-d Series part 2

 

1.1        Heidegger suggests that the parts of time need to be compose n a series of elements, each repeating the other, is a different sense:

1.11    whence the future is the toward: the having been is the to, and the present is the alongside.

1.2        each repetition the previous element as a moment of transition, or better a way of repeating towards another element .

1.201 these states are then defined both with and without the

mind. The having been is therefore at once a moment of global story, but also a mood in the mind.

1.202 Or again the towards of possibility understands oneself

within the world not as anything stable or fixed for much as a sequence of powers or an ability to shift in ones nature, all the way up unto to. To be alive becomes then capable of change and to accept the challenge of that change.

1.203 To be alive is therefore caught up in dying: at It is

caught up in he mechanics of no longer being there – of not having a possibility. This death, not only lies at the end of all things, it is also as the ultimate grounding for the entire system:

  1.204 Death is then the ultimate givier of the structure of

possibility. It is the things that is always haunting, always unpicking the future, and yet which can never be there are all.

1.205 Death is therefore the point at which that in me   cannot   

be fixed, as the fixing point lies beyond anything I could under any circumstance have within being;

 1.206 Change is therefore not an option for being, is what

  make or gives it.

 1.21 What is more in asking the domain of possibility to stop

been itself, into that which lies beyond all possibility and all being, Dasein itself is change.  Understands he roots of what it is lie beyond its nature, and so demand hat nature is not its alone. it is not merely possibility. It is also caught up in the world or domain of the having been, a having been that its schemes also are a part of and participate within.

1.211 Dasein is therefore not merely a possibility, but also as that

possibility is grounded in what lies beyond every possible, also a moment in history. I needs to act, and act here and now, and across a life. It needs therefore to participate within the having been. It needs to set its site up as a part of the having been, or that that will be given in other times as a part of it.

  1.212 Finitude becomes then creative. It is the sense To exist

 towards, the point that I am finite means that I can be different things or could have a different life: it allows me my difference, in a way that God cannot be allowed.

 1.2125 The possible is then that which defines what it is to be in

another, in the sense that one is always caught up in changing-  in another oneself, and is all the way up to when one is not at all. Possibility is therefore the medium which always is beyond ones nature, and is so because the ultimate possible lies beyond every nature: Possibility is the point I move beyond myself, I become then my own another, as I am given in having possible life:

1.21251 An another that is of course all the more rich and

complex, in that is cannot ever be finished or co,elted. To be alive is to be then in myself as another.

1.213 And in allowing that difference it also restages the action

off the mind in another stage: the stage of being a part of world history, a moment within things. To act here and how, is therefore to have the ac linger, of it o be a part in global history, even if what part that it is never known.

1.214 This lying amongst the stuffs of the world is then double

edge. Not only, are my actions a part of history, but also as I am finite I am also caught up in the world of things.  Am therefore already always caught in a domain of pre-exiting thoughts, and elements that are already there.

 1.215 My finitude, my sense of being finite as a being, gives the

fact that I am a moody bugger, or I lust after Hannah Arendt, at the same moment as I give global history in me; It defines then the sense that these lusts or moods exist among the stuff of the world as already there – the unnegoicatables of being finite.

1.1216 Thence finite attempt to leap through the trap off being

in the body. is tap has since at least Spinoza hypothesized

a  body both of and yet also beyond me. It was my nature, because I was a think inside it;  was then the body that gives me a nature.

1.217 Heidegger then break this power by restaging it. It is true

that as I have a finite being, that is as I am or a while then I exist amongst the other staff of the universe. I am in my own way among the having beens of he world. As such my body is also a having been. It lurks there around me, giving me pleasure an participating in my moods. And et the very sense that this body is having been, is also the sense that things be they state, institutions or global collapse are also out there, beyond me, and yet gripping my nature in their fate.

 1.218 The having been therefore defines the sense  as finite am

among the elements, be they present at hands or something historical in the world. But defines therefore myself as finite within a great medium. It defines a life their as it occur in another.

1.22 And yet of course one is within his medium only as one

acts or understand how one action themselves are.

  1.221 Here once again what will matter is the sense that one is

only in this personal and global history as actinos: One is not a God simply there, but rather in ones doing, in the things that one makes or the may on responds, one becomes a part of things.

1.222 Dasein acts therefore, and in acting becomes as the

residue of its previous action a part of what is already there: a resource, of it own, a having been to draw upon.

1.223 Ones own being therefore demands that one acts to               become a part in ones own history, and a resource for

 the future, even as one is that part.

    1.224 To be here and now, in the action is therefore to be in

 the name of the having been, and these sense tat things simply are, acting, and is to give ones resources, give one possibilities for other times.

1.225 One acts therefore in the present, at the present in the

hope of becoming anothered by that action. On acts with others, and in doing so draws the domain of possibilities, or what will occur and will be into juxtaposition with that is already there.

 1.226 Possibilities are the created out of what I already am,

and new options allowed: For Hannah o pass the exam is to allow the past work to be pitched into a unknown future. The past opens out, in the moment, in the taking and concentrating of time into the exam, into other elements, other things that one can be.

1.227 What is then anothered in the present is essentially my

own being, my own life. I become able to transform a nature, an make it repeat otherwise, as my very ability to have possibility is challenged and changed.

1.228 Reality in a sense, that is what was already there, break in

at the moment and allow a limited free throw of my being: I am dawn then not merely alongside the past and the future, the world and the self, but also different version of myself are caught up in the parity.

1.3        To be finite becomes in these moves a proactive thing.

1.31    On is not simply there, simply finite for another or because one is within another.

1.32    On the contrary one is finite as on is in another, and as the condition or very ruse or means for being within that other.

1.33    And yet this move, great as it is, clearly looses something. Something Heidegger is clearly aware of by the end of being and time.

1.34    The joy of pulling out the body from all the rest of time, is that it pitches a different sense one is finite at a certain point of time. To be finite was then dawn into the very different world of beings and away from the mere world of Being.

1.35    This then meant that as one was finite as sealed within oneself one was actually caught in a world of being as well as being. And this difference also needed to be allowed for and articulated.

1.36    The difference matters as this fleshy gauze of the body is hat sops one form simply assume one is master of an albeit finite being or history.

1.37     On act as a part of something utterly else, something not easily Understood or grasp in being, and yet other than death.

1.38    This fact then means the elements hat relate to this other dimension, that is moods are not necessarily the same as global history itself: he sense of the past need not be one and the same, therefore (and surely are not).

1.39    Nor can one move very freely from the wild dreams of Dasien through the augenblick to global history, as to act is always to be a body, and as a body to have that action course by other elements n so unpredictable and never simple or finished.

1.40    That is he body cannot as it relates to being be simply dismissed as stuff others worry about (and so not really their for being itself).

1.41    Understood as a present at hand that might well be true, and yet understood in the mystery of giving one a world and looping into other dimensions in that being, this is certain bonkers.

1.42    That is there exists her an another, that which loop the body up, which cannot be simply grasped in the assertion of Bing as the medium in which or through which all othering occurs.

1.43    A domain that lies beyond being, and yet before the they (others understood and nodes of influence, as being at hand); the domain of beings and of body. A domain where other finite elements, other realties really do tumble into what one it.

1.44    This blindness of beings has then, but also hilarious consequences on how one patterns Heideggerian thought and the series that overwhelm it.

 

2.0 Heidegger will in effect present the series of care pretty

      much in the raw:

2.1 The towards of future, the to of the past, and the along

      side of the present, slip into a series that runs: To Ward With

2.11 The first voice of this series in clearly the future: the future is

the toward, which uses care (warding), and uses the world to be at all. Thence to have possibility at all, is to attempt to change ones nature through the mitigation or effect of another. One moves, via care, and the world, towards being other. ToWards with…to Wards.

2.112 The second voice then pitches in with the having been,

which wards with to.

 2.113 That is it takes care of or respects that it is , by using or

 making up the present, an action made in the name fo the future. To ward with possibility, to make what might be effect how one understands what it already here, already shining in the present, becoming among things, is the message of the past.

2.1131 To be then in a mood is to have a future patterned,

 through what one already is.

 2.114 And one needs then to take real care, about what one is

and how one acts. 

 2.115 Finally with to ward, gives the sense that what I am

alongside is never simply there for me. To exists rather as away of slipping into another time, or toward another way of moving a life, my life.

 2.116 I am therefore with others as those others allow be to

different what I am: The present I never fixed in a here and how, but is rather the slippage of the ready at hand (and never present at hand) into an othering domain.

 2.12 Thence to care is to among others, other little slips of time,

which pattern what that care is. It is therefore to do something some own self, and to allow others to be for one in that doing.

2.121 To care is therefore to assert ones right to be among

other things, and the user of those other things ( a use that gives ones own way or manner to be at all).

2.122 And yet once again the stats of these others is rather

tricky, as one can clearly one be with others (with

the past) as that with establishes relatively known units.

2.123 Even when one is using the future the future, as one cares        

in always known, it is always about what is known as where the future will slip.

 2.124 and yet this is then to attempt to screen that caring from

 the very real power of that with. To be with another is to be open to that others challenge in one.

2.125 it is therefore to be everything but caring. One is caught

up in a future one cannot control or master or even relate to; Another ought o break in at a with (and one is finite) – another being being genuinely different, or a ready to hand doing something else.

 2.126 Care is not the first place one is when in this breaking in.

 Or better it is surely the reaction to the break. As other sweep up a being my being, I need to take care. But this taking care then ignores or attempt to simply assert mastery over what logically comes first: the fact that reality other than me transports in that with quite otherwise to were I might have been,

 2.13 I is I suppose no real surprise that Heidegger in the best

 traditions to a dialectic over does his reaction to Kant. He

critiqued Kant for wanting too indistinct a series:

2.131 That is Kant had supposed one could have a series that

all came down to I think somethink, when he needed to be more specific about the nature of that thought.

2.132 He opposed this then with rather a too specific thought : I

care for…, a care that has, In the best molly coddle traditions wants to overwhelm the difference of other held within it, and assert its own rights to be.

2.133 That is one needs to also ward against care, otherwise it can so very easily overwhelm a nature….

 

 

2.2 In the second section of Being and Time Heidegger clearly

 develops a slightly different series.

2.201 This series will run That is being… that is being

2.21  Is  Being That? The possible asks of itself. Being as a finite,

being within the medium of the possible all the way up to death, is the being of a series of local questions. One is in the question one asks one oneself and the kind of being that one reflects.

2.22 At the same time an answer comes back, Being that is. The

having been then form a world or idea of the already there. One might ask questions f ones own nature therefore, and yet find elsewhere (including in a part of a nature) the answer to that being: its othering nature as a thin there, a thing that one can only be by being within.

 2.221 Ones own being finite as the same moment as it opens

 ones own life up to difference and change, supposes or at least poses, other elements as distinct from one self, and with another kind of being.

2.222 Impressions become the axis for attributing others a being

of their own.

2.23 But finitude then gives also as clear and unambiguous the

moment that one unreveals or unfurls oneself in the acing as a being.

 2.231 That is it also says That is being – that is acing that is living.

In the being here and now, in the controlling of a fate, and the forcing history otherwise a reality is given, and my being is conceived.

 2.232 Being IS therefore given in the inhabiting of a world

through an action – In that acting.

2.24 And yet once again this last point raised the entire

problem of how one understands that being finite. I is this really the finite one is in towards and including death/ or are the sense of Being finite actually rather different in this last sense. That is the is the sense that one is using or misusing anther different from the sense one uses others in possibility? And if they are different how does that reflect upon or within the rules lining these tenses.

2.241 Or to put it slightly different. I is on thing to separate

 out tenses and pitch their individual linked lives, as different ways to express the sense that one is within another (and so finite) and to then assert that this being within another, is actually the same being. That is that all these assertion of individual tenses hoop into each other, as it this was merely the I think and consciousness all along.

2.242 the power of the finite to insert itself is all easily consumed

by the assertion of consciousness when the originally o the idea actually pulls against its on unity. I pulls the idea towards beings (in spite of Heidegger's squawks of protest). The dead then becomes caught up in a finite it lampoon  as some how false others  yet cannot master.

2.243 or to put it one last way, the power of Heidegger’s idea

lies less in being and not in the pitching of series as independent ways of capturing a finites relation to another within something else. This within is then not  simply, things (and cannot be simply cross related).

 

 

 

It is then to these freed finite series and the any shifting sands of others they create, then next essay turns.