2 Cautionary Notes
Case 1: What happens if you try to assert control of a life as that in which on is in of
The Background. Theories which based reason and thought on identity are stale affairs. Life tends to become reduced to a problem of neurosis. I merely a self working out its own world. It labels and rebels, and then designs of builds feeling based upon those labels. Very little real stuff actually happens it such a self. It is merely an observer, a thing one and alone. The model of humanity or being becomes then a mere flicker of epistemological consciousness.
Te proposed solution; Heidegger suggested that on ought to understand the world not through the jaded specs f a self, but rather through the hassle and bussle of actually having being Being is exciting. It is vibrant. It creates it own livening breathing thinking world, in a way that the self does not. Time becomes then an engine house of being. Or perhaps better time is where being expresses itself. But Living time is carry not chronological time: it is defined not in straightens but rather in repletion across tenses. That is to be alive is to straddle tense, and worry about what one will be, and think or learn on what one was. Time I have and the repetition in one tense of ideas from another. What s more each of these tenses give the tradition between the other two. To be I he past, is the to be also thinking how the world one envisages in the future, might come into actually being. Thence time becomes a future, which is composed in possibility. Future is something one relates to a s a place of manufacture and constructor. One builds into a ;future. It is where what on is can be unpicked and rethrown, and can be until death. Death demands not just that futures are realized, that is that one does something (and so throws one back into the having been), but also forms the ultimate key to possible-impossible relations As a I die the entire edifices is build on nothing. It is built of my ability to use wt I have, and rendered or re-render what I am throughout a living time. Death gives the fact then that there s a limit to what I can do in time, but not in being. needs or at least can change – it can repack where I am. Finally death is the limit to time As I Die time is mine alone. it asserts my control over that time or at least my right to it. My light to possibility. My possibility might be groundless, and yet it is a death right- But death imposes on the possible that shift to the past. As I dies there exists that must exist as their, and in being finished ha a power. That is it gives then world of having been. Things which linger in the mind or the word, an stand for actions, and stand across time. The stuff of reality then becomes there, and fixed. It becomes thing to negoiciate or speculate upon. He past Heidegger brilliantly changes where one looks for the past. The past as such is not about what is done, but rather about what lingers in the presents as partially or completely finished. N defined then the sort of things we find ourselves within, and not a straight tome at all. The past s the given through the present. It is all about being of the present. As such the present as such clearly resonates through the past or better those actions which as they tumble into the having been, become possibilities for other times and one places. He present I not dry time, so much as the creation of a flicker in time, a flicker where the having beens become there established, fixed unto the world, and the possible, the new futures, the places or reaction that having been will be taken up and used the futures it is already becoming a part of. The present is the flicker of the augneblick. Or the junction box of that reciprocal rejoinder of past and future. The rejoinder where the past negotiates what it is, in the light of the future that it creates, and the future likewise evolve. The ecstasies become them, among other things: The right to time and to creating = death his the point I differ from all else at, the point I must not ever loose sight of in life – the point which gives me a power t stand alone in all the world or weight of experience. A past which is not anything but memory as such as its difference, but rather a relation to being within the world. A sense then that on cannot control everything, and that there are parts of places to be inside. And finally a present within is not a now, o much as a mutual exchange- a place where past and future get to re-stitch what they are and crises cross across each other.
The flaw. Heidegger's explication is very beautiful and yet rather staid. I a sense its problem is always that problem of time it thing it attacks. It wants to replace a linear time with the a story of a life unto death, and yet this is surely only half the picture. The problem of possibility is hat it does not relate to the one mind. As I am caught in possibility, I am caught in that which is tumbling into me beyond my death, form an outside that demands me to face that death endlessly. OR better that demands I sing according to what was within a me. The very notion of possibility, is the tumble into place beyond oneself therefore. A tumble into what one is not yet. Likewise the Having been of personal history can easily unable into a possibility, and become that point alive changes or is challenge – the point from which everything is once gin different – on a personal evil, And yet, to move beyond this to history and the fateful account is story is or bigger claim. One would have to all be a part of the same history for that and yet the logic of the reciprocal rejoinder ought to need one elsewhere. If the past is is not absolute as such. its standing there is not fixed (Heidegger knows this) but then one cannot simply act to be a part of it. What one does may or my not be a part, it may or may not be taken up by it or through it. One acts then as the engine of possibility. The revelation of augenblick, the point the having been transfigures into possibility in the an illusion. Possibility might well not be listening…. So that while Heidegger really wants to seal time in a neat little loop, where personal history and global history ought to meet up somewhere – and yet he cannot effectively o it Or he cannot without that authorities problem of an individual attempting to compel history to be something. One has not right to a sort of possibilities which tumble towards death, a death itself contains also a membrane – that which is beyond me utterly, that which I can only understand in corpse mechanics ,and yet which tumbles through me. Likewise there is nothing I the reciprocal rejoinder force the past or the future into a unity. On the control there ought to be the anathema to history- the point one cannot have a historical from, They are after all the points In which and through which the past becomes as it is there a things others also have access to Or having been becomes then the point we mutiny a world form. Or better it becomes the single feature I having world, the pointer from which multiple possible spring. Pointer which s it exists through many beings in many time periods of lives, does not inspire the same possible. As such the having been is not simply the lingering of what was within the personal world. It is rather the elements between different Being – different takes upon being in different lives. It is that element which jingles jangles constellation of possibilities one with the other, and renders them open and relative to each other. But also it is that event which then articulates these exchanges for other times, other exchanges. This second articulation then will (in he light of death – that is the passage of time) render the past a resource in which pasts and for present can be can be forged. A series then of paradigms or safe exchanges with the dead. Now it is more than clear that Heidegger knows all this -second move very well and has a fair gasp of the first. The real terrible is that he wants to ultimately claim that the second which is ironically linear in form, and personal in nature (one can think a global history), is prior to the other. It is not, the exchange change within times of rejoinder oozes into history More than that in a sense it has a master hand over history. It is in the messy world of today, that the past is being plundered. It is in the exchanges we currently are or have a right to. It is not then the past which overhangs. Death bad the forcing of difference and change and the reciprocal rejoinder jolt out of Heidegger’s linear live, an become caught in many other dimension.
Case 2; Deleuze and the event.
Maybe the argument ten runs one should invert the whole affair. Maybe on should simply talk events, those element which transcend death, an having beens possibles and rejoinders as the true external elements. These events would then impact upon minds as that which forces them to act in the light of having been. The are the having been agents. More than that, they do so from a domain of possibility. That is from the domain of myriad possible universes all caught up in the same event. Events are not bridges but points of differing. To cross a bridge the Rubicon on is therefore at once to define a series of world one is no longer within, and a open to a new series or set which takes that action and builds it into myriad new combinations. The advantage of this model is clear. One immediately looses that bind of having the one past. Events reality is not that of stuff. Is gossamer. The same event is different tin differing mindsets genuinely different. There is no real or actual fixed past as such. The past is then free, really free o be different. differing past in differing individuals will then meet, or collide or stop one into and thought the other. I become multiple. My life is to create a possible for yours and visa versa. We become caught up in each other. The rejoinders are then knocked into genuine rather complex an intricate exchanges. We constantly re-negotiate the meaning of our past, and our events. We then take the event and reply to it (the battle of Hastings as has many different lives across many differing times – it creates a shadow across mind). Events create a world of exchange and the power of exchange. More than that every event is clearly pitched in the blind of death. They act through this blinding spot. That is they act through the point I am no and never can be. They act to challenge anything I might be. They partially slay what I was, an the power of the other breaks into what I was. The powers that Heidegger liberates re then truly freed. And yet at his point there is a clear new problem. One can relatively easily create the world of evens as the middle for everything else. That is the element which allows the world to be perpetually shifting and challenged. The pint in which the exchange and death re punned one to the other, and gathered in the same univocal difference. I differ in the sense that the world exchange one to the other And yet one then has problems actually working out what individuals and lives are. In a sense they necessarily fall of the spectrum Perception looses (ironically) something this otherness, becomes it is only about perceiving or grasping another – and lives loose their unity. A body becomes then either a statistic or a series of intensities: it looses omogenity, and the ability to hld together as such as perceiving. His lose is considerable: Empty egos or universal bodies are not unites that one can capture the rather sublet and very different series of interplays intra and inter human or species or world. All these exchanges actually pose different relation one or the other. They create or force upon us a difference that is actually different. To watch another eye brows moving and to read a partial truth from it, is not quite the same as to watch cumulous clouds blind up and wonder in there is rain. Both inhabit a world of the possible, -sure: but where that possible is in the mind, how it relates to all those boring ways one predict knowledge, and interrelates of personal relations, is so complex, that any simple assertion of univocal single series of difference is at best an aposteri fact. That is it is always true some change happens Always true that a something a difference is there. This is not the point 9any more than it is the [point that certain genes increase in numbers other ideas of. What matters are not univocal differences or selfish genes) but he reasons which he the reciprocal exchanges occur as they do. that is what matters are the different ways a death tumbling into mind becomes another exchange between differing minds. The blend of he exchange- the differing ways to relate to that exchange. That is the fact that two individuals are reacting a perception they see as the same or in a similar from, and then in reacting bind on to the other is a different kettle of fish o the reaction to the event The straddle of the sharing changes our nature. All the more it will then change it in the exchange where two individuals resend one to the other. That is rejoinders ad death are not simply punned. One cannot simply say they are one and the Same thing .In the same way that Heidegger could say that time forms a loop. Sometimes and at certain levels they are the same. Rejoining and differing in another are gathered towards the future - and so can be located in a difference. And yet to do this, to make this the future all ht sings is a Dawkins of a preposition – an one Deleuze does never a really accept anyway. He knows that he kind of need also other differences acts well as events, even though it take him until the fold to find them, and he finds them not in philosophy but ultimately art |