Research Interests

My current research focuses on three interconnected areas: democratization, electoral authoritarianism, and democratic survival. My recently published book investigates the link from coups, wars, and ruling-party elections to democratization, showing that these events mediate the effects of protest and socioeconomic variables. In a related AJPS article, I find that the effect of economic development is conditioned by autocratic regime strength and violent leader change. Among other implications, this explains the well-known puzzle of why average income predicts democratic survival, but not democratization. I also have an active research interest in the international dimensions of democratization.

A number of my projects examine elections in autocracies and their effects on policy. I argue that autocratic elections reveal information by channeling popular demands to the ruling party, leading to policy concessions and regime change. In a related project, I use international regime diffusion as an instrument to test the causal effect of electoral authoritarianism on policy and human development outcomes. My other autocracy research examines the strategic adoption of multiparty elections, the fates of autocratic ruling parties after democratization, and the effects of migration from autocracies.

My work on democratic survival includes an edited book and article on democratic attitudes in hybrid regimes, as well as projects on how powersharing influences democratic survival and how intergenerational economic mobility affects support for democracy. My methodological research includes a critique of matching and current approaches to causal inference. Several of my papers employ formal models, with a focus on elections and regime change.



Democratization

Shock to the System: Coups, Elections, and War on the Road to Democratization. 2021. Princeton University Press. Link, Amazon, Online Appendix


Abstract: How do democracies emerge? Shock to the System presents a novel theory of democratization that focuses on how events like coups, wars, and elections disrupt autocratic regimes and trigger democratic change. Employing the broadest qualitative and quantitative analyses of democratization to date, Michael Miller shows that more than nine in ten transitions since 1800 occur in one of two ways: countries democratize following a major violent shock or an established ruling party democratizes through elections and regains power within democracy. This framework fundamentally reorients theories on democratization by showing that violent upheavals and the preservation of autocrats in power—events typically viewed as antithetical to democracy—are in fact central to its foundation.


Through in-depth examinations of 139 democratic transitions, Miller shows how democratization frequently follows both domestic shocks (coups, civil wars, and assassinations) and international shocks (defeat in war and withdrawal of an autocratic hegemon) due to autocratic insecurity and openings for opposition actors. He also shows how transitions guided by ruling parties spring from their electoral confidence in democracy. Both contexts limit the power autocrats sacrifice by accepting democratization, smoothing along the transition. Miller provides new insights into democratization’s predictors, the limited gains from events like the Arab Spring, the best routes to democratization for long-term stability, and the future of global democracy. Disputing commonly held ideas about violent events and their effects on democracy, Shock to the System offers new perspectives on how regimes are transformed.

“Restraining the Huddled Masses: Migration Policy and Autocratic Survival,” with Margaret E. Peters. 2020. British Journal of Political Science 50(2): 503-33. PDF


Abstract: Although control over citizen movement has long been central to autocratic power, modern autocracies vary considerably in how much they limit the freedom to emigrate. Various motives come into play: Mass exit and foreign influence threaten autocratic leaders, but emigration can also stabilize regimes by expelling dissidents and encouraging remittances. We disentangle these effects by analyzing the interaction between migration flows, democratization, and regimes’ strategic choices of emigration policy. Using a half-century of bilateral migration data, we calculate the level and targets of expected emigration given exogenous geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. We find that when citizens disproportionately emigrate to democracies, countries are more likely to democratize and autocrats restrict emigration freedom in response. In contrast, a larger expected flow of emigrants, which signals emigration’s economic benefits, predicts autocratic stability and freer emigration policy. Our results have important implications for autocratic politics, democratic diffusion, and the political sources of migration.

“Emigration and Political Contestation,” with Margaret E. Peters. 2022. International Studies Quarterly.


Abstract: How does migration influence global patterns of political violence and protest? While political scientists have examined the links between trade and conflict, less attention has been paid to the links between migration and conflict. In this paper, we show that higher emigration reduces domestic political violence by providing exit opportunities for aggrieved citizens and economic benefits to those who remain. Emigration also reduces non-violent forms of political contestation, including protests and strikes, implying that high emigration can produce relatively quiescent populations. However, larger flows of emigrants to democracies increase non-violent protest in autocracies, as exposure to freer countries spreads democratic norms and the tools of peaceful opposition. We use instrumental variables analysis to account for the endogeneity of migration flows, relating predicted emigration to a range of indicators of domestic violence and protest from 1960 to 2010.

“Democracy by Example? Why Democracy Spreads When the World's Democracies Prosper.” 2016. Comparative Politics 49(1): 83-116. PDF


Abstract: Does a positive association between democracy and economic growth around the world encourage the spread of democracy? Although this intuitive relationship has been linked to the global ebb and flow of fascism and Communism, no study has empirically tested this question. I argue that democracy's relative economic success influences perceptions of its domestic and international advantages. Looking at 172 countries from 1820-2010, I show that the world-level correlation between democracy and economic growth robustly predicts the spread of democracy and represents a major source of its historical advance. The results provide new insight into the foreign influences on democratization, China's potential challenge to the liberal democratic order, and the political legacy of the global financial crisis.

“A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-2007,” with Carles Boix and Sebastian Rosato. 2013. Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1523-54. PDF


Abstract: This paper updates and describes a widely used data set on democracy. Covering 1800-2007 and 213 countries, it represents the most comprehensive dichotomous measure of democracy currently available. We argue that our measure’s distinguishing features—a concrete, dichotomous coding and a long time-span—are of critical value to empirical work on democracy. Inspired by Robert Dahl, we define a country as democratic if it satisfies conditions for both contestation and participation. Specifically, democracies feature political leaders chosen through free and fair elections and satisfy a threshold value of suffrage. After comparing our coding to other popular measures, we illustrate how democracy's predictive factors have evolved since 1800. In particular, we show that economic modernization variables have steadily declined in their correlation with democracy over time.

“Economic Development, Violent Leader Removal, and Democratization.” 2012. American Journal of Political Science 56(4): 1002-20. PDF


Abstract: This paper argues that autocratic regime strength plays a critical mediating role in the link between economic development and democracy. Looking at 167 countries from 1875-2004, I find that development strengthens autocratic regimes, as indicated by a reduced likelihood of violent leader removal. Simultaneously, greater development predicts democratization, but only if a violent turnover has occurred in the recent past. Hence, development can cause democratization, but only in distinctive periods of regime vulnerability. Although development's stabilizing and democratizing forces roughly balance out within autocracies, they reinforce each other within democracies, explaining the puzzle of why economic development has a stronger effect on democratic stability than on democratization. Further, the theory extends to any variable that predicts violent leader removal and democracy following such violence, pointing to broad unexplored patterns of democratic development.

“The Patron's Dilemma: The Dynamics of Foreign-Supported Democratization,” with Michael K. McKoy. 2012. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(5): 904-32. PDF


Abstract: We analyze an understudied mode of democratization in which the acquiescence of an autocratic regime's external ally, or patron, is pivotal to the success of a democratic movement. Although a democratic patron may prefer having democracy in its dependent allies, regime change threatens the economic and security benefits associated with the alliance. We formalize this dilemma through a repeated principal-agent model and demonstrate that the critical dimension is the patron's beliefs about the potential democracy's policies, rather than its value for democracy or the alliance goods. Patron support hinges on democratic movement signaling of its capacity to rule, popular support, and commitment to preserving the alliance. To test our theory, we analyze 25 democratic openings in American Cold War clients, followed by case studies of U.S.-aided democratization episodes in the Philippines and South Korea. We conclude with an analysis of the recent Egyptian revolution.


Electoral Authoritarianism

“The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism.” 2020. British Journal of Political Science 50(1): 17-44. PDF


Abstract: Why do autocrats adopt multiparty elections? This paper argues that transitions to electoral authoritarianism (EA) follow a strategic calculus in which autocrats balance international incentives to hold elections against the costs and risks of controlling them. I test this with a multinomial logit model that simultaneously predicts transitions to EA and democracy, using a sample of non-electoral autocracies from 1946-2010. I find that pro-democratic international leverage, captured by external dependence on democracies through trade ties and military alliances, predicts EA adoption. Socioeconomic factors that make voters easier to control, such as low average income and high inequality, also predict EA transition. In contrast, democratization entails a loss of power for autocrats, so it is mainly predicted by regime weakness and not international engagement or socioeconomic factors. The results provide new insight to autocratic regime dynamics, democracy promotion's unintended effects, and methodological problems in studies of democracy.

“Don't Call It a Comeback: Autocratic Ruling Parties after Democratization.” 2021. British Journal of Political Science 51(2): 559-83. PDF


Abstract: When autocratic ruling parties accede to democratization, they do not always fade away into history. Following 41 transitions since 1940, including those in Mexico, Taiwan, Bulgaria, and Ghana, the ruling party survived and won power after democratization. Why do some former autocratic parties prosper under democracy while others quickly dissolve? What effect does this have on democratic survival? This article uses original data to predict the post-transition fates of 84 autocratic ruling parties through 2015. It finds that parties succeed when they have authoritarian legacies that easily translate to democratic competition, such as broad programmatic experience, strong organization, and policy success. In addition, democratic institutions that disadvantage new parties and actors benefit autocratic parties. Success is therefore about maintaining ruling-party advantages through democratization, whereas extant theories emphasize radical reinvention and outsider struggle. Lastly, an instrumental variables design shows that autocratic party success negatively impacts democratic survival and quality.

“The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset: Origins, Durability, and Death.” 2020. Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(4): 756-82. PDF


Abstract: How do autocratic ruling parties gain power? What predicts their durability and how they fall? This paper introduces the Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset, the first comprehensive dataset on the founding origins, modes of gaining and losing power, ruling tenures, and other characteristics of autocratic ruling parties. It covers all ruling parties in the world from 1940-2015. Contrary to common assumptions, most ruling parties are not created by sitting dictators, but follow a range of paths to power that influence their style and duration of rule. To illustrate the data's uses, the paper confirms that ruling parties stabilize autocracies, whereas regimes with non-ruling parties are less stable. Further, parties' origins and histories matter, with revolutionary and foreign-imposed parties the most durable and parties empowered through elections the least durable. By recognizing ruling parties' heterogeneity and histories, the data can contribute to open questions on autocratic politics, regime stability, and democratization.

“Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development.” 2015. Comparative Political Studies 48(12): 1526-62. PDF


Abstract: Do autocratic institutions matter for the welfare of average citizens? Despite the large literature comparing democracies and autocracies, we know little about how human development outcomes differ among autocratic types. This paper argues that contested autocratic elections promote human development by improving state accountability and capacity. Using an instrumental variables setup, I show that the presence and history of multiparty autocratic elections predict significantly better outcomes on health, education, gender equality, and basic freedoms relative to non-electoral autocracy. In fact, the effects on health and education are as strong as the effects of democracy. In contrast, legislatures and parties without multiparty elections produce slightly negative outcomes since these institutions chiefly concern elite cooptation. The results have major implications for the study of autocracy, the political economy of development, and the welfare effects of international election promotion.

“Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes.” 2015. Comparative Political Studies 48(6): 691-727. PDF


Abstract: The responsiveness of policy to election results is a central component of democracy. Do the outcomes of autocratic elections also affect policy choice? Even when the threat of turnover is low, I argue that autocratic elections influence policy by allowing citizens to signal dissatisfaction with the regime. Supplementing existing work, this study explains how this opposition is communicated credibly and then shows that ruling parties use this information to calibrate policy concessions. In the first cross-country analysis of autocratic election outcomes and policy choice, I find that negative electoral shocks to ruling parties predict increases in education and social welfare spending and decreases in military spending following elections. In contrast, there is no policy effect leading up to elections, in response to violent contestation, or in resource-rich regimes, illustrating a potential mechanism for the resource curse.

“Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815.” 2015. British Journal of Political Science 45(3): 501-30. PDF


Abstract: This paper overviews the history of autocratic elections since 1815 and then tests how a country's experience with autocratic elections influences both democratization and democratic survival. To comprehensively capture this history, I employ original measures of Robert Dahl's electoral dimensions of contestation and participation. First, I show that autocratic elections have been common for centuries, but their character has changed dramatically across time periods. Whereas high contestation almost always preceded high participation prior to 1940, the opposite occurs in modern regimes. Second, I demonstrate that a country's history of contestation predicts both democratization and democratic survival, whereas participation is positive for survival but generally negative for democratization. Thus, democracies are more likely to survive if they experience autocratic elections prior to democratizing, with implications for democracy promotion and future political development.

“Electoral Authoritarianism and Democracy: A Formal Model of Regime Transitions.” 2013. Journal of Theoretical Politics 25(2): 153-81. PDF


Abstract: Building on the formal literature on democratization, this paper models a dictator's choice between closed authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and democracy in the shadow of violent revolt. Under autocracy, the dictator controls policy but lacks information on the policy demands of citizens and thus the likelihood of popular revolt. Electoral authoritarianism enables the dictator to tie policy choice to an electoral signal from citizens, which may be advantageous even if elections make revolt more likely to succeed. Implications are drawn for how economic inequality, regime strength, and uncertainty predict regime type, policy concessions, and political violence. A key result is that electoral authoritarianism is chosen for middle values of inequality and uncertainty.




Democratic Survival, Voting, and Elections

“Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival,” with Benjamin Graham and Kaare Strøm. 2017. American Political Science Review 111(4): 686-704. PDF


Abstract: Democracy is often fragile, especially in states that have recently experienced civil conflict. To protect emerging democracies, many scholars and practitioners recommend political powersharing institutions. Yet there is little empirical research on whether powersharing promotes democratic survival, and some concern that it can limit electoral accountability. To fill this gap, we differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining powersharing and analyze their effects on democratic survival using a new global dataset. We find sharp distinctions across types of powersharing and political context. Inclusive powersharing, such as ethnic quotas, promotes democratic survival only in post-conflict settings. In contrast, dispersive institutions such as federalism destabilize post-conflict democracies. Only constraining powersharing consistently facilitates democratic survival in societies both with and without recent conflict. Our results suggest that institution-builders and international organizations should prioritize institutions that constrain leaders, including independent judiciaries, civilian control of the armed forces, and constitutional protections of individual and group rights.

“Social Mobility and Democratic Attitudes: Evidence from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa,” with Christian Houle. 2019. Comparative Political Studies 52(11): 1610-47. PDF


Abstract: How does personal experience of intergenerational social mobility affect support for democracy? Does the relationship depend on the regime under which individuals experience mobility? While a large literature examines how wealth and economic inequality influence attitudes toward democracy and regime change, there has been little work on the effect of social mobility. We employ individual-level survey data from the Afrobarometer and Latinobarometer from 2000-13 to analyze how experiencing change in one's socioeconomic position from childhood influences support for democracy. We find that individuals that experience upward mobility are more pro-democratic, even controlling for their education, current economic situation, and country-level growth. Further, the effect is stronger for individuals that lived most of their adult lives within democracy. We also show that the effect does not run through preferences for redistribution. Rather, it's more closely related to fundamental changes in attitudes toward personal autonomy, social functioning, and the role of government.

“A Republic, If You Can Keep It: Breakdown and Erosion in Modern Democracies.” 2021. Journal of Politics 83(1): 198-213. PDF


Abstract: What leads elites to break their democratic commitments? How do the partisan loyalties and democratic values of citizens influence these choices? This paper formally analyzes incumbent abuse in democracies, the most common modern initiator of democratic breakdown. If an incumbent attempts to consolidate power, the opposition can try to rally protest, but can also cry wolf without incumbent abuse. In a democratic equilibrium, incumbents avoid abuse, the opposition calls for protest if and only if abuse occurs, and citizens protest in sufficient numbers to deter elites. Results show that non-winner-take-all institutions, high media accuracy, low partisanship, and citizen support for democracy typically promote democratic survival. However, under some conditions, higher democracy support can threaten democracy. Model extensions allow incumbents to pursue democratic erosion instead of full breakdown, promote "fake news," and strategically inflame partisanship. The paper explores several implications for democratic survival and incumbent strategies for subverting it.

“For the Win! The Effect of Professional Sports Records on Mayoral Elections.” 2013. Social Science Quarterly 94(1): 59-78. PDF


Abstract: Voters are more likely to reelect incumbents when political outcomes are positive. Is this because they explicitly credit politicians for these outcomes or because they simply opt for the status quo when happy? To distinguish these two voting models, this paper proposes professional sports records as a proxy for electorate happiness that is unrelated to political performance, and looks at their effect on incumbent mayoral elections. For 39 American cities from 1948-2009, the study finds that winning sports records boost incumbent vote totals and the likelihood of reelection, exceeding in magnitude the effect of unemployment. To account for omitted variables, it is shown that sports records from the year following the election display no such relationship. The implication is that retrospective voting is partly driven by feelings of happiness unrelated to political evaluation. The paper concludes by discussing the implications for democratic accountability, which are not as dire as many authors claim.

“Citizen Forecasts of the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,” with Guanchun Wang, Sanjeev R. Kulkarni, H. Vincent Poor, and Daniel Osherson. 2012. Politics & Policy 40(6): 1019-52. PDF


Abstract: We analyze individual probabilistic predictions of state outcomes in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. Employing an original survey of more than 19,000 respondents, we find that partisans gave higher probabilities to their favored candidates, but this bias was reduced by education, numerical sophistication, and the level of Obama support in their home states. In aggregate, we show that individual biases balance out and the group's predictions were highly accurate, outperforming both Intrade (a prediction market) and fivethirtyeight.com (a poll-based forecast). The implication is that electoral forecasters can often do better asking individuals who they think will win rather than who they want to win.

“Seizing the Mantle of Change: Modeling Candidate Quality as Effectiveness Instead of Valence.” 2011. Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(1): 52-68. PDF


Abstract: In spatial models of electoral competition, candidate quality is typically modeled as valence, a measure of general appeal assumed to be constant across voters. This paper introduces and formally models an alternative conception of candidate quality according to which candidates differ in their effectiveness, or likelihood of changing policy from the status quo. Although more effective candidates are electorally favored, voters' benefits from effectiveness are contingent on their policy preferences. The effectiveness model shares many qualitative features with the valence model, but adds several testable implications related to the position of the status quo and gives rise to non-monotonic voting. When valence and effectiveness are combined, valence dominates effectiveness in determining the winner if and only if the status quo policy is sufficiently close to the political center.




Quantitative Methodology

“The Uses and Abuses of Matching.” Under review. PDF


Abstract: Matching has become a common technique in the social sciences, but there is widespread confusion regarding its purposes. This article evaluates the three most prominent justifications for matching: to improve causal inference, to reduce model dependence, and to prevent bias from model misspecification. First, I argue that matching offers no causal leverage or advantage in dealing with selection relative to regression alone. Second, I show that matching often increases model dependence and considerably widens the opportunity for data-mining. Claims to the contrary mistakenly ignore the sensitivity of estimates to choices concerning the match itself. Third, matching's real benefit is the prevention of treatment effect bias from uncorrected covariate nonlinearities. I introduce a test for when this use is supported by the data. However, non-parametric estimators that directly model these nonlinearities are usually a better solution. Thus, we should view matching as a non-ideal response to a specific analytical problem.

“Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion,” with Michael Joseph and Dorothy Ohl. 2018. 62(2): 410-41. Journal of Conflict Resolution. PDF


Abstract: Protests and democratic transitions tend to spread cross-nationally. Is this true of all political events? We argue that the mechanisms underlying the diffusion of mass-participation events are unlikely to support the spread of elite-led violence, particularly coups. Further, past findings of coup contagion employed empirical techniques unable to distinguish clustering, common shocks, and actual diffusion. To investigate which events diffuse and where, we combine modern spatial dependence models with extreme bounds analysis (EBA). EBA allows for numerous modeling alternatives, including diffusion timing and controls, and calculates the distribution of estimates across all combinations of these choices. We also examine various diffusion pathways, such as contagion among trade partners. Results from nearly 1.2 million models clearly undercut coup contagion. In comparison, we confirm that more mass-driven political events robustly spread cross-nationally. Our findings contribute to studies of political conflict and contagion, while introducing EBA as an effective tool for diffusion scholars.




Published Work

Papers in Physical Sciences


Master's Thesis, LSE

Judgment Aggregation, Democratic Theory, and the Impossibility of Faithful Representation.