Appointments: Assistant Professor at Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University: July 2010 - present Joint appointment in the Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University: October 2010 - present Education: Ph.D. in Economics, the University of Chicago, June 2009 BA in International Relations, Kyoto University, March 1999 Research Field: Empirical Industrial Organization Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University 100 International Dr. Baltimore, MD 21202 nishida (at) jhu.edu or mitsukuni.nishida (at) gmail.com last updated: November 14, 2011 |
Working Papers:
- "Estimating a Model of Strategic Network Choice: The Convenience-Store Industry in Okinawa," NET Institute Working Paper No. 08-27, Jan 2010, submitted. Technical Appendix is available here.
- Abstract:
Competition and mergers among multi-store firms are ubiquitous in a wide range of industries, but little is known about how the store configurations change after a merger due to the computational burden of solving for an equilibrium in store networks. This paper examines the impacts of a merger of two multi-store firms on store configurations, using new cross-sectional data from the convenience-store industry in Okinawa, Japan. I propose a methodology for estimating a game of network choice by two multi-store firms. I use lattice-theoretical results to deal with the huge number of possible network choices. I integrate the entry model with post-entry outcome data while correcting for the selection of entrants by simulations. Parameter estimates find the acquirer of a hypothetical horizontal merger of two multi-store firms would increase its number of stores in the city center in Okinawa but would decrease its number in suburbs. The tradeoff of cost savings and lost revenues from clustering its own stores plays a central role in explaining this seemingly counterintuitive result. I also examine the impacts of eliminating the zoning regulation introduced in 1968 that has been a major urban policy issue.
Abstract: We explain a puzzle from two recent meta-analyses that cover 25 countries and claim to show that inputs systematically move from higher-value to lower-value activities despite strong aggregate labor productivity growth (ALP). These papers use variants of the Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) decomposition of ALP to show that the reallocation covariance term is negative in all but two countries and the reallocation between term is negative in nine countries and weakly positive in most others. We decompose ALP using three micro-level data sets from Chile, Colombia, and Slovenia and show the same puzzle holds. We show that the ALP between term can be decomposed into a term related to reallocation and a term related to the change in the total number of fims, the latter of which often works to reduce the total between term in our data. We also show these ALP patterns can arise because of heterogeneity in labor and capital, unobserved output prices, or capacity utilization, but controlling for them only marginally helps to explain away the ALP reallocation puzzles in our micro-level data sets. We show that there is no puzzle when one decomposes aggregate productivity growth in the terms of National Accounts, as inputs in the aggregate move from low to high value activities in 36 of our 39 country-year observations. We conclude that there is a fundamental difference in reallocation measured by the ALP decomposition and that measured by the decomposition of National Accounts growth.
Works in Progress:
- “Network Pricing in the US Airline Industry,” May 2009
Abstract: This paper provides a methodology to study the effect of multimarket contact on pricing in the airline industry. I model the pricing behavior in the airline industry as an n-Player game. To deal with the computational burden arising from allowing for interaction of prices across markets, I provide sufficient conditions to formulate the game of Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated substitutable products into supermodular game. The methodological novelty of this framework is that the work provides us with a computational algorithm to solve for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium pricing game with more than two players. I use the Airline Origin and Destination Survey Data Bank for the years 1999 through 2002. With the parameter estimates, I run two counterfactual simulations. First, I study the degree of competitiveness in the US airline industry. To this end, I conduct out-of-sample predictions by using an estimated noncooperative oligopoly model and a collusive oligopoly model to see which describes the reality better. Second, I study the effect of mergers. By reducing the number of players, I study the effect of a change in the number of players on equilibrium airfare.
- "Estimating Aggregate Productivity Growth with Plant Level Data when Markets Are Not Competitive,” (Joint with Amil Petrin), 2008
- “Why Does a First Mover Get Benefits? Evidence from the Convenience-Store
Industry,” 2009
- Teaching:
- BU.220.620 Economics for Decision Making
- BU.912.610 Business Processes
- BU.912.610 Competitive Strategy
- BU.180.672 (Graduate IO) Spring 2010 Syllabus
