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Ok, maybe I'm missing something here but this Lt. Col. Baumann still seems to be whining to me. Chapter 3 is nothing more than his Phases/Critical Points of his OPORD broken down into what he needed to do and what he did to accomplish them. These are the every day operations for the Army and I would hope as a Lt. Col. that he could do these things in his sleep. I feel like this man came out from under a rock and realized "wow, there's a big war going on." and suddenly he decided to see the Army from a different light.

In the first chapter he made it sound like he had no training and was thrown into the middle of a war being forced to do another MOS and that all of his troops were in the same boat. In Chapter 3 he states that they had training at Ft. Hood before they even left. It's almost like this guy sat behind a desk for years and is bitter because he had to become a soldier and think like a soldier again.

This man also seemed to have wrote this book to kiss the butts off all of his friends and comrades that carried him through this but yet bashes on the Army as a whole. Aren't these people he praises very much a part of this Army that he seems to think set him up for failure.

The Army had to start somewhere to fight this war and then they constantly made things better and still are. It's like the first automobile ever made was trial and error and vehicles today look nothing like them. We made them bigger, easier to use, faster and safer. None of this happened over night. It's been years and we are still making adjustments to make them better for the times. Gas was not always and issue but it is now, so we are trying to find a more fuel efficient automobile. The ARMY is the same way. Each war is similar in nature but always a very different war. We start with what we know and we make adjustments to make it safer for our troops, etc.

Perhaps my attitude will change once I have been through a deployment but based on my non-deployment experiences this is how I feel. Maybe even as an officer I will see things in a whole new light. I know as an enlisted soldier we take what we are given and we adapt and over come (maybe complaining while we do it but we complete the mission none the less). From this Lt. Col. point of view we adapt and over come (and then complain about it and write a book about it book).

I like the his bullet comments at the end of chapter 3. Good strong points were stated. Later on in chapters 5 & 6 He mentions alot about ill equiped his units were. Of course thats a huge issue to deal with but that again comes from higher headquarters and the Pentagon thats running the wars. Having the proper equipment and armored vehicles is vital to any war. It was available to this war (armored tanks & bradleys) he pushed hard to attain those vehicles for they present a bigger asset to use other than his MOS of Artillery Paladins, because the Units were doing close quarters instead of long range.

Like what was mentioned above, we have come a long way from when the war first started. In the 6th Chapter he mentions that while patroling certain sectors and man powering checkpoints, there had to be constant improvements, so he utilized an Engineer unit to help clear the roads, and reconstruct some of the overpasses (bridges). He used what he could get, and thats' what is asked of his duties.

Like in Vietnam, there was no body armor and skimpy helmets that hardly anyone wore, there was a quarter of the technology used compared to today's war.
I was with a small unit that ran down route Irish (the same road LTC B. patroled) its way different now thanks to the hard work and effort of todays soldiers. Right out the gate there's plenty of pot holes similar to Detroit, but those are not from bad weather, those were the real deal. Just to the north thats paralle to route Irish is another route (ironically route Michigan) that goes from BIAP to Green Zone. When/if you head over there dispites all the improvements, it is still dangerous similar to Detroit.

I read the assigned chapters and I must admit I am getting more disappointed with this book.

He keeps complaining about how units were to conduct "missions in which they were not trained, organized, and outfitted with the necessary equipment". I am sorry, but his unit is no different than any other sent to Iraq. The Army uses the term "adapt and overcome" for a reason. If the author truly believes in the title of his book, than he needs to "Adjust Fire' and complete the mission with what he has on hand.

In Chapter 5, the author states, "There was no sense whining about the situation". He is continuously complaing about the equipment, conditions, and the politics of the War. I can turn on the news and see how miserable it is over there. I can open the newspaper and read how soldiers are fighting a War without the necessary equipment. Every person has a opinion on the political agenda of the War. I was hoping to read a book about the planning of the War from a Officers point of view. Later in Chapter 5 he states, "My task was to find a way to win in my corner of Baghdad". I really hope the book turns more to the planning and execution of his mission, and turns away from the constant complaining!

In closing, I think the author did focus on a couple good things. I thought his description of direct overlay was fantastic. I learned alot from it. I also liked how he stated that a great deal of his success was based on his Lieutenants. It made me realize how great of a responsibility I will have as a new Army Officer. I realize after reading how important it is to train and more importantly to ensure that the training is mission focused.

I think the main issue he was trying to convey is that no matter how strong a leader you are you need to delegate. He observed that he had major strenghts in his subordinate chain of command and he was willing to use them to his benefit.

The Army and the other armed forces are the most efficient producers of LEADERS in the world. Even modern civilian businesses are trying to adapt the leadership building exercises the military uses. In understanding this it is a mystery to me that we cannot seem to think outside the box and anticipate the needs before we put boots on the ground. History is there to teach us, if we would only pay more attention to the mistakes of those before us we would not be so quick to repeat.

I understand where many think that the author is constantly "whining" about things, from my perspective I see his frustration. From the outside looking in we are the most organized and powerful fighting organization in the world, but from the inside we seem to be counter-productive, unorganized and very in-efficient....I would be frustrated too.

I am finding "Adjust Fire" to be a book full of knowledge with information essential for anyone aspiring to be a leader. So much so that I plan on re-reading the book once I finish it to catch anything I might have missed my first time through. I agree with OC Guiterrez on the bullet comments at the end of Chapter 3. Talk about laying the framework for success for any incoming Lieutenant! And in Chapter 5 where Lt. Col. Baumann discusses direct overlay, I found very informative! I honestly had no idea how the Army assumes control of an area, then carves that area up so unit in the task force has an area of responsibility that is their job to secure and stabilize. The one comment I will make about the book that I just don't get, is when Lt. Col. Baumann introduces someone in the book, it seems to me that he paints an 'overly' flattering portrait of that person. I don't know if I would go so far as to say that he is trying to kiss the butts of his friends, but there are times when the book does lean that way.

I will say that later in the book, there are parts where the Lt. Col. Baumann writes about what it takes to work with a people that only care about themselves and not anyone else. Which in my opinion, shows just exactly why our efforts in Iraq have been so slow to show progress. I mean, how efficiently can you really work with someone who always play's the victim and assumes no responsibility with what happens? And some of the examples that Lt. Col. Baumann gives of the Iraqi people with their "Inshallah" and "Kaffeck" attitudes/outlooks just made my jaw drop. Their is also another part of the book where Lt. Col. Baumann talks about something we actually discussed last month in class that I think illustrates perfectly the "gut check" it takes as an Officer during the times when you have to be stronger than anyone else around you. For me, I think what helps in extracting the pertinent information from this book is not getting caught up in all the little details, but looking at the bigger picture the book is meant to portray.

This gentleman is perfectly illustrating the concept of the double edged sword. Asymmetrical warfare exploits the weaknesses inherent within the strengths of the enemy. Applying the double edged sword concept here is to realize that the very same things that make us as an army the most powerful in the world ( advanced technology, reproducible structure, communications ability,) etc., all lend themselves to the creation of an opposing weakness if the enemy can properly identify and exploit it. Adaptability is compromised, creative thinking is not encouraged or rewarded and personal ambitions supercede organizational emphasis. This is what played out that the author is "whining" about.

I appreciate the honesty and transparency of the author. It really helps to get an up close and personal look at the perspective of an Officer in the military. I apprectiate the advice about utilizing all your resources and people that you have available. He also stressed how helpful it was to have strong competent leadership around you that can help shoulder the load. I would be frustrated if I was trying to do the best job I could and didnt have the right equipment and support of the COC above me.

The difficult obstacles that he had to overcome is what seperates the men from the boys. Leadership that has inspired me the most isnt the quarterback that comes in when the home team is already ahead by 49-0 and finishes out the last quarter. I am most inspired by those who in the midst of adversity can remain calm and strong. Those who can fight against the odds and still come out on top.
The Quarterback who plays with injured players but still finds a way to win the game. The Officer who is short handed on equipment and troops but is still able to get the job done.

This months readings have again shown the need for an accommodation of unconventional thinking in today’s army. I think a good example is how Lt. Col. Baumann saw how he could be more affective at securing the roads by patrolling the side roads. They were where the enemy was attacking from instead of where they were attacking. This showed his ability to think critically and to adapt to the enemy, however his neighboring units did not adopt this method and his commander argued with him over why he was not driving on the roads. If his superiors were more adept at thinking unconventionally in an unconventional war they would have seen the wisdom in his decision and they would have adopted his method as well.

This months reading also opened my eyes more to how the changes made to the campaign in 2007 are working to reduce violence. Lt. Col. Baumann explained how dismounted troops usually receive more casualties, but in this war we are much more effective dismounted than we are as mounted targets driving down the road and huddled in FOBs only going where it is perceived to be the most safe.

im trying to absorb all of this info and compare how it would apply to a real war. these arab armies are a hodgepodge group of guys and the u.s. army is fighting in terrain much like the 60's detroit riots.

how could an officer adapt his company if he was fighting the russians or chineese? would there be time to adapt and relearn new skills while an enemy was attacking?

i like his idea of not driving on roads. it was a bedrock principle learned in vietnam "NEVER EVER USE ROADS" you will get ambushed and hit land mines (aka ied's), i think some of the people planning these missions dont know basic history.

im getting confirmation that it is important and somtimes necessary to buck the system, take the narrow path, and think outside the box, even if it causes some additional stress.

I for the most part enjoyed reading chapters 3, 5, and 6. I have seen many similar things not only when I was deployed but also just being in the Guard. Especially when comes to supply and equipment. It seems the Guard is always struggling when it comes to equipment just like LT Col Baumann with is lack of patrolling vehicles. I also do not see Lt Col telling his story as complaining or whining but a frustrated leader who want to take the best care of his Soldiers that he can but cannot with his current equipment and similar items.
I found many of his sections enlightening. I hope that most leaders do similar items like stay close to his LT's to teach coach and mentor (sounds similar to a TAC officer) but I am hopeful most of the Officers I will be working for are.
I also liked the Part when he talks about how America runs its wars like a business. And I agree that they cannot be run that way. War is not fun or profitable and no one is going to like it. Not to mention the media is far to evolved and only tells the people the bad stuff and none of the good that they accomplish while there.

I enjoyed reading these chapters however I gotta admit it seems so overwhelming to think about the positions these commanders take. In chapter five he talked about a progression much like a relay race when you receive command of a new area and the baby steps that start and progressively you should become better then the last unit that was there and that every unit that had performed behind the standard had failed. This portion made perfect sense to me but like LTC Baumann, I too would be definitely afraid of not exceeding the standard. I was thinking about that the whole time he was describing the expectation.

I also really enjoyed the end of chapter 5 when LTC Baumann talked about the expectations he had of Lieutenants and what he told them as he took command. Those seemed very bold, real, out going, scarey and ambitious. I almost feel like framing that page and putting it on my desk as a reminder of the expectations and why I am a hot commodity to the Army. I know as a new Lieutenant, I would appreciate knowing the expectations my commander had for me.

Chapter 3
After reading chapter three I must say I was rather impressed. I thought this was a great chapter dealing with training especially for future lieutenants. First it is important to note that the Army will always need to be able to shift gears, meaning that tactics and strategies are never set in stone and we need to adapt and overcome whatever challenges come our way. We see in this chapter that the 1-21 Field Artillery had to become a maneuver unit. Asking a whole unit to change its identity and what it knows is not an easy task. I never knew how important morale is in this type of transformation. When attempting this transformation Lt. Col. Baumann discussed how important it was to have good leaders under him, in particular Major Menti. To notice his talents and use them to help achieve the overall training goal, this is a smart leader using all of his resources to ensure the right plans and training is being developed. Another key event that took place was the fact that Lt. Col Baumann traveled to Iraq to gather Intel. I was surprised how fast he was able to get info back to Ft. Hood. With time running out before deployment, getting as much information back to base so training and be conducted was crucial. The way I look at it is, this is a leader who cares about his troop and is doing everything in his power to set things up for success. Finally the chapter concluded with something I wasn’t prepared for, that is how important lieutenants are. To me this was the most important part of the chapter. I was so impressed with how Lt. Col. Baumann treated his lieutenants so well. I love the fact that he was more like a coach or a mentor to them. This is huge, I don’t know if everyone treats lieutenants in this way but to establish this kind of relationship is so important especially going into a war zone. I am not going to lie, this section motivated me. If I had a leader like this I would work my but off for him every day. It is important to note that during one’s time as a lieutenant this is where most of the learning takes place as an officer. It is such an important part of an officer’s career. I think it is key to understand this and guide young leaders once again it is setting up everyone for success and not failure which in my opinion is something a leader must be able to do this at all times.

I believe Lt Col. Baumann is clearly demonstraiting the need for all officers to be able to adapt to any given situation. He again, makes several points that the U.S. Army was set up and trained to fight a more conventional war and not a counterinsurgency. This is where the role of the officer comes in, especially at the company grade level. The army needs people able to think on their feet and who are not set in their ways of how a war is supposed to work. Our enemies are also aware that the U.S. is highly trained in conventional warefare and therefore they resort to alternative tactics, which we must in turn adapt to.

I felt it was unfortunate that because the 1-21 artillary battalion was still looked at as a support element and not an actual maneuver element by the BCT commanders, the 1-21 did not recieve the equipment that was required to more adequately accomplish its mission. I found what appears to be a failure in politics frightening. This is another reminder that we as officer's will need to make sure that the men serving under us are being looked after. We can not assume that what looks like common sense is being considered as such by higher commanders.

Chapter 5
After reading chapter 5, I thought it described really well what it was like just getting to Iraq into a battle zone for the first time. I’ve never been deployed anywhere and Lt. Col. Baumann did a good job painting a picture of just entering a war zone. I defiantly could understand the soldiers concern with the humvees not being enforced in particular way. I guess it’s the nature of the job; we aren’t always going to have best resources available and must simply deal. In this case that is what they did and continued to push on, they had no choice. I also recall from the chapter that since they trained in California they were already used to the weather. This doesn’t sound like a big deal but its elements like this that help the transition easier on troops into new places. As they rolled into Camp Falcon, Lt. Col. was quick to notice the fact that the local workers were not closely watched or controlled. I was surprised that he noticed this but was astounded that this was almost the first thing he picked up on after arriving. Maybe this was due to the fact that this is a person that has just arrived into a war zone and of course his guard is up and being on the lookout for everything. I was surprise to read that Lt. Col Baumann have been in the Army for 17 years and has never been in real life combat in any way. It must have been a bit nerve racking at times for him but he seem to handle everything ok, especially when it came to setting up for operation. I think he had a good grasp on things. In what he referred to the “tactical hand off” right seat observation at the battalion task force level. I think this is probably one of the best ways to learn. It was hands on training and because of this training it allows everyone to be on the same page. He was worried about regression among the troops when transitioning into their new roles. With hands on training I think this is less likely to occur. Probably the last thing that I thought was important in the chapter was the fact that Lt. Col. Baumann felt that strategic program was actually working against him. Seeing the resemblance in Vietnam to Iraq I was kind of surprised that he was the only one to pick up on that. We think as a society that we have learned from our mistakes but it seems that in this case we haven’t. I would be a bit concerned with this as well. Overall I thought this was a good chapter dealing a troops entering a war zone for the first time.

Chapter 6,
After reading chapter 6, I think we actually get a taste of politics 101. In this chapter we see how important it is to argue one’s case or point. When resources are limited of course it is going to cause tension among everyone. It was not surprising to see that 1-7 Calvary didn’t give up there tanks. There are always two sides to every story. Lt. Col. Baumann felt his 1-21 task force could use them for more important things but 1-7 thought otherwise. They felt they were essential to do their mission. Lt. Col. Does make a great point with this case and that is this tank situation was an example of dealing with standard problems that needed non-standard solutions. I’m sure this is not going to be the first case we see in this book, many more will probably follow. Even further finding out that his battalion was viewed as something other than what he was told he was must have been frustrating, especially when it came to allocating resources. In my opinion this is a huge hurdle to overcome. Once again its part of being a leader, reacting to and overcome any challenges that come his way. A good leader can do this a jump over this hurdle. I never realized how much politics play in military operations and this chapter really showed me how important it is to be a politician and an Officer in the Army.