Michele Lombardi

Michele Lombardi

Department of Economics, University of Surrey

Telephone: +44 (0)1483 682 774
Fax: +44 (0)1483 689 548
Room No: 22 AD 00
Office hours:  Wednesdays, 10:00am – 12:00 noon.
Email:
M.Lombardi@surrey.ac.uk
 

Publications

    Lombardi, M.: Uncovered set choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare, August 2008, 31(2): 271 – 279. (paper, details)
    Lombardi, M.: Reason based choice correspondences. Mathematical Social Science, January 2009, 57(1): 58-66. (paper, details)
    Lombardi, M.: Minimal covering set solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, May 2009, 32(4): 687-695. (paper, details)
    Lombardi, M., and M. Mariotti: Uncovered bargaining solutions. International Journal of Game Theory, accepted. (paper, details)
      

    Working Papers

    Lombardi, M., and N. Yoshihara: Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution on non-convex problem. (paper, details
    Lombardi, M.: What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority characterize? (paper, details)
    Lombardi, M., and R. Veneziani: Liberal Principles for Social Welfare Relations in Infinitely-Lived Societies. (paper, details)
    Lombardi, M., and R. Veneziani: Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle. (paper, details)
     

    Referee For

    Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Social Choice & Welfare.free hit counter
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    Attachments (1)

    • curriculum-vitae.pdf - on 23 Oct 2009 12:27 by Michele Lombardi (version 1)
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