Forthcoming

Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Modeling Framework  (Forthcoming from Oxford University Press)

"De Se Epistemology" (Forthcoming in Attitudes "De Se": Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics.  A. Capone and N. Feit eds.  CSLI Publications)

I argue that we can settle controversies about de se degrees of belief without first settling controversies about de se content.  I do so by describing a de se updating scheme built from elements available to all theories of content.  But I then suggest that solutions to degree of belief puzzles may favor certain theories of de se content over others.

Published

This article explains the central technical result of "Not Enough There There" (see below) in a more step-by-step, accessible fashion.  It also frames that result in terms of the language-dependence problems faced by Carnap's early confirmation theories, and briefly describes the philosophical consequences more fully explored in the latter half "Not Enough There There."

Begins by explaining then proving a generalized language dependence result similar to Goodman's "grue" problem.  I then use this result to cast doubt on the existence of an objective evidential favoring relation (such as "the evidence confirms one hypothesis over another," "the evidence provides more reason to believe one hypothesis over the other," "the evidence justifies one hypothesis over the other," etc.).  Once we understand what language dependence tells us about evidential favoring, our options are an implausibly strong conception of the a priori, a hard externalism on which agents are unable to determine what their evidence favors, or a subjectivist view that makes evidential favoring relative to features of the agent.

"Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology" (Philosophical Studies 149 (2010): 119–134.)

One thing wrong with any theory of justification that generates "bootstrapping" in Vogel's gas gauge example is that it permits a no-lose investigation—an investigation that may justify a proposition but is guaranteed not to undermine it.  I give necessary and sufficient conditions for no-lose investigations then argue that they can be avoided only by a skeptic, a Closure-denier, or an internalist about justification.

"The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs" (Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 555–605.)

Formalizes and expands the traditional Bayesian framework for modeling agents' rational degrees of belief to apply to cases involving context-sensitive beliefs. Along the way, it offers a solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and defends that solution from alternate accounts.

"What Would a Rawlsian Ethos of Justice Look Like?" (Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008): 289–322.)*

A response to G. A. Cohen's argument that a prevailing "ethos" of justice would prevent a Rawlsian just society from having any income inequalities.  I suggest that Cohen's argument fails because a Rawlsian ethos would involve correlates of both of Rawls' principles of justice.

Review of David Christensen's Putting Logic in its Place (Mind 117 (2008): 677–681.)

Unpublished

"Contractualism, Chances, and Aggregation"

I propose a new way for a Scanlonian contractualist to argue that, when faced with a situation in which a number of people are threatened with the same level of harm, you should save as many people as possible from that harm.  The argument draws on a principle Sophia Reibetanz has defended for managing cases involving the chance of harm.

"An Infinitesimal Addition to Certain Frustration"

A brief response to Alan Hájek's Cable Guy Paradox.

Dissertation

Quitting Certainties: A Doxastic Modeling Framework (my UC Berkeley PhD dissertation)

Presents a unified Bayesian framework that models changing rational degrees of belief in situations involving memory loss and context-sensitivity.

[Page last modified 8/10.]

* Some legaleze required by the publisher: This is an electronic version of an article published in Philosophy & Public Affairs.  Complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Philosophy & Public Affairs, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal’s website at www.blackwellpublishing.com/papa or http://www.blackwell-synergy.com.