Congress
tried to fix the worst aspects of the anthrax vaccine program, and
obtain more reliable information on anthrax vaccine more between 1999
and 2002.
Congress appears to have failed for two reasons: it does not like to step on DOD's toes, and it was outsmarted.
Congress demanded Vaccine Healthcare Centers
Congress
likes win-win situations and has tried to solve the anthrax vaccine
problem by creating win-win solutions. When it faced the wrath of the
upper levels of the Department of Defense, on the one hand, and injured
and scared troops, on the other, instead of ending the vaccine program,
Congress mandated the creation of Vaccine Healthcare Centers, where
those who believed they had received a vaccine injury would be treated,
and their illnesses could be researched.
However, six years later, soldiers do receive treatment at the four Vaccine Healthcare Centers
--but overall, no one has been cured, and only a few have been
significantly improved. The Centers themselves have had to fight for
funding each year, and face threats of closure. They have done research, according to a 2007 talk by the Clinics' founder/director, Renata Engler M.D., recently
retired head of Allergy-Immunology at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.,
but none of it has been published in medical journals or made available
to the public. Only one 2002 abstract, describing the first 82 patients treated, can be found. Yet over 2,000 more patients have had complete evaluations at the Vaccine Healthcare Centers since.
Dr.
Engler has given a number of talks about anthrax and other vaccine
issues, many of which are available on the internet. On the one hand,
while on active duty, Dr. Engler claimed that vaccine safety concerns
have been based on rare cases --but on the other hand, she also said in April 2007 that serious adverse events in 1-2% of vaccine recipients may
need exemption management, and admitted that the adverse effects from
mixtures of drugs and vaccines are unknown. One million six hundred
thousand soldiers have received anthrax vaccinations since 1998. If 2%
had a serious adverse reaction, that would be 32,000 already-injured people.
Thus
the Vaccine Healthcare Centers, at Walter Reed, Fort Bragg, Norfolk and
Wilford Hall, have neither clarified any of the questions regarding
adverse reactions from anthrax or other vaccines used in the military,
nor have they developed effective treatment protocols. Most military
medical providers are not aware the Centers exist, and injured soldiers
fail to be referred to them for assistance.
Congress demanded Medical Research on Anthrax Vaccine
Congress
also required that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
research adverse reactions to anthrax vaccine, and to ensure that
adequate and effective research projects were undertaken, Congress
demanded in 2000 that an Institute of Medicine Committee be formed to
guide CDC in this endeavor.
The Institute of Medicine Committee
did a good job of evaluating CDC's proposed research projects and
recommending which were most valuable. This Committee also emphasized
the need to perform longitudinal research to assess the possibility of
reactions developing months or years after vaccination. Its report was published in 2003.
However, CDC (which has been paid many millions of dollars by DOD to do the research) has failed to follow the Institute of Medicine recommendations regarding use of military medical databases to assess long-term adverse events. Its one published study of optic neuritis following vaccinations used an arbitrary inclusion cutoff of
18 weeks following vaccination for a diagnosis of optic neuritis to be
made. (Incidentally, this also required that soldiers had to be
diagnosed while fighting in a war zone, given the fact they are
vaccinated immediately before deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan for six
to twelve months. This virtually guaranteed that only the most severe
cases would meet the criteria established by CDC.) It was therefore no
wonder that although optic neuritis hospitalizations are much commoner
following anthrax vaccination, CDC failed to find more cases in the
vaccinated within 18 weeks of vaccination. Other studies are pending,
but are being carried out by the same group that "cooked" this first study. I expect they will reach whatever conclusion the funder desires.
Congress supported research on 2nd and 3d generation "replacement" anthrax vaccines
However,
the 2nd generation VaxGen anthrax vaccine, made by using a higher
concentration of the same active ingredient as the current anthrax
vaccine, Biothrax, failed during advanced development, and will not be able to supercede Biothrax. HHS cancelled the contract in December 2006.
The National Institutes of Health rescinded their proposal to fund research on a 3d generation anthrax vaccine
in March, when they were dissatisfied with all the proposals submitted.
Currently no anthrax vaccines appear to be in development, and no
replacement for Biothrax is in the works.
Emergent
Biosolutions, a.k.a. Bioport, spent millions to acquire a lobbying
"dream team" -- then sold 10 million more vaccine doses to the
government for civilian use!
Bioport has had on its payroll a
former US Surgeon General, an Army Surgeon General, a former head of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others who had responsibility for
biodefense procurement in their former roles in government. One of the
PR firms employed by Emergent Biosolutions is DC Navigators, which
boasts of its ability to do its own grassroots organizing. DC Navigators has had as clients 8 state Governors and 8 US Senators, among others. Emergent spent over 2 million dollars in 2006 alone on nine lobbying firms.
Perhaps as a result, NIH is now considering purchase of 22.75 million more doses
for the civilian stockpile. The current cost is $24.78 per dose, or
$563 million for this addition to the National Strategic Stockpile. The
original 10 million doses of anthrax vaccine in the stockpile cost
approximately $220 million. All told, Emergent Biosolutions has done
extraordinarily well since purchasing the vaccine manufacturer for $25
million in 1998.
Fear-mongers scared Americans with images of anthrax weapons and mushroom clouds.
Now
we know it was all hype--but we didn't know it then. Failing to prepare
for an anthrax attack by Saddam Hussein's troops would have made
Congress appear careless. Just in case Congress didn't get it, real
anthrax spores were sent to the Capitol, leading to enormous fear
throughout the United States, a prolonged and expensive clean-up, and
billions of dollars appropriated for responses to bioterrorism,
including plenty of anthrax vaccine.
Congress did its job -- but nothing changed
Congress
held 13 hearings that dealt with anthrax vaccine between 1999 and 2001.
Congress commissioned studies on anthrax vaccine from the GAO, the
Congressional Research Service, and the Institute of Medicine. Congress
made sure specialized medical care for vaccine-injured soldiers was
made available within the military.
Congress learned the vaccine
was only questionably effective. Congress learned some people were
being severely injured by the vaccine. What was unclear then, and
remains unclear today, is how many are injured, how badly, by what
mechanisms, and whether they ever recover.
By late 2000,
vaccinations had ceased due to multiple manufacturing failures at the
anthrax vaccine plant. No new vaccine could be shipped out. FDA
withheld a license for the manufacturing facility, even after it was
completely renovated at taxpayer expense. Then the anthrax letters were
sent, and HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson insisted the anthrax plant would
be given its license. Thompson also gave DOD an "Emergency Use Authorization" to use anthrax vaccine after its license was again suspended in 2004.
In
2004, a lawsuit challenging the vaccine's licensing process led to the
license being suspended, and mandatory vaccinations ceasing for two
years. Subsequently, the FDA issued the comment period that had
previously been missed, ignored the many scientific challenges the
comment period generated, and reapproved the vaccine license.
Resumption of mandatory vaccinations was announced in October 2006, and
several hundred thousand soldiers have since been vaccinated.
It's deja vu all over again: No documented threat. A suspect manufacturer. A vaccine unlikely to be effective against weaponized anthrax made by a skilled adversary. And lots more people being harmed.
Unfortunately,
the vaccine produced now is no better than the vaccine made in the old
facility. The FDA continues to receive adverse event reports at the
same rate as before: one in every 250-300 recipients reports problems
to the FDA Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System. And the director of
the Vaccine Healthcare Centers, Dr. Renata Engler, who has data on
thousands of reactions, said there are "No apparent differences between pre-renovation and post-renovation lots."
Congress
used various means at its disposal to ameliorate the worst problems
associated with anthrax vaccine, and attempted to assure the vaccine
was thoroughly investigated. Yet these measures have been thwarted, the
research corrupted and the military medical data withheld. False
threats were manufactured to spur biodefense spending, including the
purchase of inadequate but already existing "solutions" like anthrax
vaccine.
It is now time, after nine years of the on-again,
off-again anthrax vaccine program, for Congress to stop mandatory
vaccinations unless and until a proven safe, effective vaccine becomes
available.