 Maître de Conférences (CNU Section 5) CES and GREGOR, University of Paris 1 Sorbonne E-mail : laure.athias@idheap.unil.ch Research interests: Contract Theory, Provision of Public Services, Public Private Partnerships, Political Economics, Public Service Motivation. Positions: Visiting Assistant in Research, Department of Economics, Yale University - January to August 2007 Research Project obtained (Swiss National Science Foundation): . Fiscal
decentralization and Public Private Partnerships: A means of improving
efficiency in the delivery of public goods and services?, 330 000CHF. Publications: · "Responsabilité politique et design contractuel des partenariats public privé”, Revue Economique 60 (4): 1011-1022, 2009. · "Winner's curse in toll road concessions", (with A. Nunez), Economics Letters, 2008, Volume 101 (3), pp. 172-174.
· "Un Partenariat Public Privé Rigide ou Flexible ? Théorie et Application aux Concessions Routières à Péage", (with S. Saussier), Revue Economique 2007/3, volume 58, p. 565-576. Working Papers: · (with R. Soubeyran) "Demand Risk and Public Authority's Counter-Incentives in PPPs". Working Paper. . "Political Accountability, Incentives, and Contractual Design of Public Private Partnerships". Working Paper. · (with A. Nunez), "The More The Merrier? Number of Bidders, Information Dispersion, Renegotiation, and Winner's Curse in Toll Road Concessions". Submitted. · (with S. Saussier), "Contractual Rigidity or Flexibility for Public Private Partnerships? Theory and Evidence from Infratructure Concession Contracts", r&r&r The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. Works in Progress: · (with R. Soubeyran), "Counter-Incentives in Incomplete Contracts". · (with E. Chong), "Provision of Public Services with Non-Benevolent Public Authorities". . (with N. Acatrinei), "Crowding-in or Crowding-out Public Service Motivation? Evidence from Swiss Education and Security Sectors". |