Abstract I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience is sufficient to justify beliefs about the external world. I propose that justification for propositions describing our perceptual experiences partially constitutes any justification we may possess for beliefs concerning the external world. In this way, our justification for beliefs about the physical world may only be inferential since it is grounded in any justification we have for at least one other proposition. This theory occupies an intermediate position between the two aforementioned foundationalist accounts, which allows it to sidestep problems that plague them both. In defense of relational direct realism [pdf] Abstract According to proponents of relational direct realism, veridical perceptual experiences are irreducible relational psychological states that include as constituents perceived physical objects or some aspect of them. One consequence of relational theories is the rejection of the causal theory of perception. Paul Coates objects both to the relational theory and to its commitment to the noncausal theory of perception. First, he argues that the idea of an experiential relation is incoherent. I reply that his argument involves a fallacy. Second, he argues that relational theorists are unable to explain how we grasp facts about experiential relations or what determines which object is perceived. I reply that relational theorists are able to provide the required explanations. Finally, he argues that relational theories cannot accommodate our understanding that veridical perceptual experiences are causally dependent on physical objects. I suggest how the claims of noncausal theories are consistent with this understanding. A noncausal theory of perception Proposes an analysis of perception according to which appropriate causal production is neither necessary nor sufficient for veridical perceiving. Attempts to account for allure of the necessity of an appropriate causal generation of perceptual experience for genuine perception Papers in the early stagesDirect realism and the argument from hallucinationProposes several responses to argument from hallucination against direct realism. Considers both the phenomenological version of the argument from hallucination and the causal version of the argument from hallucination Direct realism and the argument from causation Considers objections to direct realism based upon causal claims. This includes the argument from secondary qualities, the argument from locality of experiential content, and the argument from psychophysics. Recent work in direct realism Provides taxonomy of theories of perception that may claim to be a 'direct realist' theory. Distinguishes theories of perception into compositional and relational theories and into common factor and non-common factor theories. Theories of perception plausibly construed as direct realist may be one of any four resulting combinations. Real appearances Sketches an relational, common factor version of a direct realist theory of perception. Offers defense against arguments from illusion and perspectival relativity. Against dogmatism Evaluates certain theories in epistemology according to which we can have noninferential justification for propositions describing external physical objects. Papers I want to start working on soonJustification of experiential propositionsPhenomenal bottleneck Color primitivism, illusion, and color perception Realism, objectivity, and truth Perception, cross time relations, and the time gap objection The American New Realists Moral intuitionism PresentationsIn defense of relational direct realismCentral States Philosophical Association (St. Paul, Minnesota), September 26-27, 2008 Foundational Belief[s] and the Structure of Justification American Philosophical Association Pacific Division 2006 Annual Meeting (Portland, Oregon), March 22-26, 2006 University of Iowa Graduate Student Philosophical Society Third Annual Fall Conference (The University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa), November 12, 2005 Iowa Philosophical Society 2005 Annual Meeting (Simpson College, Indianola, Iowa), November 5, 2005 Some Distinctions in the Direct Realism Debate University of Iowa Graduate Student Philosophical Society Second Annual Fall Conference (The University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa), November 6, 2004 |