Real appearances: the metaphysics and epistemology of direct realismBrief Abstract
I defend a version of relational direct realism called the real appearances theory according to which perception of mind-independent physical objects and events in the external world is constituted by direct acquaintance with instances of color and shape properties that belong to physical objects and with surfaces of those objects. Thus, in contrast to compositional direct realism, the real appearances theory does not appeal to representations to mediate perception. Further, according to the real appearances theory, hallucinatory experiences involves direct acquaintance with property instances that do not belong to any physical object. Thus, in contrast to disjunctivist theories, the real appearances theory does not dismiss or minimize the standard objections to direct realism or deny that there is a common ontological component present in both hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory experiences.
Extended Abstract
This project distinguishes competing direct realist theories of perception and defends one version called the
real appearances theory. For indirect realists, conscious perceptual experience is constituted by direct acquaintance with internal sensory entities. Minimal direct realists deny this claim, but suggest in its place a number of competing accounts of perceptual experience. One issue that divides direct realists concerns the
mediation of perception. Compositional direct realists say that veridical perception is partially constituted by internal psychological states (usually representational states) that do not include as constituents physical objects or any aspect of them. Relational direct realists say that veridical perceptual experience is an irreducible psychological relation that includes as constituents physical objects or some aspect of them. A second issue that divides direct realists concerns whether there are
common factors present in veridical and hallucinatory perceptual experiences. Common factor direct realists say that all perceptual experiences are partially constituted by intrinsically similar entities while non-common factor direct realists deny this. Four direct realist theories may be generated by combining the responses to each of the two issues.
The real appearances theory combines relational and common factor direct realism. Consequently, in contrast to both compositional and non-common factor theories, it is forced to face directly the traditional arguments against direct realism. Perceptual experience is direct acquaintance with sensible quality instances, which characterize physical objects in veridical perception but which constitute mind-dependent visual objects in hallucination. Proximate neural states causally sufficient for hallucinatory experience are insufficient for veridical perceptual experience; instead, a causal process going from the perceived object to a neural state is causally necessary and sufficient for veridical perception. The argument from secondary qualities fails to overturn the possibility that sensible colors are causally inert but nonetheless are objects of direct acquaintance. The time-gap argument requires for its success the premise that an object must be temporally simultaneous with our acquaintance with it, which plausibly can be denied. Finally, all purported sensory illusions must be explained either as situations in which cognition accounts for apparent illusoriness, or as abnormal veridical perceptual experiences, or as ordinary but pervasive hallucinations.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Perception
1.1 Real appearances of an external world 1.2 The concept of direct acquaintance1.3 Direct realism and epistemology1.4 Some terminology1.5 Strategy
Chapter Two
Minimal direct realism
2.1 Realism and the idea of an external world2.2 Direct realism and indirect realism 2.2.1 Initial attempt at a distinction 2.2.2 Conscious and unconscious states 2.2.3 More careful distinctions 2.2.4 Some clarifications2.3 Four variants of minimal direct realism 2.3.1 The mediation question 2.3.2 The common factor question 2.3.3 Compositional direct realism versus relational direct realism 2.3.4 Non-common factor direct realism versus common factor direct realism2.4 Challenges to the real appearances theory 2.4.1 Hallucinations and causation 2.4.2 Illusions
Chapter Three
Real appearances
3.1 Subjects of real appearances 3.1.1 Direct acquaintance and presentation 3.1.2 Phenomenal awareness and cognition 3.1.3 Consciousness and introspection 3.1.4 Use of analogies 3.1.5 Reductionism and subjectivity3.2 Objects of real appearances 3.2.1 Sensible quality instances 3.2.2 Sensible quality instances and surfaces 3.2.3 Sensible object profiles and physical objects 3.2.4 Sensible scenes and external world situations
Chapter Four
Hallucination and causation
4.1 Hallucination 4.1.1 Hallucination and real appearances 4.1.2 Mind-dependence and existence 4.1.3 Physical location and projection4.2 Causation 4.2.1 The selective theory 4.2.2 Philosophy of perception and science 4.2.3 Secondary qualities4.3 Hallucinations again 4.3.1 Conceptual analysis and causation 4.3.2 Causal objection4.4 Time gap
Chapter Five
Illusion and perspectival relativity
5.1 Tacit cognition response5.2 Generic property response5.3 Emergent property response5.4 Shape, illusion, and perspectival relativity 5.4.1 Spatial depth 5.4.2 Fading depth and spatial concepts 5.4.3 Projected image response 5.4.4 The multiple perspectives response 5.4.5 The relational shape properties approach 5.4.6 Toward a successful response5.5 Color, illusion, and perspectival relativity 5.5.1 The alternatives 5.5.2 A radical solution
Chapter One
Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Perception
Chapter Two
Minimal direct realism
Chapter Three
Real appearances
Chapter Four
Hallucination and causation
Chapter Five
Illusion and perspectival relativity