Published papers

In defense of relational direct realism

Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy

Available online

According to proponents of relational direct realism, veridical perceptual experiences are irreducible relational mental states that include as constituents perceived physical objects or intrinsic aspects of them. One consequence of the theory is the rejection of the causal theory of perception. This paper defends the relational theory against several objections recently developed by Paul Coates. He argues that the required experiential relation is incoherent and unmotivated. The argument that it is incoherent commits a fallacy. In reply to the argument that it is unmotivated, I suggest that the relational theorist's appeal to transparency provides sufficient motive and, when properly clarified, defeasibly justifies the theory as well. Coates also argues that rejection of the causal theory leaves relational theorists without any way of determining which object is perceived or of accommodating our scientific understanding of perceptual experiences as causally dependent on physical objects. I reply that relational theorists are able to provide the required explanations and discuss how the noncausal theory is consistent with this scientific understanding of perceptual experience.

Foundational beliefs and the structure of justification

Synthese 64 (2008): 117-139

Available online
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I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience is sufficient to justify beliefs about the external world. I propose that justification for propositions describing our perceptual experiences partially constitutes any justification we may possess for beliefs concerning the external world. In this way, our justification for beliefs about the physical world may only be inferential since it is grounded in any justification we have for at least one other proposition. This theory occupies an intermediate position between the two aforementioned foundationalist accounts, which allows it to sidestep problems that plague them both.

In progress

Naïve realism and illusion

In the first half of the paper, I sketch a naive realist theory of perception. According to this version of relational direct realism, (1) non-hallucinatory perceptual experiences are constituted by acts of direct acquaintance with physical objects and sensible quality instances that characterize them and (2) the phenomenological content of such experiences is constituted only by these relata. Understood this way, naive realism is thought to run aground on shoals of illusory experiences: how could properties of perceived objects constitute the phenomenological content of illusory experiences? It does not seem that they could. However, if the naive realist attempts to account for the phenomenological content of illusory experience by some means other than sensible qualities of perceived objects, the challenge is to say why this same account should not also be given of fully veridical experiences. While this form of the argument from illusion is not a problem for other versions of relational direct realism, it does pose a problem for naive realism. The key to a successful response for the naive realist is to block the argument earlier. After clarifying the notion of direct acquaintance and its relation to other conceptions of relational direct realism and their responses to the problem of illusion, I explore and defend a novel response to the arguments from illusion and perspectival relativity (and, indeed, various mundane non-illusory experiences). I concentrate on recent objections to naive realism along these lines by John Foster, A.D. Smith, E.J. Lowe, Howard Robinson, Harold I. Brown, and Ned Block

Internalism and knowledge relevant normative factors

Response to John Greco's criticisms of certain internalist theories of epistemic justification. Greco argues that internalist theories of epistemic normativity are inadequate for several reasons. First, internalism cannot easily accommodate the causal or strong modal components required for justified belief and knowledge since such components are arguably external. Second, internalism leads to skepticism due to its focus on subjective rather than on objective justification. I dispute Greco’s claims here. First, internalism can accommodate any required causal or strong modal components for justified belief and knowledge without this conceding anything to externalist theories of epistemic normativity. Second, internalism need not lead to skepticism and that Greco makes a disputable assumption in this argument for this conclusion.