Sunday, April 19, 2009
The Truthful Information on KAL Flight 007 1983
Blog Detail
The Original Information on KAL Flight 007 1983
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do…
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=2777
I vividly remember my mother pacing nervously back and forth on our
living room back then in our Sysosset, Long Island (NY) home, even
before, her hearing on the news about this flight being shot down by the
the Former Soviet Union in 1983. Why (?) It was like she knew
something might happen to my Dad who was scheduled to be on this flight
to JFK from Seoul South Korea that very night.
My father was
scheduled to be on this flight at that time, he told me just now that by
“the time I took it, his flight changed to the Flt # to KAL7.
I told my father that I remember him telling me this but he begs to
differ with me now. Anyway, I remember him missing the flight because he
told me a few summers ago that his company called him rescheduling his
flight back to America from Korea originally scheduled for that date for
one week later. (THANK GOD).
Did my father solve the mystery insofar as wherefore this flight was shot down in 1983(?) I don’t really know.
But when my Dad visited me in Bloomingdale, NJ two years ago we were
sitting in my room talking and I remember asking him about it. I also
remember him telling me that this particular jet to the best of his
recollection was purposely invading Russian airspace to spy for the
United States of America when the USSR shot it down killing all
passengers.
My father worked for the government company called 'Chas T Main in Boston' at that time which did governmental contracts for the CIA and USAID in which he handled 15 million dollar contracts for the American government.
My father told me the weather was particularly poor that night.
Sometimes our memories differ slightly (wink).
J. Starr
P.S>>> Romeo and Juliet as well as the word "Kamchatka", was word I heard often from my father and mother when they spoke!
====================================================================================
KAL 007 Revisited (Part 1) |
By Bert Schlossberg
June 12, 2005
The
destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 occurred more than 20 years
ago, but still proves quite relevant today, especially because of the
incomplete and inconclusive evidence regarding the actual series of
events on the night of August 31, 1983, and the whereabouts or remnants
of the passengers and the airplane. In the first of a series of articles
dedicated to reinvigorating the debate and the investigation into this
mysterious incident, Bert Schlossberg recounts some of the details of
KAL 007's deviation from its flight path, and the stalking of this
flight by Maj. Osipovich in his Sukhoi 15 intercepter.
HOW KAL 007 WAS LOST
Delayed one hour because of strong tail winds[1], KAL 007 departed
Anchorage International Airport at 13:00 GMT (4:00 a.m. Alaskan time).
Climbing, the jumbo jet turned left, seeking its assigned route J501,
which would soon take it onto the northernmost of five 50-mile wide
passenger plane air corridors that bridge the Alaskan and Japanese
coasts. These five corridors are called the NOPAC (North Pacific)
routes.
KAL 007’s particular corridor, Romeo 20, passed just 17 1/2 miles from
Soviet airspace off the Kamchatka coast. Though the Boeing 747 was
capable of being navigated by Long Range Navigation (LORAN)[2]2—a less
up-to-date system relying on navigational guidance aids external to the
aircraft—its principal method of navigation was the Inertial Navigation
System (INS).
The INS consisted of three independent, self-contained, but
electronically linked units guiding the aircraft according to nine
“waypoint” coordinates, some of which were “punched” into the units
prior to flight. If more than nine were required, number 10 (and
subsequent) coordinates were entered during the flight, replacing
waypoint entries overflown and vacated. Korean Airlines received its
computerized flight plan from an independent supplier company,
Continental Air Service. This plan would designate the following nine
waypoints for KAL 007’s route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South
Korea—BET (Bethel), NABIE, NEEVA, NIPPI, NOKKA, NOHO, IFH (Inkfish), MXT
(Matsushima), and GTC (Niigata). Each INS unit (two of which were
actually used for navigation, the third being a reserve) utilized
gyroscopes and accelerometers[3] which minutely and continuously (seven
times per second) adjusted (through the automatic pilot) the aircraft in
flight in conformity with these coordinates, taking into account
changing wind, velocity, weight, and other conditions.
Each unit is comprised of three sub-units:
1. An Inertial Navigation Unit which senses both the horizon and the
various movements of the aircraft as it performs the necessary
computations to guide the plane along its desired track. The INU is
housed in the electronics bay of
the aircraft.
2. A Control Display Unit, containing digital readout windows for
navigational data as well as pilot data entry options. The CDU is
located in the flight
deck.
3. A Mode Selection Unit, used for navigational mode engagement. The MSU is located on the flight deck.
Ironically, the same space-age technology that produced the INS’s
ability to navigate without reference to external aids made it possible
for the Soviet salvage ship Mikhail Merchink to stabilize itself
dynamically over KAL 007’s wreckage, minutely compensating for wind and
water changes.
KAL 007 never reached its assigned transoceanic route Romeo 20. Seven to
ten minutes after takeoff, the jumbo jet began to deviate[4] to the
east of its prescribed flight path—a deviation which would gradually
increase until, approximately three and a half hours after takeoff, it
would enter Russian territory just north of Petropavslovsk on the
Kamchatka Peninsula. Home to the Soviet Far East Fleet Inter Continental
Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine base, as well as several air
fields, Petropavslovsk was bristling with weaponry.
Click for large version
HL7442 Photo © Frank C Duarte Jr
The details of KAL 007’s flight from Anchorage, Alaska, to the Kamchatka
Peninsula follow. (For details on the navigational aspects of KAL 007’s
deviation, look at FAQ 3 on www.rescue007.org, “What can be said about
the deviation of KAL flight 007 from its intended course?”) At 28
minutes after takeoff, civilian radar at Kenai, on the eastern shore of
Cook Inlet and 53 nautical miles southwest of Anchorage, with a radar
coverage of 175 miles west of Anchorage, tracked KAL 007 more than six
miles north of where it should have been. Where it should have been was a
location “fixed” by the nondirectional radio beacon (NDB) of Cairne
Mountain. The NDB navigational aid operates by transmitting a continuous
three-letter identification code which is picked up by the airborne
receiver, the Automatic Direction Finder (ADF). Cairne Mountain was KAL
007’s first assigned navigational aid out of Anchorage Airport.
Something was going wrong.
That night, Douglas L. Porter was the controller at Air Route Traffic
Control Center at Anchorage, assigned to monitor all flights in that
section, recording their observed position in relation to the fix
provided by the Cairne Mountain nondirectional beacon. Porter later
testified that all had seemed normal to him[5]. Yet he apparently failed
to record[6], as required, the position of two flights that night—and
only two: KAL 007, carrying Democratic Congressman McDonald and 268
others, and KAL 015, carrying Republican Senators Jesse Helms of North
Carolina and Steven Symms of Idaho, Congressman Carroll J. Hubbard Jr.
of Kentucky, and others[7], which followed KAL 007 by several minutes.
KAL 007 continued on its night journey, having previously received
clearance (13:02:40 GMT) to proceed “direct Bethel” when able. Bethel is
a small fishing village on the western tip of Alaska, 350 nautical
miles west of Anchorage. It is the last U.S. mainland navigational point
(but not the last land point), and the first of a series of required
reporting stations (KAL 007 was to do the reporting) that would guide
KAL 007 along its way—a sort of obligatory external “back-up”
verification system designed to confirm the accuracy of KAL 007’s
internally based Inertial Navigational System[8].
There were two navigational elements operative at Bethel. The first was
the VOR (Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range) navigational radio
station. This apparatus emitted Morse code signals (providing its
station identity) at regular intervals in all directions
(omni-directional). If KAL 007 had been using Bethel’s VOR station as a
course provider, the aircraft had only to ride one of these emitted
signal radials “home” in order to be brought to destination. The pilot
(or copilot, who also had a receiver before him) had only to ensure that
the VOR needle remained centered in order to be certain that he was on
course. That is, KAL 007 had only to “ride the radial.” However, KAL 007
was not to use the VOR Bethel station as a course provider—the Inertial
Navigation System would do that—but as a reporting point.
The second navigational apparatus available at Bethel was the DME
(Distance Measuring Equipment). “When tuned to a DME equipped ground
facility, the airborne DME sends out paired pulses at a specific
spacing. This is the interrogation. The ground facility receives the
pulses and then transmits back to the interrogating aircraft a second
pair of pulses with the same spacing but on a different frequency. The
airborne DME measures the elapsed time required for the roundtrip signal
exchange and translates that time into nautical miles and time to the
station as well as the aircraft’s current ground speed[9].” But the VOR
and the DME operate as one[10]. Having verified by the Morse code that
he had the right station, Captain Chun would have dialed in the VOR
frequency, and that would have given him both the VOR and the DME. The
VOR (and the DME) at Bethel were part of a navigational complex called
TACAN for Tactical Air Navigation. Hence, it received the acronym
VORTAC.
Korean Airline’s Bethel procedure required Flight 007 to verify its
position through VOR/DME. Apparently, it did not do so, for at 50
minutes after takeoff, military radar at King’s Salmon, Alaska, tracked
KAL 007 at a full 12.6 nautical miles north of where it should have
been.
What could the pilots of KAL 007 have known of their course deviation?
From Bethel and on, alert pilots could have known much—starting with the
Horizontal Situation Indicator. The Horizontal Situation Indicator’s
needle would have alerted the pilots of their course deviation. This is
because the cockpit HSI console needle, capable of showing deviation
only up to eight miles, would be “pegged” all the way to the side.
The pilots, thus, should have known that they were at least eight miles
off course[11]! Despite this, strangely enough, at 13:49, the pilots
were reporting that they were on course! “007, Bethel at forty niner.”
And so, fifty minutes after takeoff, military radar at King Salmon,
Alaska acquired KAL 007 at more than 12.6 miles off course. It had
exceeded its permissible leeway of deviation by six times! (Two nautical
miles an hour error is the permissible drift from course set by INS.)
Furthermore, pilot and copilot should also have been aware of the
aircraft’s serious deviation because now, much more than 12 miles off
course, KAL 007 was too far off course for the pilots to make their
required Very High Frequency (VHF) radio reports, and had to relay these
reports via KAL Flight 015, just minutes behind it and on-course (KAL
007, increasingly off course, would have to rely on KAL 015 three times
to transmit its reports to Anchorage Air Traffic Control). That should
have alerted them.
At one point in this section of its flight, (14:43 GMT) KAL 007 put a
call through a navigational “hookup,” the International Flight Service
Station on High Frequency. Flight 007, now too distant to speak directly
with Anchorage Controller through Very High Frequency, was transmitting
its message indirectly using High Frequency[12]. The message was a
change in the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) for the next waypoint
called NEEVA—delaying by four minutes the ETA that KAL 015 had
previously relayed on behalf of KAL 007. Since a revised ETA could only
be calculated by means of readout information presented by KAL 007’s
Inertial Navigation Systems Control Display unit, pilot and copilot were
once again presented with the opportunity of verifying their position
and becoming aware of their enormous deviation.
Halfway between waypoint NABIE and the next required reporting waypoint,
NEEVA, KAL 007 passed through the southern portion of the United States
Air Force NORAD (North American Air Defense) buffer zone. This zone,
monitored intensively by U.S. Intelligence assets, lies north of Romeo
20, KAL 007’s designated air route, and is off-limits to civilian
aircraft. KAL was apparently undetected—or, if detected, unreported.
And so KAL 007 continued its night journey, ever increasing its
deviation—60 nautical miles off course at waypoint NABIE, 100 nautical
miles off course at waypoint NUKKS, and 160 nautical miles off course at
waypoint NEEVA[13]—until it penetrated Kamchatka’s borders.
At 15:51 GMT, according to Soviet sources, KAL 007 “bumped” the Soviet
buffer zone of Kamchatka Peninsula.[14] The buffer zone was generally
considered to extend 200 km from Kamchatka’s coast and is technically
known as a Flight Information Region (FIR). Within that region, aircraft
would be queried by Soviet interceptors emitting a signal to the
unidentified aircraft. An apparatus called a transponder would squawk
back, among other things, the aircraft’s four-digit code, identifying
the plane—if it were a Soviet plane. A non-Soviet block plane would not
respond, but this in itself registered a negative identification. The
pilots of the intruding aircraft would be unaware of the Soviet query.
This system is similar to the U. S. military’s Identification Friend or
Foe (IFF).
The 200 km. buffer zone is counterpart to the United States’ Aerospace
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), but the 100 km. radius of the buffer
zone nearest to Soviet territory had the additional designation of Air
Defense Zone. Heightened surveillance measures would be taken against
any non-Soviet aircraft entering the Air Defense Zone.
August 31/September 1, 1983 was the worst possible night for KAL 007 to
“bump the buffer” for a complexity of reasons—all of them ominous. It
was but a few short hours before the time that Marshal Ogarkov, Soviet
Chief of General Staff, had set for the test firing of the SS-25, an
illegal mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)[15]. The SS-25
was to be launched from Plesetsk, the launch site in northwest Russia
which was used for test firing of solid fuel propellant ICBMs—24 minutes
later to land in the Klyuchi target area on the Kamchatka
Peninsula[16].
Prior to his appointment as Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of the
General Staff, General Ogarkov had been Chief of the Main Operation
Directorate of the General Staff and, as such, had begun and had
directed the Strategic Deception Department, or “Maskirovka,” which was
charged with hiding Salt 2 violations from United States intelligence.
On August 31/September 1, Soviet aerial “jammers” under Maskirovka were
sent aloft to prevent United States intelligence eyes and ears from
obtaining the illegal SS 25’s telemetry data.
And indeed, United States intelligence eyes and ears were wide open and
unblinking that night—an RC-135 Boeing 707 reconnaissance plane was
“lazy eighting” off the Kamchatka peninsula coast electronically
“sucking in” emissions.
Click for large version
The RC-135: The priemier U.S. Spy Plane of the 1980s
Photo © Tom Vance
Exactly which emissions the 707 was collecting depended on which of two
versions of the RC-135—code-named “Rivet Joint” and “Cobra Ball,”
respectively—happened to be deployed that night. Rivet Joint, based at
Eielson Air Force Base south of Fairbanks, Alaska, was furnished with
cameras, SLAR (side-looking radar) and an array of advanced electronic
equipment designed to eavesdrop on in-the-air and on-the-ground
conversations, locate and decipher radar signals, “spoofing”[17] (i.e.
simulating electronically and otherwise near intrusions of the border
thus turning on Soviet radar stations), and tripping and recording the
enemy’s “order of battle.”
Cobra Ball, based on Shemya Island on the tip of the Aleutian Island
chain, similarly equipped as the Rivet Joint 707 but with much more
apparatus, stayed far from the borders of the Kamchatka peninsula
waiting for the precise moment of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
reentry in order to capture the missile’s telemetry signals.
Rivet Joint and Cobra Ball were both under the command of the Air
Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC), but the personnel operating the
electronic equipment were signal intelligence specialists of the
Electronic Security Command (ESC) under the authority of the National
Security Agency (NSA). The NSA was charged with the responsibility of
gathering and deciphering “raw” intelligence data. This raw data was
collected from supersensitive apparatus aboard aerial platforms such as
the RC-135, on land collection stations such as that on Wakkanai on the
northernmost Japanese Island of Hokkaido (it was from this Wakkanai
station that the Japanese radar track of KAL 007’s descent had been
obtained), and the Misawa Air Base on the main Japanese Island of
Honshu. Raw data was even collected from under the sea—from strings of
underwater movement and pressure sensors, and from listening devises
that are capable not only of “fixing” a ship and its type, but of
ascertaining its name, port of departure, destination, and probable
mission.
The raw intelligence data then underwent preliminary analysis at various
collection platforms and stations, and then, in the far east, were
beamed 23 thousand miles up to a geosynchronous satellite (one whose
orbit around the world was correlated with the rotation of the earth
around its axis in such a way that it remained continually “motionless”
over a designated portion of the earth). From this satellite, the raw
data was beamed to the NSA facility at Pine Gap, Australia, and from
there relayed to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. At Fort
Meade, the data was further analyzed and then distributed to various
intelligence services of the United States government.
The collection stations and platforms around the world operated in an
on-spot evaluation of the critical nature of the raw material they
collected and analyzed. An evaluation of highest priority was called a
“Critic Report.” A Critic Report had to be at the desks of both the
President’s National Security Adviser and the Director of the NSA within
ten minutes of evaluation at the collection station. In practice,
Critic Reports usually reach their destinations within five minutes. It
is rare for there to be more than two Critic Reports a year[18].
Most commentators believe that the KAL 007 incident fully warranted a
Critic Report. After all or most of the ramifications became apparent,
Senator Helms would write Boris Yeltsin, “One of the greatest tragedies
of the Cold War was the shoot-down of the Korean Airlines Flight KAL 007
by the armed forces of what was then the Soviet Union on September 1st,
1983... The KAL 007 tragedy was one of the most tense incidents of the
entire Cold War[19].”
It is almost certain, then, that United States intelligence agencies,
poised that night to receive all that the Soviets emitted, were in
position to follow KAL 007’s incursion into the Soviet buffer zone off
Kamchatka. In fact, they were charged to do so. The RC-135 Rivet Joint
would have seen Kamchatka’s radar positions “light up” one after another
and would have heard the chatter at dozens of command posts. James
Bamford, author of The Puzzle Palace and an expert on the operations of
the United States National Security Agency explains:
“The RC-135 is designed for one purpose—it’s designed for
eavesdropping... There’s almost no way that the aircraft could not have
picked up the indications of Soviet activity: Soviet fighters taking
off, Soviet defense stations going into higher states of readiness,
higher states of alert[20].”
Most probably Cobra Ball’s radar (as well as Rivet Joint’s) would have
acquired KAL 007 in its flight traversing the RC-135’s area of
detection. The Soviet Union would contend that not only was there an
RC-135 in proximity to KAL 007 as the passenger plane neared the coast
of Kamchatka, but that their proximity to each other was premeditated
for United States intelligence-gathering purposes.
“On 31 August, at 17.45 Moscow time (02.45 Kamchatka time on 1
September) an RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft was flying southeast of
Karaginski Island. In this area it closed with the aeroplane performing
flight KAL 007. Both aircraft were capable of monitoring the situation
in the air with their airborne equipment. However, no reaction to the
close approach of these aeroplanes to each other took place in the air
and they continued to fly on parallel headings for 10 minutes. This
confirms that the joint flight of the two aeroplanes was not
coincidental, but was planned in advance[21].”
The Soviets would also contend that KAL 007’s entire flight—from the
time prior to its entry into Soviet airspace off Kamchatka, until it was
shot down— “dovetailed” with three passes of a United States Ferret-D
intelligence gathering satellite, which would have therefore been
apprised of KAL 007’s progress into airspace over supersensitive Soviet
military installations.
“Ferret-D appeared over Chukotka at 18.45 Moscow time on 31 August and
flew for about 12 minutes east of Kamchatka and in Kurile Islands. On
this orbit the satellite was able, immediately prior to the incursion of
the intruder aeroplane into Soviet airspace, to zero in on Soviet radio
facilities... in a routine state of alert and pinpoint their location
and level of activity...
“On its second orbit Ferret-D appeared... at the moment when the
intruder aeroplane penetrated Soviet airspace—it was over the Kamchatka
area. The aeroplane’s violation of the State frontier forced Soviet
monitoring facilities to step up substantially their level of operation.
All of this was recorded by the Ferret-D spy satellite...
“Finally, the ensuing orbit of Ferret-D coincided with the third and
last stage of the intruder aeroplane’s flight over Sakhalin. In this
interval it was able to record the operation of all the additional
Soviet Air Defense Command electronic facilities on Sakhalin Island and
the Kurile Ridge and in Primorski Kray.”
There were also powerful land and sea radar arrays that could well have
tracked KAL 007 as it approached and entered Soviet territory. These
were Cobra Judy aboard the U.S.S. Observation Island, then off the coast
of Kamchatka; Shemya Island’s Cobra Dane line of sight radar with
maximum range of 28 thousand miles and capability of tracking an
airplane at 30 thousand feet altitude through an area covering 400 miles
(the curvature of the earth being its limiting factor); and Shemya
Island’s Cobra Talon, an over the horizon (OTH) “backscatter” radar
array with a range from 575 miles to 2,070 miles. Cobra Talon operated
by bouncing its emissions off the ionosphere (deflection) to the other
side of the line of sight horizon, thus acquiring its targets. These
radar arrays had capability for both surveillance and tracking. Whether
this capability was actualized in the case of Flight 007 is currently
unknown. The security “blanket” is a thick one!
We do know that the United States Air Force radar stations at Cape
Newenham and Cape Romanzoff in Alaska not only had the capability to
track all aircraft heading toward the Russian Buffer Zone, but they were
required to do so [22]. They were furthermore required to warn the
straying aircraft on
emergency frequency, and to warn the pertinent Air Traffic Control
Centers so that they too could attempt to warn the straying aircraft.
Well within range of these radar sights, KAL 007 had veered directly
toward Kamchatka.
But that night KAL 007 plunged into the Russian 200 kilometer buffer
zone, then the 100 kilometer Air Defense Zone, and then it was over
Russian territory with no one to stop it.
There was one last navigational aid to warn the crew. With consoles at
the knees of both pilot and copilot, the plane’s weather radar[23] could
have alerted them to the fact that they were no longer flying over
water, as they ought to have been. Weather radar has two modes—land
mapping for clear weather, when it would be possible to look down and
see water or land masses as well as the contours of the coast lines and
the weather surveillance mode for cloudy weather, when it is necessary
to “see through” clouds in order to detect dangerous thunderstorms. In
land mapping mode, KAL 007 had only to make sure that the land mass of
Kamchatka and the Island string of the Kurile chain would remain to the
right. That night, however, KAL 007’s weather radar was probably not in
land mapping mode, for the weather was inclement. The International
Civil Aviation Organization’s meteorological analysis would conclude
that, “there was extensive coverage of low, medium, and high level
clouds over southern Kamchatka associated with an active cold
front[24].” ICAO’s analysis of KAL 007’s weather radar functioning would
state, “it was concluded that the radar was not functioning properly or
that the ground mapping capability was not used[25].”
Unsuspectingly, KAL 007 crossed the Kamchatka peninsula, and while over
the international waters of the Sea of Okhotsk nearing the coast of
Sakhalin, a “welcome” was in frantic preparation 33 thousand feet
below—documented by the transcripts of the Russian military
ground-to-ground communications submitted by the Russian Federation and
appended to the 1993 ICAO report.
General Kornukov[26] (to Military District Headquarters-Gen. Kamenski):
(5:47) ...simply destroy [it] even if it is over neutral waters? Are
the orders to destroy it over neutral waters? Oh, well.
Click for large version
Destroy it even if it is over neutral waters?
Major Osipovich flew a Sukhoi 15 interceptor on the night of Aug. 31, 1983
Photo © Sergey Riabsev
General Kornukov: (6:13)
Chaika[27]
Titovnin[28]:
Yes, sir. He[29] sees [it] on the radar screen, he sees [it] on the screen. He has locked on, he is locked on, he is locked on.
Kornukov:
No answer, Roger. Be ready to fire, the target is 45-50 km from the
State border[30]. Officer in charge at the command post, please, for
report.
Titovnin:
Hello.
Kornukov:
Kornukov, please put Kamenski on the line. Kornukov: ...General Kornukov, put General Kamenski on[31].
General Kamenski:
Kamenski here.
Kornukov: (6:14)
Comrade General, Kornukov, good morning. I am reporting the situation.
Target 60-65[32] is over Terpenie Bay[33] tracking 240, 30 km from the
State border, the fighter from Sokol is 6 km away. Locked on, orders
were given to arm weapons. The target is not responding, to identify, he
cannot identify it visually because it is still dark, but he is still
locked on.
Kamenski:
We must find out, maybe it is some civilian craft or God knows who.
Kornukov:
What civilian? [It] has flown over Kamchatka! It [came] from the ocean
without identification. I am giving the order to attack if it crosses
the State border.
Kamenski:
Go ahead now, I order...?
And at another location—at Smyrnykh Air Force Base in central Sakhalin...
Lt. Col. Novoseletski[34]: (6:12)
Does he see it on the radar or not?
Titovnin: (6:13)
He sees it on the screen, he sees it on the screen. He is locked on.
[In 1996, Osipovich would reverse his previous denials that he knew that
the "target" he had downed was a civilian passenger plane: "I saw two
rows of windows and knew that this was a Boeing. I knew this was a
civilian plane. But for me this meant nothing. It is easy to turn a
civilian type of plane into one for military use." (New York Times
interview, September 9, 1996)]
Novoseletski:
He is locked on.
Titovnin:
Locked on. Well, Roger.
Titovnin: (6:14)
Hello.
Lt. Col. Maistrenko[35]:
Maistrenko!
Titovnin:
Maistrenko Comrade Colonel, that is, Titovnin.
Maistrenko: (6:15)
Yes.
Titovnin:
The commander has given orders that if the border is violated—destroy [the target].
Maistrenko:
...May [be] a passenger [aircraft]. All necessary steps must be taken to identify it.
Titovnin:
Identification measures are being taken, but the pilot cannot see. It’s dark. Even now it’s still dark.
Maistrenko:
Well, okay. The task is correct. If there are no lights—it cannot be a passenger [aircraft].
Titovnin:
You confirm the task?
Maistrenko:
Eh?
Titovnin:
You confirm the task?
Maistrenko:
Yes.
Titovnin:
Roger.
And at yet another location...
Kornukov: (6:21)
Gerasimenko!
Lt. Col. Gerasimenko[36]:
Gerasimenko here.
Kornukov:
Gerasimenko, cut the horseplay at the command post, what is that noise
there? I repeat the combat task: fire missiles, fire on target 60-65
destroy target 60-65.
Gerasimenko:
Wilco.
Kornukov:
Comply and get Tarasov here. Take control of the MiG 23 from Smyrnykh,
call sign 163, call sign 163, he is behind the target at the moment.
Destroy the target!
Gerasimenko:
Task received. Destroy target 60-65 with missile fire, accept control of fighter from Smyrnykh.
Kornukov:
Carry out the task, destroy [it]!
Gerasimenko:
...Comrade General... Gone to attack position.
Kornukov: (6:24)
Oh, [obscenities], how long [does it take him] to go to attack position,
he is already getting out into neutral waters. Engage afterburner
immediately. Bring in the MiG 23 as well... While you are wasting time,
it will fly right out. Gerasimenko.
Gerasimenko:
Here.
Kornukov:
So, 23[37] is going behind, his radar sights are engaged, draw yours off
to the right immediately after the attack. Has he fired or not?
Gerasimenko:
Not yet, not at all.
Kornukov:
Why?
Gerasimenko:
He is closing in, going on the attack. 163[38] is coming in, observing both.
Kornukov:
Okay, Roger, understood, so bring in 163 in behind Osipovich to guarantee destruction.
This article was excerpted from the book "Rescue 007: The Untold Story
of KAL 007 and Its Survivors," by Bert Schlossberg, Xlibris, 2001, pages
139 156.
ENDNOTES:
[1] It was the practice of Korean Airlines to sometimes delay a flight
so that it would not arrive at Kimpo Airport in Seoul, Korea prior to
6:00 a.m., as customs and passenger handling personnel began their
operations at that time.
[2] LORAN uses a “master” land station and two “slave” stations that
transmit low or medium frequency signals. The intersection of
transmission lines of pairs of such stations establishes a plane’s
location.
[3] The accelerometers detect changes in the aircraft’s motion (any direction) in reference to the gyroscopic lines.
[4] ICAO 1983 report, p. 5.
[5] Testimony of Douglas L. Porter, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, October 6, 1984.
[6] KAL 007: the Coverup, Summit Books, New York 1987, Pg. 37
[7] Senators Helms, Symms, and Congressmen McDonald and Hubbard had been
invited by the president of South Korea to participate in the
celebration of the 30th year commemoration of the U.S.-Korea Mutual
Defense Pact.
[8] Korean Airlines required use of the North Pacific Operations Manual,
which stipulates that the last land-based navigational aid for oceanic
flights (Bethel) be used to verify INS accuracy.
[9] Aeronautical Knowledge, Paul E. Illman, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, p. 281.
[10] After Bethel, KAL 007’s waypoints were not on its “straight line”
flight trajectory (the Great Circle). If KAL 007 had no DME, it would
have had to follow radials (like “connect the dots”) to its planned
destination, rather than following the planned straight line trajectory.
With DME, the pilots, once having intercepted the radial, would know
the distance to the emitting VOR station, and could calculate the
straight line trajectory.
[11] An aircraft HSI generally has an image of a plane directly above
the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s needle when the aircraft is on
course. A needle pointing to the left or to the right of the image would
indicate that the plane is deviated left or right of the course. KAL
007’s HSI’s needle would have been pegged all the way to the right
(North). ICAO expanded on the Horizontal Situation Indicator’s
capability of showing course deviation. The pilots could have known that
they were off course by looking at the Horizontal Situation Indicator
(HSI) in front of each of them. Though the HSI was primarily designed to
show the aircraft’s situation with regard to the horizon, the 747’s HSI
contained an indicator to register deviation from plotted course.
“Indications [of being on course] available to the crew would have been a
reducing or zero track bar displacement with the HSI display set to INS
and a similar reducing or zero cross track error on the CDUs
[consoles]. There would have been a similar effect with the VOR track
displacement...”—ICAO report 1993, p. 42, sect. 2.4.4.
[12] At waypoint NABIE, KAL 007 was too far north to make radar contact
with the Very High Frequency Air Traffic Control relay station on St.
Paul’s Island. KAL 015 relayed for KAL 007.
[13] ICAO report 1993, p. 45, sect. 2.8.1.
[14] A U. S. State Department release designates 1551 GMT as the time
KAL 007 penetrated the Soviet buffer zone. This time was probably
ascertained through U.S. eavesdropping of Soviet radar and voice
transmissions by two U. S. Air Force Electronic Security Command
Groups—the 6981st located at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage,
Alaska; and the 6920th at Misawa Air Force Base on Hokkaido Island,
Japan.
[15] The SS-25 was in violation of the SALT II agreements on three counts:
1. It was a new kind of ICBM (the first mobile one ever launched).
2. Its telemetry was encoded and encrypted. When a test ICBM reentry
vehicle approaches the target, it emits vital data relating to its
velocity, trajectory, throw-weight, and accuracy by means of coded
(symbolized) and encrypted (scrambled) electronic bursts, which are then
decoded and decrypted by Soviet on-ground intelligence gathering
stations.
3. The missile as a whole was too large for its reentry vehicle (dummy
warhead), raising suspicion that the missile was being developed for new
and more advanced warheads than allowable.
[16] Liquid propellant ICBMs were launched from Tyuratam in southwest Russia.
[17] See footnote number 27 on page xx for the transcript of a Soviet
shoot down of a U.S. electronic intelligence aircraft on a “spoofing
mission” over Soviet Armenia on Sept. 2, 1958.
[18] Next in priority were “E-grams,” with an outer reception time of 20
minutes. “Spot Reports” came next in priority at 30 minutes, and
“Klieg Lights” after that. This whole structure of communications, with
numerous other facets of function and operation, are subsumed under the
acronym of CRITICOM—Critical Intelligence Communication System.
[19] Senator Helms’ letter of December 10, 1991, to Boris Yeltsin. See Appendix F.
[20] As quoted by David Pearson, KAL 007: The Coverup, p. 156.
[21] Preliminary Information on the Progress of the U.S.S.R.
Investigation of the accident to a South Korean Aeroplane on 1 September
1983—Appendix F, Restricted, U.S.S.R. Attachment to ICAO report of
1983, p. F11.
[22] The Cape Newenham and Cape Romanzoff radars monitored at the NORAD
Regional Operations Command Center were but two of twelve comprising the
United States Alaskan Distant Early Warning/Aircraft Control and
Warning (DEW/ACW) System.
[23] KAL 007’s Bendix radar had a maximum range of 200 NM with a 180° scan capability.
[24] ICAO 1983, section 1.7.1., p. 9.
[25] ICAO 1983, p. 45. Section 2.9.1.
[26] General Anatoli Kornukov, Commander, Sokol Air Force Base
(Sakhalin). Kornukov was appointed by Boris Yeltsin on January 22, 1998,
as Russia’s new Air Force Commander.
[27] Call sign for Far East Military District Air Force.
[28] Flight Controller for Major Osipovich—Combat Control Center of Fighter Division.
[29] Major Gennadie Osipovich flying Sukhoi 15 Flagon interceptor—call sign 805.
[30] Apparently, the Soviets were prepared to fire while KAL 007 was in
international air space. It had previously been flying over Russian
territory.
[31] Commander, Far East Military District Air Force.
[32] Call sign for KAL 007 “intruder.”
[33] Terpenie Bay is on the East coast of Sakhalin Island. KAL 007 had
thus successfully traversed Kamchatka and, almost having traversed the
Sea of Okhotsk, it was about to enter Sakhalin’s air space.
[34] Smirnykh Air Base Fighter Division Acting Chief of Staff.
[35] Operations Duty Officer, Combat Control Center of Fighter Division.
[36] Acting Commander, 41st Fighter Regiment.
[37] MiG 23.
[38] Call sign for the MiG 23.
Written by
Bert Schlossberg
Bert Schlossberg is the International Director of the International Committee for the Rescue of KAL 007 Survivors, http://www.Rescue007.org.
His wife, Exie, lost her father, Alfredo Cruz, and her cousin, Edith
Cruz, both of whom were aboard KAL 007. Bert and Exie welcome all email
responses about this article and about this incident, from pertinent to
personal.
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| 7 User Comments: |
Username: DON14 [User Info]
Posted 2005-07-02 06:06:08 and read 27986 times.
the truth will never come out |
Username: DON14 [User Info]
Posted 2005-07-03 06:06:40 and read 27955 times.
Your first part I like so far your going in the right direction . Something is just not right with this picture |
Username: BSchlossberg [User Info]
Posted 2005-07-11 19:15:45 and read 27743 times.
DON14,
Thanks for your comments. The truth is coming out. bit by bit. Enough has come out already to act! |
Username: GoldenArgosy [User Info]
Posted 2006-03-25 17:56:49 and read 25608 times.
Thanks
for the great read. Either I didn't know or I had forgotten about the
second KAL flight that night (015). Where had that taken off from? Had
that also departed from Anchorage minutes behind 007? Also, totally
random connection here to James Bond |
Username: BSchlossberg [User Info]
Posted 2006-03-26 15:07:31 and read 25588 times.
Thanks for your good word, GoldenArgosy!
KAL 015, the companion flight of KAL 007, started from Los Angelos, and
was at Anchorage Alaska for refueling, plus, during the time KAL 007 was
at Anchorage. It took off for Seoul 15 minutes later than 007 but
gradually decreased distance from it. When it arrived in Seoul, and 007
had not yet, all the families waiting for their loved one had their
deepest concerns realized. Something terrible had happened.
James Bond - 007! Yes quite a coincidence. I once entered Barnes and
Nobles to enquire aboutt he book I had written "Rescue 007" and got the
response from the bookseller, "Oh, a James Bond fan. Huh?" That's how it
goes! |
Username: BSchlossberg [User Info]
Posted 2007-02-21 15:16:13 and read 18026 times.
Please
post any comments to this article (arrticle 1) to the comments for the
last article (article 6) in the KAL 007 series. Thank you!
Bert Schlossberg |
Username: Okie [User Info]
Posted 2008-09-06 19:01:54 and read 7984 times.
I
was in the former USSR with my mother and other nurses from the US who
were teaching dialysis to the Soviets. It was very scary, as we were
not informed of what happened until a week later. In the beginning the
story was that there was a plane missing, but they didn't know anything
about it. Later we were told the plane had been shot down, but they
still didn't know anything about it. On our departure from Moscow, we
had to wait several hours for the Soviets to allow a Finair flight to
come in and pick us up; as our allies had shut down any Soviet aircraft
in their fly zone. Reading your findings was very interesting. |
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Kamchatka was word I heard often from my father and mother when they spoke!