Needed: Patriot Act in India
When the Union of India comes out with a new law to fight terror in the
wake of 26/11, I suggest that it should be a Patriot Act, on the lines of the
Patriot act enacted in USA
in the wake of 9/11. The Patriot Act should also include provisions for establishing
a Monument to Martyrs of Hindustan. All security forces personnel who have
sacrificed their lives fighting for the nation’s integrity and security should
be honoured and compensated with pay and pensions as in USA which has
learnt to respect its veterans.
kalyanaraman
Govt plans anti-terror law
Satya Prakash,
Hindustan Times
New Delhi, December 13, 2008
First Published: 23:43 IST(13/12/2008)
Last Updated: 01:19 IST(14/12/2008)
The
government on Saturday said that it would bring in a new law to deal with
terrorism in an effective manner.
“We will
enact a law to deal with the situation prevailing in the country. We will have
a law, which will specifically deal with terrorist activities,” said Law
Minister H.R. Bhardwaj at an international conference of jurists on terrorism
and human rights.
“The
government will very soon decide the contents of that law,” he said in the
presence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chief Justice of India K.G.
Balakrishnan.
Asked if the
new law will be introduced in the current session of Parliament, the law
minister said it was pending with the Home Ministry and the cabinet was yet to
clear it.
He mentioned
how countries like the US
and the UK
have strengthened their terror laws.
Stating that
anti-terror laws such as TADA and POTA had been abolished, Bhardwaj said time
had come for a “really very effective” legislation to combat terrorism in the
aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. However, any such law would not in any way
infringe on Article 21 (Right to Liberty).
“The law will be there with reasonable restrictions,” he added.
In his
address, Chief Justice Balakrishnan sounded a note of caution against
curtailment of civil rights, saying care must be taken to ensure that new laws
do not trample upon the fundamental rights of the citizens.
“While the
ultimate choice in this regard lies with the legislature, we must be careful
not to trample upon Constitutional principles such as ‘substantive due process’,”
he said.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=c8acc11b-ba97-439a-976f-2b1fda5156fdMumbaiunderattack_Special
Hindusthan at war. Who were Missing in Action on 26/11? Running to mummy (US).
Stop 'running to mummy (US)' for tackling
terror: BJP to Govt
11 Dec 2008, 1650 hrs IST, PTI
NEW DELHI: Pledging support for a full-scale war
against terror, Opposition BJP on Thursday said the government must stop
"running" to Washington hoping that
the US
would come to its rescue in tackling Pakistan-backed terrorism.
"Please stop running to mummy (US)" hoping that somebody else will
help the country to tackle terrorism, senior BJP leader Arun Shourie said
initiating a discussion in the Rajya Sabha on the recent terror attacks in
Mumbai.
He said the government keeps pinning its hopes on US Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice coming here to resolve the country's problems with regard to
terrorism.
Asking the government to stop the peace process with Pakistan, he said "your
intelligence record shows that ISI is now knitting together Indian insurgent
groups".
Observing that China was
propping up Pakistan,
Shourie said Islamabad was supporting terrorism
and at the same time putting the onus of the peace process on New Delhi.
Advising the government to come out of the "self-denial" mode, he
said four days before the Mumbai terror strikes, former home minister Shivraj
Patil was taking consolation in the figures showing comparison of terrorist
attacks during the NDA and the UPA governments.
Referring to coastal security, he said barring one, none of the remaining 35
islands in Lakshadsweep was properly staffed by intelligence agencies.
Noting that the country remained vulnerable because terrorist groups backed by
the neighbouring country use high technology like voice over internet protocol,
he warned that in the next five years the terrorists would use non-conventional
weapons like chemical and nuclear arms in miniature forms.
Shourie said the 'proxy war' started by former Pakistan President Zia ul Haq
has kept India "bleeding" for 35 years with no damage to them.
Advising the government to judge Pakistan by the ground realities,
he said "please do not go by joint statements that you sign with their
leaders".
Rejecting the theory of using minimal force, Shourie said the government should
go with full force to win over the proxy war unleashed by Pakistan.
"Not an eye for an eye. But for an eye, both eyes. For a tooth, whole
jaw," he said.
He observed that violence in Jammu and Kashmir
had come down in the last one year because Pakistan was preoccupied with its
own problems in troubled areas like Balochistan, the tribal belt and other
places.
He asked the government to empower the proposed Federal Investigation Agency
with adequate teeth. Asking the government not to make it a prestige issue, he
said if the UPA was "allergic" to POTA, it should bring changes in
the National Security Act so that tough actions can be taken against
terrorists.
Shourie said the entire country would support the government if it took
effective and urgent steps to combat terrorism.
He reminded Chidambaram that if he failed to act sternly against terrorism,
"this time it will not only the share prices that will come down, but the
entire country would have been let down and exposed to greater danger".
Critical of the government for "routinising" the threats of terror
attacks through sea and land routes, Shourie cautioned that seeking Pakistan's help
in probing Mumbai attacks would be like living in a "fool's
paradise".
He said the attacks have made clear that "all the terror infrastructure in
India set up by Pakistan
remains, be it the hawala network or smuggling routes through our
coastlines".
He added that Pakistan will
"never suffer" and "it has already gone on blackmail mode as
soon as India twitched its
brows after the Mumbai attacks, threatening to move its forces from Afghanistan to
the Indo-Pak borders".
Shourie said Pakistan has
always used this tactic when under pressure and started
"blackmailing" the US,
"which is its main prop. Condoleezza Rice came here, but what will she do
when their government will go in the next five weeks".
The BJP MP said that Pakistan
has always nurtured terror modules in India and "if we agree to its
request of a joint probe, it would be like living in a fool's paradise".
Reading out
various statements and resolutions issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the
then home minister Shivraj Patil and defence minister A K Antony between early
last year till a day before the Mumbai attacks, Shourie said that "terror
is getting routinised".
The BJP MP also stressed on involvement of local help to terrorists involved in
Mumbai terror attacks and lamented that "we are politically hamstrung to
talk about it".
He said between 2004 and 2006, 81 terror modules have been busted by
intelligence agencies.
"These were ISI modules and due to this, many possible explosions were
averted. But ISI has been able to penetrate into India, and the intelligence
agencies are yet to unravel its full network," he said, adding that
effective steps for curbing terrorism are required.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3822870,prtpage-1.cms
India is witnessing a terror war, says
Advani
PTI | December 11, 2008 | 15:26
IST
Declaring that it was together with the United Progressive
Alliance government in the war on terror, the Opposition on Thursday assured
its full backing to the Centre on any 'hard decisions' taken to help end the
scourge in the wake of Mumbai attacks.
"The Home Minister has talked of taking hard decisions.
Whatever steps you take which would help win the war on terror, my party and
the National Democratic Alliance will support them," Leader of the
Opposition L K Advani said in the Lok Sabha.
http://www.rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=//news/2008/dec/11mumterror-india-witnessing-terror-war-says-advani.htm
Indo-Asian News Service
New Delhi, December 11, 2008
First Published: 13:16 IST(11/12/2008)
Last Updated: 13:25 IST(11/12/2008)
Pakistan
epicentre of terror, don't expect much from UN: Advani
Terming
Pakistan
the “epicentre” of terrorism, opposition leader LK Advani on Thursday cautioned
the government against relying completely on the UN Security Council to bring
the perpetrators of the “terror war” in Mumbai to justice.
“We are trying
to pressurise Pakistan
by moving the UNSC. But we should not forget our experience in terms of Kashmir. We should take whatever action we can take on
our own strength, as this is our problem. We should not expect too much from
the UNSC,” Advani said in a statement in the Lok Sabha.
"The
world says that South Asia is in the eye of
the storm on terrorism. Let us realise and say it candidly that the epicentre
of the terror is Pakistan.
We moved UNSC but we haven't named Pakistan. I don't know why."
Addressing the
house after Home Minister P Chidambaram, the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP)
prime ministerial candidate said the Nov 26 attack on India's financial capital
was a "terror war" that was the fallout of “cross border terrorism”.
“It is not
just terror, it is cross border terrorism, a word which Pakistan's former
president General Parvez Musharraf refused to accept during (the 2001) Agra
summit. He instead termed the terrorism in Kashmir
as the fight for liberation,” said Advani, who was deputy home minister in the
BJP-led government then.
He said Pakistan's
crackdown of terrorist groups was hogwash.
“We should not
be fooled by the crackdown operation of Pakistan against terrorist groups,”
Advani said.
Assuring the
government of the opposition's support in all “stern decisions” aimed at
rooting out terrorism, Advani also pointed fingers towards Pakistan's
intelligence agency ISI for perpetrating terror in the country.
“Pakistan President (Asif Ali) Zardari has
accepted that non-state actors on Pakistan soil are fomenting terrorism.
ISI itself is a non-state actor because it is not under the elected Pakistan
government and is answerable only to the army,” he added.
He said the
Nov 26-29 Mumbai terror siege which killed 172 people was an attack on the
“economic progress” and the “peaceful coexistence of multi-religions” in India.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=a8bcf385-9d07-4c98-994c-6e7baf9d7168
From the Los Angeles
Times
Opinion
[MIA
== Missing in Action]
MIA in Mumbai
Indian
officials, police and commandos must share the blame for mishandling the
attacks.
By Edward N. Luttwak
December 5, 2008
Those who live in Tel Aviv, New
York or London
need not fear a Mumbai episode. If 10 infantry-trained terrorists were to
attack those cities, local police with their own hostage-rescue teams would
quickly deal with them.
But in India, the reality is that local police
cannot be expected to react usefully to a terrorist attack, or indeed any form
of armed attack, as they would in many other countries -- for example, sealing
off the area and summoning help. Instead, Mumbai and India's other mega-cities
are policed by semi-illiterate constables who deal only with petty crime as
they make their rounds, drinking free tea in cafes and accepting small gifts
from shopkeepers for chasing away intrusive beggars. They hardly ever stop
inter-religious or inter-caste violence and are reluctant to engage anyone with
a firearm.
Accordingly, in Mumbai there was no police cordon
around the huge Taj Mahal Palace & Tower hotel nor the quite small Nariman
House of the Jewish Chabad-Lubavitch group during the sieges, so that
terrorists could have been reinforced or could have escaped.
It's not that India is unfamiliar with terrorism.
According to recent data from India's Home Ministry, about 7,000 Indians have
been killed in terrorist incidents since 2004 -- mostly but not exclusively by
Muslim extremists. Obviously the nation has needed a much better-educated,
better-paid, better-trained national anti-terrorist police unit for years, but
none has been established. Thus the forces available to fight the terrorists in
Mumbai were pathetically inadequate in quantity, quality or both.
That was clearly true of Maharashtra's state
anti-terrorism squad, which is headquartered less than 10 minutes from the
sites of the attacks but which had a total of 35 officers -- and fewer than 15
on duty. This, to protect a state population of 96 million, 18 million in
Mumbai alone. The squad's commander, Hemant Karkare -- who was killed early in
the attacks -- was a 54-year-old investigator, not a fighter even at the level
of an ordinary infantryman.
By contrast, India's National Security Guards,
formed in 1985, are well trained. But the guards are a military-style commando
assault force, with no real experience in civilian hostage rescue, even though
that is one of their official missions. With 7,500 trained men, they could have
responded adequately in a military way, if only someone had managed to call
enough of them in quickly.
The first terrorist attack was reported about 9:30
p.m. The strategy for alerting the central government failed, so it was
Vilasrao Deshmukh, the chief minister of the Maharashtra state government, who
got the call to decide what help was needed. He happened to be on a trip in the
state of Kerala, hundreds of miles to the south. For 90 minutes, he did nothing
of consequence while receiving calls on his cellphone about the attacks.
Finally, at 11 p.m., he called Shivraj Patil, the home minister in charge of
the nation's security and law enforcement. (After this colossal security
failure, Patil resigned Sunday. It took Deshmukh until Wednesday to do the
same.)
Because Patil had no information of his own -- a
very peculiar situation for an interior minister anywhere -- he put the key
question to Deshmukh: How many commandos of the National Security Guards were
needed? Deshmukh replied 200. That may have been more than enough to fight
against 10 or 15 infantry-trained terrorists (they were not ninjas or samurai,
after all) but was grossly inadequate to deal with even one target as big as
the immense Taj hotel. Patil had no competent staff to intervene to determine
the right number, which was at least 1,000.
All the government commandos were in New Delhi,
more than 700 miles from Mumbai. Even as the mayhem in Mumbai was being
broadcast to the world, no one thought to send the commandos in the fastest way
possible -- by commandeering several of the passenger jets at New Delhi's
airport with crews ready to fly. Instead, an old and slow Ilyushin Il-76 and
its sleeping pilots were summoned from the Chandigarh airport 150 miles away.
The transport plane did not arrive in New Delhi until 2 a.m. By the time the
commandos arrived in central Mumbai, it was 7 a.m., 9 1/2 hours after the first
reports of attacks.
Even then, they had to act with almost no
information -- not even an accurate floor plan of the massive Taj hotel -- and
of course in grossly inadequate numbers, given the need to sweep the Taj room
by room. As a result, the commandos didn't move on the lowest-priority Nariman
House of Chabad, the smallest target by far, until Friday morning, more than 40
hours after it was first entered by the terrorists on Wednesday night. They
blasted their way inside, and after an interval -- which could have proved
fatal to any captives had any still been alive at that point -- other
government commandos rappelled from helicopters, in full view of TV cameras and
the uncontained crowd pressing in all around. They were greatly applauded as
they left after killing the terrorists and finding the five hostages dead
inside.
In the end, the attacks in Mumbai were a revealing
confrontation between 10 to 15 trained soldiers willing to fight and die and a
hopelessly inadequate security system. But India is a democracy with a free
press, and what will happen soon, after all the usual recriminations and
resignations, will be the creation of a properly decentralized system, backed
by an information network. It is unfortunate that the thousands of previous
deaths from terrorism didn't suffice to reform the system before the Mumbai
tragedy.
Edward N. Luttwak is a senior associate at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-luttwak5-2008dec05,0,7905913.story
Hindusthan needs an Act on the lines of the USA PATRIOT ACT.
USA PATRIOT ACT is an
acronym. It stands for: "Uniting and Strengthening America by ProvidingAppropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and ObstructTerrorism
Act of 2001" (Public Law Pub.L.
107-56). It was signed into law on Oct. 26, 2001 in the wake of the 9/11 terror
attack in USA.
Full text of the Act.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/8708244/Patriot-Act
I am providing herewith a
brief outline of the main features of the Act which should become the model for
any state with a will to find national and international terror.
The key features of this
Act are:
- Enabling law enforcement agencies to search
telephone, e-mail communications, medical, financial records
- Expanding Treasury authority
to regulate financial transactions involving foreign individuals and
entities
- Enhancing discretion of law
enforcement and immigration authorities to detain and depot immigrants
suspected of terrorism-related acts
- Terrorism is defined to
include international and domestic terrorism.
It redefined the term "domestic terrorism" to broadly include mass destruction as well as assassination or kidnapping as a terrorist activity. The definition also encompasses activities that are "dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State" and are intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population," "influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion," or are undertaken "to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping" while in the jurisdiction of the United States.Terrorism is also included in the definition of racketeering. Terms relating to cyber-terrorism are also redefined, including the term "protected computer," "damage," "conviction," "person," and "loss."
The major criticism is that the Act curtailed civil liberties such as searches without the owner’s or occupant’s permission or knowledge.
The Act amended other key acts such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Money Laundering Control Act, Bank Secrecy Act, Immigration and Nationality Act.
The most important pvodisions of the Act relate to anti-money-laundering to prevent terrorism.
The key is to make it harder for money launderers to mask their identities. In this context, the Participatory Notes encouraged by P. Chidambaram as Finance Minister even for Indian nationals does exactly this: helps the money launderers to mask their identities. The Patriot Act of Hindusthan should ban such financial transactions emanating from foreign-based financial institutions operating through Indian stock markets.
Financial institutions must now undertake steps to identify the owners of any privately owned bank outside the U.S. who have a correspondent account with them, along with the interests of each of the owners in the bank. It is expected that additional scrutiny will be applied by the U.S. institution to such banks to make sure they are not engaging in money laundering. Banks must identify all the nominal and beneficial owners of any private bank account opened and maintained in the U.S. by non-U.S. citizens.
The definition of money laundering was expanded to include making a financial transaction in the U.S. in order to commit a crime of violence; the bribery of public officials and fraudulent dealing with public funds; the smuggling or illegal export of controlled munitions and the importation or bringing in of any firearm or ammunition not authorised by the U.S. Attorney Generaland the smuggling of any item controlled under the Export Administration Regulations
The Act also introduced criminal penalties for corrupt officialdom. An official or employee of the government who acts corruptly — as well as the person who induces the corrupt act — in the carrying out of their official duties will be fined by an amount that is not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the bribe in question. Alternatively they may be imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or they may be fined and imprisoned.
Cyberterrorism was dealt with in various ways. Penalties apply to those who either damage or gain unauthorized access to a protected computer and then commit a number of offenses. These offenses include causing a person to lose an aggregate amount greater than US$5,000, as well as adversely affecting someone's medical examination, diagnosis or treatment. It also encompasses actions that cause a person to be injured, a threat to public health or safety, or damage to a governmental computer that is used as a tool to administer justice, national defense or national security. Also prohibited was extortion undertaken via a protected computer.
The National Security Act of 1947 was amended o require the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to establish requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence collected under FISA and to provide assistance to the United States Attorney General to ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches is disseminated for efficient and effective foreign intelligence purposes.With the exception of information that might jeopardize an ongoing law enforcement investigation, it was made a requirement that the Attorney General, or the head of any other department or agency of the Federal Government with law enforcement responsibilities, disclose to the Director any foreign intelligence acquired by the U.S. Department of Justice
TITLE I--ENHANCING DOMESTIC SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM
Sec. 101. Counterterrorism fund.
Establishment; Availability.--There is hereby established in the
Treasury of the United States a separate fund to be known as the
``Counterterrorism Fund'', amounts in which shall remain available
without fiscal year limitation--
(1) to reimburse any Department of Justice component for any
costs incurred in connection with--
(A) reestablishing the operational capability of an
office or facility that has been damaged or destroyed as
the result of any domestic or international terrorism
incident;
(B) providing support to counter, investigate, or
prosecute domestic or international terrorism,
including, without limitation, paying rewards in
connection with these activities; and
(C) conducting terrorism threat assessments of
Federal agencies and their facilities; and
(2) to reimburse any department or agency of the Federal
Government for any costs incurred in connection with detaining
in foreign countries individuals accused of acts of terrorism
that violate the laws of the United States.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress condemning discrimination against Arab and
Muslim Americans.
the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of
fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and religious
backgrounds.
Sec. 103. Increased funding for the technical support center at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 104. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in
certain emergencies.
Sec. 105. Expansion of National Electronic Crime Task Force Initiative.
The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take
appropriate actions to develop a national network of electronic crime
task forces, based on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force model,
throughout the United States, for the purpose of preventing, detecting,
and investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including
potential terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and
financial payment systems.
Sec. 106. Presidential authority.
when the United States is engaged in armed
hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or
foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign
person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he
determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in
such hostilities or attacks against the United States;
and all right, title, and interest in any property so
confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms
directed by the President, in such agency or person as
the President may designate from time to time, and upon
such terms and conditions as the President may
prescribe, such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt
with in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States, and such designated agency or person may
perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment
or furtherance of these purposes…
Classified Information.--In any judicial review of a
determination made under this section, if the determination was based on
classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified
Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the
reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer
or imply any right to judicial review.
TITLE II--ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES
Sec. 201. Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications relating to terrorism.
Sec. 202. Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications relating to computer fraud and abuse offenses.
Sec. 203. Authority to share criminal investigative information.
Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure is amended to read as follows:
``(C)(i) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this
rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also
be made--
``(I) when so directed by a court
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding;
``(II) when permitted by a court at the
request of the defendant, upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the
grand jury;
``(III) when the disclosure is made by an
attorney for the government to another Federal
grand jury;
``(IV) when permitted by a court at the
request of an attorney for the government, upon a
showing that such matters may disclose a violation
of State criminal law, to an appropriate official
of a State or subdivision of a State for the
purpose of enforcing such law; or
``(V) when the matters involve foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information
(as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph),
to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official in order to assist the
official receiving that information in the
performance of his official duties.
``(ii) If the court orders disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be
made in such manner, at such time, and under such
conditions as the court may direct.
``(iii) Any Federal official to whom information is
disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph
may use that information only as necessary in the
conduct of that person's official duties subject to any
limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such
information. Within a reasonable time after such
disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file
under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that
such information was disclosed and the departments,
agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.
``(iv) In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the
term `foreign intelligence information' means--
``(I) information, whether or not concerning a
United States person, that relates to the ability
of the United States to protect against--
``(aa) actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
``(bb) sabotage or international
terrorism by a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power; or
``(cc) clandestine intelligence
activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an
agent of foreign power;…
Authority To Share Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception
Information.--
(1) Law enforcement.--Section 2517 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following:
``(6) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or attorney for
the Government, who by any means authorized by this chapter, has
obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents
to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security official to the
extent that such contents include foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as
defined in subsection (19) of section 2510 of this title), to assist the
official who is to receive that information in the performance of his
official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant
to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the
conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on
the unauthorized disclosure of such information.''.
Sec. 204. Clarification of intelligence exceptions from limitations on
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic
communications.
Sec. 205. Employment of translators by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Sec. 206. Roving surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 207. Duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who
are agents of a foreign power.
Sec. 208. Designation of judges.
Sec. 209. Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants.
Sec. 210. Scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications.
Sec. 211. Clarification of scope.
Sec. 212. Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect
life and limb.
Sec. 213. Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant.
Sec. 214. Pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA.
Sec. 215. Access to records and other items under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Sec. 216. Modification of authorities relating to use of pen registers
and trap and trace devices.
[[Page 115 STAT. 273]]
Sec. 217. Interception of computer trespasser communications.
Sec. 218. Foreign intelligence information.
Sec. 219. Single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism.
Sec. 220. Nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence.
Sec. 221. Trade sanctions.
Sec. 222. Assistance to law enforcement agencies.
Sec. 223. Civil liability for certain unauthorized disclosures.
Sec. 224. Sunset.
Sec. 225. Immunity for compliance with FISA wiretap.
TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST
FINANCING ACT OF 2001
Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Findings and purposes.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) money laundering, estimated by the International
Monetary Fund to amount to between 2 and 5 percent of global
gross domestic product, which is at least $600,000,000,000
annually, provides the financial fuel that permits transnational
criminal enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to
the detriment of the safety and security of American citizens;
(2) money laundering, and the defects in financial
transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to the
financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds for
terrorist attacks;
(3) money launderers subvert legitimate financial mechanisms
and banking relationships by using them as protective covering
for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime
and terrorism, and, by so doing, can threaten the safety of
United States citizens and undermine the integrity of United
States financial institutions and of the global financial and
trading systems upon which prosperity and growth depend;
(4) certain jurisdictions outside of the United States that
offer ``offshore'' banking and related facilities designed to
provide anonymity, coupled with weak financial supervisory and
enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to disguise
ownership and movement of criminal funds, derived from, or used
to commit, offenses ranging from narcotics trafficking,
terrorism, arms smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, to
financial frauds that prey on law-abiding citizens;
(5) transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make
it difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to
follow the trail of money earned by criminals, organized
international criminal enterprises, and global terrorist
organizations;
(6) correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking
mechanisms susceptible in some circumstances to manipulation by
foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding the
identity of real parties in interest to financial transactions;
(7) private banking services can be susceptible to
manipulation by money launderers, for example corrupt foreign
government officials, particularly if those services include the
creation of offshore accounts and facilities for large personal
funds transfers to channel funds into accounts around the globe;
[[Page 115 STAT. 297]]
(8) United States anti-money laundering efforts are impeded
by outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions that make
investigations, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult,
particularly in cases in which money laundering involves foreign
persons, foreign banks, or foreign countries;
(9) the ability to mount effective counter-measures to
international money launderers requires national, as well as
bilateral and multilateral action, using tools specially
designed for that effort; and
(10) the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and
Supervisory Practices and the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering, of both of which the United States is a
member, have each adopted international anti-money laundering
principles and recommendations.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this title are--
(1) to increase the strength of United States measures to
prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering
and the financing of terrorism;
(2) to ensure that--
(A) banking transactions and financial relationships
and the conduct of such transactions and relationships,
do not contravene the purposes of subchapter II of
chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, section 21
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or chapter 2 of
title I of Public Law 91-508 (84 Stat. 1116), or
facilitate the evasion of any such provision; and
(B) the purposes of such provisions of law continue
to be fulfilled, and such provisions of law are
effectively and efficiently administered;
(3) to strengthen the provisions put into place by the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. 981 note), especially
with respect to crimes by non-United States nationals and
foreign financial institutions;
(4) to provide a clear national mandate for subjecting to
special scrutiny those foreign jurisdictions, financial
institutions operating outside of the United States, and classes
of international transactions or types of accounts that pose
particular, identifiable opportunities for criminal abuse;
(5) to provide the Secretary of the Treasury (in this title
referred to as the ``Secretary'') with broad discretion, subject
to the safeguards provided by the Administrative Procedure Act
under title 5, United States Code, to take measures tailored to
the particular money laundering problems presented by specific
foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside
of the United States, and classes of international transactions
or types of accounts;
(6) to ensure that the employment of such measures by the
Secretary permits appropriate opportunity for comment by
affected financial institutions;
(7) to provide guidance to domestic financial institutions
on particular foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions
operating outside of the United States, and classes of
international transactions that are of primary money laundering
concern to the United States Government;
(8) to ensure that the forfeiture of any assets in
connection with the anti-terrorist efforts of the United States
permits
[[Page 115 STAT. 298]]
for adequate challenge consistent with providing due process
rights;
(9) to clarify the terms of the safe harbor from civil
liability for filing suspicious activity reports;
(10) to strengthen the authority of the Secretary to issue
and administer geographic targeting orders, and to clarify that
violations of such orders or any other requirement imposed under
the authority contained in chapter 2 of title I of Public Law
91-508 and subchapters II and III of chapter 53 of title 31,
United States Code, may result in criminal and civil penalties;
(11) to ensure that all appropriate elements of the
financial services industry are subject to appropriate
requirements to report potential money laundering transactions
to proper authorities, and that jurisdictional disputes do not
hinder examination of compliance by financial institutions with
relevant reporting requirements;
(12) to strengthen the ability of financial institutions to
maintain the integrity of their employee population; and
(13) to strengthen measures to prevent the use of the United
States financial system for personal gain by corrupt foreign
officials and to facilitate the repatriation of any stolen
assets to the citizens of countries to whom such assets belong.
Sec. 303. 4-year congressional review; expedited consideration.
Subtitle A--International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures
Sec. 311. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or
international transactions of primary money laundering
concern.
Sec. 312. Special due diligence for correspondent accounts and private
banking accounts.
Sec. 313. Prohibition on United States correspondent accounts with
foreign shell banks.
Sec. 314. Cooperative efforts to deter money laundering.
Sec. 315. Inclusion of foreign corruption offenses as money laundering
crimes.
Sec. 316. Anti-terrorist forfeiture protection.
Sec. 317. Long-arm jurisdiction over foreign money launderers.
Sec. 318. Laundering money through a foreign bank.
Sec. 319. Forfeiture of funds in United States interbank accounts.
Sec. 320. Proceeds of foreign crimes.
Sec. 321. Financial institutions specified in subchapter II of chapter
53 of title 31, United States code.
Sec. 322. Corporation represented by a fugitive.
Sec. 323. Enforcement of foreign judgments.
Sec. 324. Report and recommendation.
Sec. 325. Concentration accounts at financial institutions.
Sec. 326. Verification of identification.
Sec. 327. Consideration of anti-money laundering record.
Sec. 328. International cooperation on identification of originators of
wire transfers.
Sec. 329. Criminal penalties.
Sec. 330. International cooperation in investigations of money
laundering, financial crimes, and the finances of terrorist
groups.
Subtitle B--Bank Secrecy Act Amendments and Related Improvements
Sec. 351. Amendments relating to reporting of suspicious activities.
Sec. 352. Anti-money laundering programs.
Sec. 353. Penalties for violations of geographic targeting orders and
certain recordkeeping requirements, and lengthening effective
period of geographic targeting orders.
Sec. 354. Anti-money laundering strategy.
Sec. 355. Authorization to include suspicions of illegal activity in
written employment references.
Sec. 356. Reporting of suspicious activities by securities brokers and
dealers; investment company study.
Sec. 357. Special report on administration of bank secrecy provisions.
Sec. 358. Bank secrecy provisions and activities of United States
intelligence agencies to fight international terrorism.
Sec. 359. Reporting of suspicious activities by underground banking
systems.
Sec. 360. Use of authority of United States Executive Directors.
Sec. 361. Financial crimes enforcement network.
Sec. 362. Establishment of highly secure network.
Sec. 363. Increase in civil and criminal penalties for money laundering.
Sec. 364. Uniform protection authority for Federal Reserve facilities.
Sec. 365. Reports relating to coins and currency received in
nonfinancial trade or business.
Sec. 366. Efficient use of currency transaction report system.
Subtitle C--Currency Crimes and Protection
Sec. 371. Bulk cash smuggling into or out of the United States.
Sec. 372. Forfeiture in currency reporting cases.
[[Page 115 STAT. 274]]
Sec. 373. Illegal money transmitting businesses.
Sec. 374. Counterfeiting domestic currency and obligations.
Sec. 375. Counterfeiting foreign currency and obligations.
Sec. 376. Laundering the proceeds of terrorism.
Sec. 377. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
TITLE IV--PROTECTING THE BORDER
Subtitle A--Protecting the Northern Border
Sec. 401. Ensuring adequate personnel on the northern border.
Sec. 402. Northern border personnel.
Sec. 403. Access by the Department of State and the INS to certain
identifying information in the criminal history records of
visa applicants and applicants for admission to the United
States.
Sec. 404. Limited authority to pay overtime.
Sec. 405. Report on the integrated automated fingerprint identification
system for ports of entry and overseas consular posts.
Subtitle B--Enhanced Immigration Provisions
Sec. 411. Definitions relating to terrorism.
Sec. 412. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorists; habeas corpus;
judicial review.
Sec. 413. Multilateral cooperation against terrorists.
Sec. 414. Visa integrity and security.
Sec. 415. Participation of Office of Homeland Security on Entry-Exit
Task Force.
Sec. 416. Foreign student monitoring program.
Sec. 417. Machine readable passports.
Sec. 418. Prevention of consulate shopping.
Subtitle C--Preservation of Immigration Benefits for Victims of
Terrorism
Sec. 421. Special immigrant status.
Sec. 422. Extension of filing or reentry deadlines.
Sec. 423. Humanitarian relief for certain surviving spouses and
children.
Sec. 424. ``Age-out'' protection for children.
Sec. 425. Temporary administrative relief.
Sec. 426. Evidence of death, disability, or loss of employment.
Sec. 427. No benefits to terrorists or family members of terrorists.
Sec. 428. Definitions.
TITLE V--REMOVING OBSTACLES TO INVESTIGATING TERRORISM
Sec. 501. Attorney General's authority to pay rewards to combat
terrorism.
Sec. 502. Secretary of State's authority to pay rewards.
Sec. 503. DNA identification of terrorists and other violent offenders.
Sec. 504. Coordination with law enforcement.
Sec. 505. Miscellaneous national security authorities.
Sec. 506. Extension of Secret Service jurisdiction.
Sec. 507. Disclosure of educational records.
Sec. 508. Disclosure of information from NCES surveys.
TITLE VI--PROVIDING FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS,
AND THEIR FAMILIES
Subtitle A--Aid to Families of Public Safety Officers
Sec. 611. Expedited payment for public safety officers involved in the
prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts
related to a terrorist attack.
Sec. 612. Technical correction with respect to expedited payments for
heroic public safety officers.
Sec. 613. Public safety officers benefit program payment increase.
Sec. 614. Office of Justice programs.
Subtitle B--Amendments to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984
Sec. 621. Crime victims fund.
Sec. 622. Crime victim compensation.
Sec. 623. Crime victim assistance.
Sec. 624. Victims of terrorism.
TITLE VII--INCREASED INFORMATION SHARING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
Sec. 701. Expansion of regional information sharing system to facilitate
Federal-State-local law enforcement response related to
terrorist attacks.
[[Page 115 STAT. 275]]
TITLE VIII--STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL LAWS AGAINST TERRORISM
Sec. 801. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems.
Sec. 802. Definition of domestic terrorism.
Sec. 803. Prohibition against harboring terrorists.
Sec. 804. Jurisdiction over crimes committed at U.S. facilities abroad.
Sec. 805. Material support for terrorism.
Sec. 806. Assets of terrorist organizations.
Sec. 807. Technical clarification relating to provision of material
support to terrorism.
Sec. 808. Definition of Federal crime of terrorism.
Sec. 809. No statute of limitation for certain terrorism offenses.
Sec. 810. Alternate maximum penalties for terrorism offenses.
Sec. 811. Penalties for terrorist conspiracies.
Sec. 812. Post-release supervision of terrorists.
Sec. 813. Inclusion of acts of terrorism as racketeering activity.
Sec. 814. Deterrence and prevention of cyberterrorism.
Sec. 815. Additional defense to civil actions relating to preserving
records in response to Government requests.
Sec. 816. Development and support of cybersecurity forensic
capabilities.
Sec. 817. Expansion of the biological weapons statute.
TITLE IX--IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 901. Responsibilities of Director of Central Intelligence regarding
foreign intelligence collected under Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 902. Inclusion of international terrorist activities within scope
of foreign intelligence under National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress on the establishment and maintenance of
intelligence relationships to acquire information on
terrorists and terrorist organizations.
Sec. 904. Temporary authority to defer submittal to Congress of reports
on intelligence and intelligence-related matters.
Sec. 905. Disclosure to Director of Central Intelligence of foreign
intelligence-related information with respect to criminal
investigations.
Sec. 906. Foreign terrorist asset tracking center.
Sec. 907. National Virtual Translation Center.
Sec. 908. Training of government officials regarding identification and
use of foreign intelligence.
TITLE X--MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 1001. Review of the department of justice.
Sec. 1002. Sense of congress.
Sec. 1003. Definition of ``electronic surveillance''.
Sec. 1004. Venue in money laundering cases.
Sec. 1005. First responders assistance act.
Sec. 1006. Inadmissibility of aliens engaged in money laundering.
Sec. 1007. Authorization of funds for dea police training in south and
central asia.
Sec. 1008. Feasibility study on use of biometric identifier scanning
system with access to the fbi integrated automated
fingerprint identification system at overseas consular posts
and points of entry to the United States.
Sec. 1009. Study of access.
Sec. 1010. Temporary authority to contract with local and State
governments for performance of security functions at United
States military installations.
Sec. 1011. Crimes against charitable americans.
Sec. 1012. Limitation on issuance of hazmat licenses.
Sec. 1013. Expressing the sense of the senate concerning the provision
of funding for bioterrorism preparedness and response.
Sec. 1014. Grant program for State and local domestic preparedness
support.
Sec. 1015. Expansion and reauthorization of the crime identification
technology act for antiterrorism grants to States and
localities.
Sec. 1016. Critical infrastructures protection.
Full text is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107
