pramANA lakShaNa

- Dr. BNK Sharma's History of Dvaita School of Philosophy

(i) In traditional accounts of systems of Indian thought, it is usual to begin with a a statement of the number and nature of pramANAs i.e., sources or guarantors of correct knowledge, recognized by a given system. Max Muller expresses great admiration for this practice of Indian writers, as it removes a good deal of misunderstanding and makes the task of philosophical assessment of a given system easy.

Following this time-honored practice, Madhva indicates in his PL., the number of pramANAs admitted by him, their definition, modes of functioning and nature of reality apprehended by them. We are told at the end of the work that the exposition follows the Brahmatarka of vyAsa not now extant.

(ii) The attacks made by the Advaitins, pursuing the dialectic method of inquiry and refutation of the Buddhists, on the nyAya vaishEshika realism, its categories and thought-measuring devices seem to have been responsible in its turn for the composition fo such works as the PL., by Madhva in an attempt obviously at perfecting his own system and making it perfect against similar attacks. HE has therefore taken due note of the criticisms of Advaitic dialecticians like Vimuktatman and Anandabodha against various types of realism and had endeavored to discard much that was superfluous or illogical in the older system of Realism, while improving upon all that was of permanent value and metaphysical merit in them.

(iii) The naiyAyikAs themselves, had, as a result of outside criticism, introduced many changes in the minutiae and methodology of their system. Much of the old looseness of thought and vocabulary had been shed and new school of logic inaugarated by Gangesha UpashyAya, with a staggering paraphernalia of technical jargon,had come into being.

(iv) Though a realist himself, Madhva had his own differences with the Nyaya- Vaiseshikas. He had therefore to traverse the entire field of realistic logic and metaphysics over again with a newer outlook. A certain measure of constructive exposition of one's own views becomes necessary in such cases from a comparitive and critical standpoint. It was to these tasks, then, that Madhva addressed himself in his PrakaraNas.

A pramANa as ordinarily understood, is a means or guarantor of valid knowledge : pramAkaraNaM pramANam But to Madhva, it has a wider and a higher denotation also, viz., the core of reality itself : yathArthaM pramANam pramANa embraces, in its fold, truth,or true knowledge and the means of such knowledge. True knowledge per se is "kEvala-pramANa".What leads to it is "anu-pramANa". Sense -perception, Inference and Verbal testimony come under the latter.

Madhva accepts but three pramANas as fundamental : pratyakSha(Sense -perception), anumAna(inference) and Agama(Verbal testimony or scripture). The additional pramANAs recognized by other systems, such as the upamAna of gautama and the arthapaTTi of the mImAMsakAs are subsumed under the Inference. "Anupalabdhi" of the Bhattas is subsumed partly under Inference and partly under Perception; and "Sambhava" and "ParisEsa" under Inference. The scheme of pramANAs are thus considerably simplified and reduced to the barest limits of logical necessity. The subject of fallacies is similarly treated. The number of avayavas terms or members indispensable for an adequate statement of a syllogism is cut down to the barest minimum. Madhva makes no fetish of the exact number of avyayas that will have to be recognized for a complete syllogism. As a general rule, he is for three : pratij~jA hetu and dRuShTAnta and dispenses with the well-known scheme of five-membered syllogism (pancAvayavavAkya) of the naiyAyikAs. Even a bare proposition implying a probans (hetu) will do, or even a proposition involving a middle term. The subject of NigrahasthAnas (points for closure of a debate) is also similarly treated. The nyAya defnition of pramANA as samyaganubhavasAdhanam is analysed and refuted. The validity of Smriti(recollection) denied by some philosophers is resolutely maintained. Madhva says, in this connection, that the very edifice of experience would collpase, if the validity of our recollection is impugned. apramANyAMgIkAro anubhUtaM mayetyatra pramANabhAvAt | To try to establish the validity of our past experience through inference involves needless strain and violence to experience. liM~gagatvena prAmANyakalpane kalpanAgauravaM drUShTahAniSca | The domain of prameyas is then exhaustively dealt with. The number of granthas in the PL. is 50