Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University (2009- )  fuhitokojima1979 “at” gmail.com (replace “at” with @) (617) -699-1942; (650) -725-2620 Research Interests Primary Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Market Design Secondary Field: Political Economics Teaching Syllabus and slides are available. Please feel free to use the slides for your personal use and for your teaching. If you find any errors, typos, and/or possible mis-citation (I hope they do not occur!), I appreciate your letting me know. Current Teaching ECON 289: Topics in Game Theory (graduate, winter 2010) ECON 285: Market Design (graduate, fall 2009) Teaching in the Past & Mini Lectures Econ 474: Matching and Market Design (Spring 2009 at Yale) Mini Lectures on Matching and Market Design (October 2009 at Princeton; July 2009 at Yonsei University; June 2009 at University of Tokyo)
Selected Publications Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008), with Yeon-Koo Che, forthcoming, Econometrica. Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (2007), with Mihai Manea, forthcoming, Econometrica. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review 99, pp 608–27. Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (2007), with Mihai Manea, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory Risk-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics in N-Player Games (2006), Journal of Economic Theory 128, pp 255-273. Matching,
Resource Allocation, Auction and Market Design Impossibility of Stable and Nonbossy Matching Mechanisms (2009), forthcoming, Economics Letters. Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts (2007), with John William Hatfield, forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior. Random Assignment of Multiple Indivisible Objects (2007), forthcoming, Mathematical Social Sciences. Matching with Contracts: Comment (2008), with John William Hatfield, American Economic Review 98, pp 1189- 1194. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures (2007), Social Choice and Welfare 31, pp 357-365. The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market (2007), Economics Letters 99, pp 581-584. When can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain Results (2007), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (contribution), Article 32. Matching and Price Competition: Comment (2007), American Economic Review 97, pp 1027-1031. Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration (2006), with M. Utku Ünver, International Journal of Game Theory 36, pp 473-488 (the Special Issue in Honor of David Gale). Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets (2006), Social Choice and Welfare 27, pp 25-28. Learning and Evolutionary Game Theory p-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics (2007), with Satoru Takahashi, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming. Stability and Instability of the Unbeatable Strategy in Dynamic Processes (2006), International Journal of Economic Theory 2, pp 41-54. (2006 IJET Lionel W. McKenzie Prize) Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability (2007), joint with Satoru Takahashi, International Game Theory Review 9, pp 667-688. Political Economics Bureaucrats or Politicians?: Comment (2008), American Economic Review 98, pp 561-562. A Theory of Hung Juries and Informative Voting (2007), with Yuki Takagi, accepted subject to revision, Games and Economic Behavior. Non-Refereed Publications Matching Market Design (a survey, in Japanese), Keizai Seminar (Economics Seminar), with Yosuke Yasuda, 2009. Game Theory and Market Design, 1st part, 2nd part (newspaper articles, in Japanese), The Nikkei, 2009. Working papers Matching, Resource Allocation, Auction and Market Design Finding All Stable Matchings with Couples (2007), revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior. Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts (2007), with John William Hatfield Robust Stability in Matching Markets (2009) Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem (2009), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom
Political Economics Learning and
Evolutionary Game Theory |