 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics,
Stanford University (2009- ): I will be on leave at Columbia University during academic year 2011-2012. fuhitokojima1979
“at-mark” gmail.com (replace “at-mark” with @); best way to reach me (650)-725-2620 (my office phone) (617) -699-1942 (cell phone; often in a bad connection); Skype ID: fuhito.kojima (best way to reach me except for by email) Research Interests Primary Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Market Design Secondary Field: Political Economics Teaching Syllabus and slides are available. Please feel free to use the slides for your personal use and for your teaching. If you find any errors, typos, and/or possible mis-citation (I hope they do not occur!), I appreciate your letting me know. Current Teaching Economics W4415: Game Theory (undergraduate, Spring 2012), see Coursework for details. The tentative syllabus is here (see the syllabus in the Coursework for the up-to-date information) Teaching in the Past & Mini Lectures Econ 289: Topics in Game Theory (graduate, winter 2011), syllabus, course slides are uploaded in Coursework. Econ 51: Economic Analysis II (undergraduate, winter 2011), syllabus, course material such as slides are uploaded in Coursework. ECON 289: Topics in Game Theory (graduate, winter 2010) ECON 285: Market Design (graduate, fall 2009) Econ 474: Matching and Market Design (Spring 2009 at Yale) Mini Lectures on Matching and Market Design (October 2009 at Princeton; July 2009 at Yonsei University; June 2009 and July 2010 at University of Tokyo) Robust Stability in Matching Markets (2010), forthcoming, Theoretical Economics. Substitutes and
Stability for Matching with Contracts (2010), with John
William Hatfield, Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1704-1723. A Theory of Hung Juries and Informative Voting (2010), with Yuki Takagi, Games and Economic Behavior, 69, 498-502. Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts (2009), with John William Hatfield, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, p.745-749 Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2010), with Yeon-Koo Che, Econometrica. Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (2007), with Mihai Manea, forthcoming, Econometrica, 78, 633-653. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review 99, pp 608–27. Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (2010), with Mihai Manea, Journal of Economic Theory, 145, pp 106-123. Risk-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics in N-Player Games (2006), Journal of Economic Theory 128, pp 255-273. Matching,
Resource Allocation, Auction and Market Design The "Rural Hospital Theorem" Revisited (2011), forthcoming, International Journal of Economic Theory (a special issue in honor of Lionel McKenzie). Impossibility of Stable and Nonbossy Matching Mechanisms (2010), Economics Letters, 107, pp 69-70 Random Assignment of Multiple Indivisible Objects (2009), Mathematical Social Sciences, 57, 134--142. Matching with Contracts: Comment (2008), with John William Hatfield, American Economic Review 98, pp 1189- 1194. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures (2007), Social Choice and Welfare 31, pp 357-365. The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market (2007), Economics Letters 99, pp 581-584. When can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain Results (2007), The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (contribution), Article 32. Matching and Price Competition: Comment (2007), American Economic Review 97, pp 1027-1031. Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration (2006), with M. Utku Ünver, International Journal of Game Theory 36, pp 473-488 (the Special Issue in Honor of David Gale). Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets (2006), Social Choice and Welfare 27, pp 25-28. Learning and Evolutionary Game Theory p-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics (2008), with Satoru Takahashi, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68, 689-701. Stability and Instability of the Unbeatable Strategy in Dynamic Processes (2006), International Journal of Economic Theory 2, pp 41-54. (2006 IJET Lionel W. McKenzie Prize) Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability (2007), joint with Satoru Takahashi, International Game Theory Review 9, pp 667-688. Political Economics Bureaucrats or Politicians?: Comment (2008), American Economic Review 98, pp 561-562. Other Publications (like surveys, some of these are non-refereed) Matching Theory and Its Applications: "Regional Imbalance" of Medical Residents and Its Solutions (2011) (in Japanese), with Yuichiro Kamada and Jun Wako, forthcoming, Iryo-Keizai Kenkyu (Research in Health Economics) Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics (a refereed survey), with Peter Troyan, forthcoming, Japanese Economic Review. Matching Market Design (a non-refereed survey, in Japanese), Keizai Seminar (Economics Seminar), with Yosuke Yasuda, 2009. Game Theory and Market Design, 1st part, 2nd part (newspaper articles, in Japanese), The Nikkei, 2009. Frontiers of the School Choice Problem (2010) (a non-refereed survey, in Japanese), with Yosuke Yasuda, in Designing School Choice Systems, Yosuke Yasuda (editor), NTT Press; Tokyo. Working papers Matching, Resource Allocation, Auction and Market Design Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution (2011), with Yuichiro Kamada, forthcoming, American Economic Review P&P. Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach (2011), with John William Hatfield and Yusuke Narita, under review Many-to-many Matching with Max-Min Preferences (2011), with John William Hatfield and Yusuke Narita, under review Understanding Stable Matchings: A Non-Cooperative Approach (2011), with Michihiro Kandori and Yosuke Yasuda, coming soon! Finding All Stable Matchings with Couples (2007), revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2010), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom, revise and resubmit, American Economic Review. The `Boston' School Choice Mechanism (2010), with M. Utku Ünver, under review Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets (2010), with Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth, revise and resubmit, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program (2010), with Yuichiro Kamada, revise and resubmit, American Economic Review. (a non-technical introduction to the above paper (in Japanese) is available here, written with Yuichiro Kamada and Jun Wako) School Choice: Impossibilities for Affirmative Action (2010), accepted subject to revisoin, Games and Economic Behavior. Efficient Resource Allocation under Multi-unit Demand (2011), under review
Political Economics Equivalence Between Costly Voting and Probabilistic Voting (2011), with Yuichiro Kamada, under review |