EFPD Trainingsite

Charleston SC Sofa Super Store Fire

Audio Clips        
Clip A
Clip B

Reports:
SC OSHA
City of Charleston Phase I
City of Charleston Phase II (Routley Report)
NIOSH
ATF



Department Culture
1. Chief controlled promotions
2. Chief controlled hiring
3. Chief controlled just about everything
4. Freelancing was condoned
5. Charleston took pride in fighting all fires aggressively while utilizing as little water as possible

Construction:

1. Unauthorized construction of loading dock and holding area.  This would have required the installation of a sprinkler system.
2. Blocked exits due to unauthorized construction.  Exits that previously exited out of the building now exited into the holding area.
3. Inadequate access for fire equipment around site.  Our building codes require access within 200' at all positions of a building.  This allows a 200' pre-connect to reach a fire.
4. Blocked roll down fire doors.

Other Factors:
1. Multiple exit doors padlocked shut
2. Closest fire hydrant removed by city due to a history of multiple vehicle impacts.

Engineering:
1. Complete failure to understand hydraulic theory.

Fire Attack:
1. No ventilation (truck companies did not perform truck work)
2. Failure to understand the significant fire loading in the building.
3. Freelancing.
4. Opposing streams.
5. Failure to recognize changing conditions.
6. Failure to immediately secure an adequate water supply.
7. Failure to report interior conditions and changes
8. Policies regarding SCBA tank levels may have had an impact on the available time in the fire.
9. Ventilating the front windows of the establishment provided needed oxygen to the fire. 

Command:
1. Failure to take and maintain an effective command system
2. Failure to recognize and respond to multiple pass devise activations.
3. The Chief of the Department (IC) took the functional position of a Division Supervisor coordinating the attack at the loading area, while attempting to be the IC.
4. The Incident Commander did not work to eliminate environmental noise, and was unable to hear emergency traffic.

Communications:
1. Emergency communications were frequently digital.


Engine 11 was the second due engine to this fire.  Engine 11 was delayed
to the fire, as they attempted to access the rear of the building from Pebble
road to the South.  This was not possible due to a fence.  It is important to
note that no hydrants fronted the Sofa Store from the frontage on Savannah
Highway.


The fire is believed to have started at 1900 hrs. It was reported by a
passer-by to store employees.  The fire was reported at
19:07:58 to Charleston Dispatch.  Weather was clear, 79 degrees Fahrenheit
with humidity of 82%.  Wind was out of the South-Southwest at 9 -11 mph.

The "A" side (shown here) is the North end of the building, and fronts to
Savannah Highway.


As the second due engine, Engine 11 was supposed to establish water
supply to Engine 10 as instructed by Capt. 11.  The E-11 firefighter
dropped his pack and set out on foot to find a hydrant.  Capt. 11 entered the
main showroom (seen here) with Chief 2 and called out for an 1 1/2" line
to be pulled into the main showroom.  After seeing E-11 repositioning  at
the front of the showroom, the E-11 firefighter returned to the support
an attack assignment.