My CV (with references)

Contact Information:

James I.  Stewart

tel. 503-799-4562
email: econjim@gmail.com

Nevin's Prize Finalist Dissertation Summary (Journal of Economic History, June 2005)
 

Migration to the Agricultural Frontier and Wealth Accumulation, 1860-1870 Tables  (Explorations in Economic History, October 2006)

Abstract: I use a new data set of households linked between the 1860 and 1870 censuses to study frontier migration. Households that moved to the frontier to farm were more likely than non-migrants to have been poor, landless, and illiterate, and to have had young children. Also, after controlling for observable differences, migrants had below average abilities to accumulate wealth. These findings suggest fewer opportunities for migrants to accumulate wealth in non-frontier areas and a reason for their migration. Nonetheless, migrants fared well, accumulating wealth at high rates. The gains in wealth of migrants, especially those with long tenure on the frontier, suggest the extraordinary benefits of migration.  

Cooperation When N is Large: Evidence from the Mining Camps of the American West (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, March 2009)

Abstract : The sources of cooperation in small groups are well documented. There is, however, less understanding about cooperation in large groups. I study the enforcement of property rights in the mining camps of the American West. Miners demanded secure property rights and protection from violence to exploit the region's mineral wealth and organized governments for this purpose. In the model, miners must divide their labor between mining and supporting property rights institutions. The main prediction of the model is that cooperation in property rights enforcement emerges only when social norms about cooperation are sufficiently widespread. The model also predicts that social norms are less effective in mining camps with large populations or high labor productivity. I test these predictions against detailed evidence from the letters, diaries, and reminiscences of miners in 25 camps in California, Colorado, and Montana, and find that the evidence supports the predictions. The results show that social norms can significantly lower the costs of collective action in large groups.

Economic Hardship or Opportunity? The Causes of Geographic Mobility on the Agricultural Frontier, 1860-1880 (Journal of Economic History, March 2009)

Abstract: Historians disagree about whether geographic mobility on the frontier reflected economic hardship or opportunity because of the inability to observe the outcomes of non-persisters. This paper uses a new sample of frontier families linked between the 1860, 1870, and 1880 U.S. censuses to study mobility and wealth accumulation. Using the incidence of Confederate guerrilla warfare in frontier counties to generate exogenous migration, I find the effect of geographic persistence on wealth accumulation is insignificant. Families observed in the same township or county in 1860 and 1870 accumulated wealth no faster than families observed in different frontier townships or counties.  Young, blue collar, and landless families—those with the highest net benefits of migration—were the most likely to move.  Also, in general, individual characteristics before migration to the frontier such as wealth, occupation, and place of origin did not affect persistence on the frontier after migration. These findings reflect widespread economic opportunity on the frontier.

Why Did Farmers Belong to Interest Groups? Evidence on the Causes of Membership from the Farmers' Alliance (December 2011, revised and resubmitted, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization)

Abstract: This paper studies the causes of membership in the Farmers’ Alliance, a large and influential farm group in the late 1800s.  Models positing interest group membership depends on a rational weighing of member benefits and costs do not explain well the causes of Alliance membership.  Instead, the expected benefit of Alliance lobbying, a collective good, had the largest impact on membership. As members did not have to belong to benefit from Alliance lobbying, the influence of lobbying benefits suggests they behaved cooperatively.  Members were not motivated by pure altruism and did not misperceive the benefits and costs of membership.  Instead, membership likely reflected a strong form of conditional cooperation between beneficiaries of Alliance lobbying.  Farmers’ cooperation suggest the barriers to collective action in large farm groups were not as high as thought and help to explain the political power of farmers in U.S history.

Occupational Attainment in U.S. Frontier Cities: Economic Opportunity or Positive Selection in Migration? (March 2011, to be revised and resubmitted, Explorations in Economic History)

Abstract: Previous research about economic opportunity in U.S. frontier cities has not controlled for selective migration.  I use a dataset of 12,505 households linked between the 1860 and 1880 U.S. censuses to study the impact of migration to San Francisco and other frontier cities on job holding.  Using regional variation in transportation costs to generate exogenous migration, I find that the effect of migration on job holding was large.  The typical migrant attained a higher quality job in a frontier city than he would have attained in a non-frontier city.  Also, selection in migration does not explain observed differences between frontier and non-frontier cities in job attainment.  Finally, migrants moved to cities where they expected to attain the best jobs, and frontier migrants tended to be in white collar jobs, literate, and foreign-born.  These results provide additional evidence about the benefit of frontier migration and geographic mobility in the nineteenth century United States.

Signaling of Regulator Preferences in Proposal-Based Rule Making: California’s Building Energy Efficiency Standards (December 2010)

Abstract: In California, the investor-owned utilities (IOUs) support the California Energy Commission (CEC) in developing energy efficiency codes and standards.  This paper hypothesizes that in supporting code development the IOUs help to resolve an information asymmetry about CEC preferences for regulation that can lead to costly disagreement between stakeholders.  A simple model shows that the IOUs can truthfully signal the CEC’s preferences to other stakeholders and alleviate this asymmetry.  I test the model’s predictions using data from CEC proceedings to update the state’s building energy codes between 2002 and 2003.  The analysis shows that IOU support of rule making reduced the probability of disagreement between stakeholders by over 50 percent.  This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for the expected costs of compliance, the costs of opposing a proposed code change, and the non-random assignment of code change proposals by the CEC to the IOUs.  Administrative rule making agencies in California and other states may want to consider this model.

Western Skies and Agrarian Discontent (January 2004)

Abstract: After the Civil War, the frontier became the center of agrarian discontent.  This paper argues farm unrest was the result of imperfect information about growing conditions on the frontier.  Americans migrated to the frontier under false information about their prospects for gain.  The droughts of the late 1880s and 1890s not only spread hardship and despair, but also radicalized farmers.  The high price of credit in the aftermath of the drought became one of farmers' biggest grievances and a rallying point of the Populist movement.

Work in Progress

The Political Participation of American Women before Suffrage

Abstract: Frontier women played a decisive role in securing female voting rights. This research studies the political participation of frontier women during the campaign for suffrage using a dataset of female members and non-members of the Dakota Farmers’ Alliance between 1890 and 1894. The freedom of women to participate in politics was determined by the social attitudes of their husbands or fathers and their communities as well as the economic value of female production in the household.  I apply a household bargaining model to understand the causes of female participation in the Farmers’ Alliance. The findings will have implications for understanding female autonomy in rural households, the growth of female political participation, and the spread of suffrage institutions in U.S. history.

Why Some Farmers Raised Less Wheat and More Hell: Social Norms of Equity in the Distribution of the Costs of Collective Action (December, 2007) 

Abstract: How are the costs of collective action distributed between potential beneficiaries?  Norms of equity hold the greatest beneficiaries of collective action should contribute.  This paper examines the role of social norms of equity in promoting participation in the Farmers' Alliance, an influential nineteenth century farm interest group.   A model of social norms predicts the likelihood of participation was increasing in the fraction of the population bound by norms and decreasing in township size and the opportunity cost of participation.  I test these predictions with data on 1200 members and non-members of the Farmers' Alliance in 33 South Dakota townships.