B.Phil. 2003, D.Phil. 2007, University of Oxford

I have wide-ranging philosophical interests, especially in ethics and epistemology. My present research focuses on connections between sophisticated ethical principles and ordinary practical deliberation. 

I am particularly interested in normative reasons, the nature of virtue, and the forms of ethical knowledge that might be available to us either pre-theoretically or through the development of ethical theories.

Research

A CV is available here: [pdf]. A selection of papers can be accessed below. 

I am presently writing a monograph, Knowing Better (for Oxford University Press), and editing and writing commentary with Roger Crisp for History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary (for Wiley-Blackwell).  I am also editing The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (for Oxford University Press).

Reasons, Facts-About-Evidence, and Indirect Evidence [pdf]

Forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy, with Stephen Kearns (draft).

Weighing Reasons [

pdf

]

Forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy, with Stephen Kearns (draft).

This is a response to two critics, John Broome and John Brunero.

Two Levels of Moral Thinking [

pdf

]

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1, 2011, 75-96.

This paper is a prototype of Chapter 1 of Knowing Better.

Three Conceptions of Practical Authority [pdf]

Jurisprudence 2:1 (June), 2011, 143-60, with Candice Delmas.

Moral Skepticism for Foxes [pdf]

Boston University Law Review 90, 2010, 497-508.