The first portion of my research investigates the circumstances under which the second chamber defeats government legislation, rather than using less public (and less costly) ways to register their disapproval. I examine four parliamentary systems (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom) using an original dataset based on votes on government bills between 1993 and 2003. The analysis suggests that the veto strength possessed by the second chamber coupled with the ability of governing parties to shape preferences within the chamber shape the likelihood of defeat. An article based upon this portion of my research has been accepted for publication in Legislative Studies Quarterly and a copy of the latest draft of this paper can be obtained using the links at the bottom of this page. 

Second, I look at whether or not defeating the government actually results in policy shifts towards the second chamber. Here, I adopt a critical case study approach using the British House of Lords. The findings suggest that even within a "weak" second chamber, defeats often result in policy concessions. Results also offer tentative support for the claim that these concessions are more likely to occur in policy areas associated with the second chamber's area of expertise. A working draft of this paper can be accessed using the links at the bottom of this page.

I am currently working on projects which examine the effects of Europeanization on second chambers throughout the European Union as well as the role that party discipline plays in shaping legislative outcomes within second chambers. I will post these papers as they are completed.