Assistant Professor of Philosophy Boston University  B.U. Philosophy Department 745 Commonwealth Ave. Boston, MA 02215 dlieb at bu.edu CV (pdf) Papers: Sider on Existence (co-authored with Matti Eklund) Noûs 41:519-28. Note: Ted Sider has written a response. Abstract: Ted Sider gives two arguments that the (unrestricted) existential quantifier cannot possibly be semantically indeterminate. We argue that there is a clash between the arguments: they cannot both work. Then we discuss the significance of the clash for how to conceive of the nature of ontology. Simple Generics (forthcoming in Noûs) Abstract: Consensus has it that generic sentences such as "Dogs bark" and "Birds fly" contain, at the level of logical form, an unpronounced generic operator: Gen. On this view, generics have a tripartite structure similar to overtly quantified sentences such as "Most dogs bark" and "Typically, birds fly". I argue that Gen doesn't exist and that generics have a simple bipartite structure on par with ordinary atomic sentences such as "Homer is drinking". On my view, the subject terms of generics are kind-referring. The interesting truth conditions characteristic of generics arise from the interesting ways in which kinds inherit properties from their members. Review of Jeffrey King's The Nature and Structure of Content The Philosophical Review 119(2): 246-250.Causation and the Canberra Plan (forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly)
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