 Despite its title, this is really a book about happiness, and is meant to serve as a reasonably comprehensive guide to the subject. At the broadest level, the book tries to make the case for the importance of the psychology of well-being, or prudential psychology, as a field of inquiry. More narrowly, the book argues against a chief assumption of modern thought, namely the idea that individuals are highly authoritative about their own well-being: that by and large, we know our interests and make prudent choices in pursuit of them. This assumption is dubious: even considering just the psychological aspects of well-being, our interests prove to be far less transparent to us than we tend to think; moreover, we seem to have surprisingly little aptitude for assessing and pursuing our own welfare. Along the way, the book defends an emotional state account of happiness against the dominant theories, hedonistic and life satisfaction accounts. Happiness, thus understood, is a central element of well-being, which is construed in terms of the eudaimonistic ideal of self-fulfillment. The resulting picture of human flourishing occupies a middle position between Aristotelian objectivism and modern subjectivist views such as desire theories of well-being. Further particulars in this marketing screed. "Official" pages and ordering available at Oxford USA and UK/Europe or Amazon USA and UK A detailed table of contents appears here The introductory chapter is posted here For non-academic readers, some guidance here Reviews Selected papers Published material provided for viewing according to “fair use” laws. This paper examines the normative principles that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. After arguing that well-being policy is both legitimate and necessary, we lay out a case for "pragmatic subjectivism": given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens’ "personal welfare values": those values—and not mere preferences—that individuals' see as bearing on their well-being. We suggest a variety of means for determining what people value, but conclude that there is no canonical means of doing this: there will often be some indeterminacy about what people value. Finally, we consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice, arguing that headline measures of well-being should include subjective well-being—given that it is so widely and deeply valued—and perhaps other values as well. Paternalism in Economics (with Anna Alexandrova). Penultimate draft Contrary to widespread belief, standard methods of policy analysis in economics actually license widespread, deeply objectionable forms of paternalism. Also contrary to widespread belief, happiness/well-being policy actually offers an important means to avoid paternalism. Forthcoming in a collection of papers on paternalism from Cambridge, edited by Christian Coons and Michael Weber. Central Park: Nature, Context and Human Well-Being. A relatively accessible discussion of the importance of social and physical context to the pursuit of happiness, with a special emphasis on the benefits of contact with natural environments. Written for a collection of papers by the Project Plus working group on "felicitators." High Fidelity Economics (with Anna Alexandrova). Penultimate draft How research on happiness and behavioral economics is improving economic methodology. Less precise, but higher fidelity. Forthcoming in Hands and Davis, The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology. Happiness. Entry for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Nature and Significance of Happiness. Penultimate draft What happiness is and why it matters, in brief. Probably the best quick overview of my views about happiness. Extends earlier defense of emotional state versus life satisfaction theories of happiness. For the Oxford Handbook of Happiness (eds. Ilona Bonwell and Susan David). Biophilia and Human Flourishing. Earlyish draft--do not cite without permission Examines the idea that human beings have a need for contact with nature. What does this claim mean, how can we assess it, and what are its prospects? I do not endorse the view in this paper, but do suggest that the idea is worth taking seriously. The Folk Concept(s) of Happiness: Preliminary Notes A brief summary of survey results on folk intuitions about happiness and well-being. The Pursuit of Unhappiness People tend systematically to make serious errors of prediction and choice in matters of well-being. These errors are probably serious enough to cast doubt on our ability to profit, via our choices, from having arbitrarily high levels of freedom to shape our lives as we wish, contrary to the liberal optimism characteristic of much modern thought. An early and somewhat rough version of material in Chapters 11 and 12 of the book. Well-Being and Virtue A critique of perfectionist accounts of well-being, focusing on Aristotelian theories. While such views have more going for them than most critics have realized, virtue or excellence still forms no fundamental part of well-being. Seeing why illuminates interesting points about the nature of well-being. Philosophy and the Science of Subjective Well-Being A survey of philosophical work relating to empirical work on subjective well-being. Draft 1/8/07; a revised version appears in Eid and Larsen, The Science of Subjective Well-Being. On Being Happy or Unhappy My “theory of happiness” paper, defending an emotional state view. Draft 6/10/05. Published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXI:2 (September 2005), pp. 287-317. Do We Know How Happy We Are? We are worse than we think at introspecting and recalling affect. Draft 6/28/06; published in Nous. Life Satisfaction, Ethical Reflection, and the Science of Happiness Life satisfaction is overrated, with implications for empirical research. Draft 7/7/05; published in The Journal of Happiness Studies Happiness, the Self, and Human Flourishing Well-being consists partly in happiness. Published in Utilitas Happiness and Pleasure Hedonistic conceptions of happiness are implausible. Published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62:3 (2001), pp. 501-528. Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness Discusses different senses of ‘happiness’, relation to empirical research, and the role of philosophy in determining the nature of happiness. Aimed mainly at empirical researchers. Published in The Journal of Happiness Studies 1:2 (2000), pp. 207-225. What Do We Want from a Theory of Happiness? Defends a methodology for philosophical work on happiness, rejecting conceptual analysis and scientific naturalism. An adequate account of happiness should be intuitively credible and answer to our practical interests in the notion. Published in Metaphilosophy, 34:3 (2003), pp. 305-329. My PhD Dissertation: Happiness and Ethical Inquiry: An Essay in the Psychology of Well-Being Contains a fair amount of material not in the other papers, though some of my views have changed since. Evil Characters Explores the evaluation of character by examining the worst extremes. Discusses the aspects of character that matter for assessing evil characters and argues for an affective-motivational approach. Published in American Philosophical Quarterly, 36:2 (April 1999), pp. 131-148. Consistency of Character and the Character of Evil Extends the previous discussion by arguing that evil character involves a certain kind of consistency, roughly marked by (at least) a near-complete absence of moral concern or motivation. Published in Haybron, ed. Earth’s Abominations: Philosophical Studies of Evil. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002. Moral Monsters and Saints Argues that the notion of evil character is morally significant, with genuine theoretical interest. Also indicates limitations in other approaches to evil, and suggests that our intuitions about extremes of character are a problem for consequentialist ethics. Published in The Monist, 85:2 (2002), pp. 260-284. The Causal and Explanatory Role of Information Stored in Connectionist Networks Connectionist processing is less holistic than many think. Network behavior is explicable in terms of selected data stored therein, contra Ramsey, Stich and Garon’s argument for the incompatibility of connectionism with folk psychology. Minds and Machines, 10:3 (2000), pp. 361-380. |