Thinking about Democracy

The word “Democracy” means more than an ancient archetype of government. Democracy is a buzz word in world politics. International affairs are replete with references to democratic affairs and initiatives, and often politicians epitomize some set of democratic ideals as the ultimate manifestation of humanity's cooperation. It is impossible for any international observer to go without hearing about Democracy. With such widespread use, the word “Democracy” has developed a highly personal meaning. “Democracy” does not spawn rote knowledge of Aristotle's critiques of the Athenian Parthenon; nor does the word “Democracy” elicit the same sketches of American society that Tocqueville eloquently portrayed in Democracy in America. Instead, the word “Democracy” generates as many different meanings as people who hear or read it. I use the psychological term “schema” to denote an individual's personal conception of Democracy—the meaning of the word “Democracy” which the individual uses to identify the concept. Democracy schemas vary widely due to the heavy usage of the word.

A schema is qualitatively different from a theoretical conception. Aristotle’s sketch of Democracy in The Politics exemplifies a theoretical conception; such a theoretical conception prescribes meaning to the concept by positing an identification and classification of related phenomena. In other words, Aristotle claimed to link a number of observations into his own theoretical conception of Democracy. Both schemas and theoretical conceptions classify observations of phenomena into categories, but while theoretical conceptions prescribe meaning, a schema derives meaning from an individual’s perception of information about complex concepts. If John sees people voting and hears from one of them that voting is Democratic, then John might derive the meaning of Democracy from this voting. Aristotle’s theoretical conception posited that Democracy includes voting (among other things), so Aristotle prescribed meaning to the term.

Schemas arise from an individual's organization of outside information into personally coherent concepts. This schema derives meaning useful to that individual for the purpose of identifying that concept from that person's set of information. Cognitive Psychologists have argued for decades about how and what kinds of information people use to formulate concepts (see Murphy, 2004 for a review), but nevertheless a schema utilizes outside information to internalize personal meaning. Theoretical conceptions on the other hand prescribe meaning to a concept by virtue of the theory itself. Theoretical conceptions attest to what a concept should be. Schemas are mental structures that individuals use to simplify explanations, so schemas are useful only to that person. Schemas may accurately or inaccurately portray a theoretical concept. Take a moment to imagine a dog, what you imagine likely has four legs, hair, and a wet nose. What you are imagining reflects the things you personally know about dogs. This is your dog schema. Now imagine a scientist is attempting to classify a new breed of mammal that closely resembles a dog. Perhaps the scientist examines the DNA of known dogs to this new mammal and classifies the animal accordingly. Although you might see the animal and classify it as a dog based on your own schema, if the scientist believes the DNA varies in such a way that precludes the creature from being a dog, then the dog does not fit his theoretical conception.

Theoretical conceptions might shape a schema if that person understands and values a particular theory. Believing that Democracy is accurately represented in a particular book provides an individual with a basis for a schema. Although most people certainly utilize some theoretical understanding of Democracy, this is not always the case. A schema could be devoid of any theoretical representation, perhaps even uniquely identifying the concept of Democracy, instead it could, for instance, silhouette personal assumptions. For example, many Americans procure beliefs about what Democracy is through their parents, the news, or some kind of educational experience (like a high school civics class). Imagine a girl named Kelly who asks her parents, “What does ‘Democracy’ mean?” Perhaps Kelly’s parents tell her, “Democracy means freedom,” so she believes that Democracy is that particular state of mind. She thus identifies Democracy as “freedom.” The extent to which a person relies on a theoretical conception depends at least partially on that person's knowledge of any particular theory. Whenever an individual is confronted with new information (like a new democracy theory), he or she decides whether to adopt the information to their schema.

Schemas do not necessarily rely solely on any theoretical conceptions. A theoretical conception of Democracy might describe Democracy as: a form of government in which people equally contribute directly to their own governance. The purpose of this description is to define (or refine) the concept of Democracy, prescribing meaning for a broad audience. This theoretical conception might resemble something found in a textbook. On the other hand, a schema encapsulates the thoughts that a person has about Democracy. The function of both a person's experiences and inner psychological mechanisms (the same function explored by cognitive psychologists interested in concepts and categories) derives the meaning of an individual's conception of Democracy. Growing up in a conservative American household (and without a terrific education), John might identify Democracy with the set of “moral American values of liberty that represent the epitome of societal success.” This schema  of John's relies on the function of his experiences and his interpretation of those experiences. His schema is the synthesis of this function into a personally coherent concept. Thus, a Democracy schema utilizes more information than a simply theoretical explanation.

Philosophers and social scientists have devoted considerable attention throughout the ages to developing theoretical conceptions of Democracy. These theoretical developments can improve the functioning of Democracy by identifying functional problems and potential solutions to those problems. Theoretical developments have no effect on individual schemas, however, unless an individual adopts the new theory. Individuals do not utilize theoretical concepts alone; individuals utilize their own schema of Democracy (which may or may not reflect particular theoretical concepts). John can not use Aristotle’s thoughts (the theoretical conception) to think about Democracy without incorporating these thoughts into his schema. Schemas have psychological meaning because we use those conceptions (and not theoretical ones) to think about Democracy.

So long as a person has some schema of Democracy, he or she has thoughts about Democracy. Thoughts are unavoidable consequences of awareness. We can’t be aware of something without thinking about it. Recognizing Democracy brings Democracy to our attention and makes us aware of it. Recognition of any schema triggers some kind of thoughts. These thoughts are collectively referred to as an Attitude. Schemas therefore trigger attitudes. Social psychologists typically  reduce attitudes to include an individual's Affect and Cognition (for a brief review, see Myers, 2005 pp134-140). The following paragraphs apply this principle to attitudes about Democracy.

People believe things about Democracy. The things that an individual believes about Democracy are collectively referred to as Cognitions. While an individual uses a schema to identify what he or she understands Democracy to be, that same individual believes things about the concept. People may believe Democracy is effective or ineffective, bureaucratic or personal, natural or unnatural, peaceful or war-mongering, or virtually any other adjective. A young child educated in America may believe that Democracy is the fairest method of group decision-making (perhaps because of his simplistic schema that Democracy is the process by which majority rules in a vote). Another child learning in North Korea may believe that Democracy is obscene (perhaps because her Democracy schema is a cartoon villain).  Where modern Americans might see bureaucracy and manipulation, others who are fighting in a Democratic coup see liberty and justice. People use schemas to recognize Democratic concepts. Cognitions reflect the content of an individual’s learning about these concepts.

Similarly, people have feelings associated with Democracy. The way that an individual feels about Democracy is referred to as Affect. Democracy may elicit pride from an American soldier who has lost a limb fighting to spread Democracy to Iraq or angst from an Afghanistan mother who has lost her children from a misplaced American missile. Democracy may represent the sanctity of American government, or it may represent the tyranny of the West. In the former case, Democracy elicits a reverential feeling; in the latter case, it represents feelings of despise. Perhaps Democracy is a source of academic interest to the political scientist, and perhaps it spurs fear and loathing to a Chinese government official. Experiences condition Affect responses. Conditioning is a specific type of learning that occurs when a schema recognizes a concept and an experience pairs that concept with a stimuli (for a brief review of the concept of conditioning, see Myers, 2005).

To distinguish between schemas, Cognitions, and Affect, remember that people use schemas to identify and communicate about observed phenomena. Cognitions are the beliefs that people have about their schemas, and Affect refers to the feelings that people have about their schemas. Schemas, Cognitions, and Affect are all manifest in a person's thoughts. John's belief that “voting is democratic” is part of John's Democracy schema. John's pride in democracy is part of his Affect. His belief that democracy is an effective form of government contains both the Cognition (effectiveness) and schema (form of government).

Affect and Cognition cannot be directly measured, so they are inferred through behavior (see Nosek & Hansen, 2007 for more on attitude measurement). If John votes in every election, you might infer through this behavior that he believes voting is important or that he feels obligated to participate. Although it seems that the most direct way to ascertain John's attitude toward something might be to ask John, his response would not exactly indicate an Attitude; his response (a verbalization) is itself a behavior. The behavior of relating an attitude to another person is called attitude expression, and those attitudes are “expressed attitudes.” Expressed attitudes do not necessarily reflect the “inner” attitude of people. We would still have to infer John’s inner attitude through his expressed attitude (i.e. that he is telling the truth). Someone could conceal behavior to hide his or her true feelings, intentionally mislead another person by expressing an untruthful attitude, or even express a mistaken attitude. Thus, both personal motivations and faulty perceptions of inner attitudes can alter expressed attitudes from true inner attitudes. In any case, others can never know for certain a person’s attitude. Expressed attitudes, on the other hand, can be directly measured simply by asking an individual what they feel and what they believe about Democracy.

A variety of outside influences defy the expression of inner attitudes. The most striking outside influence is social acceptance. People have a tendency to express socially acceptable attitudes, even if those socially acceptable attitudes differ considerably from their own inner attitudes. In 2002 the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, although privately many Representatives harbored reservations (Nagourney, 2002). Favoring the Iraq war was a popular sentiment at the time, and the social acceptance of the sentiment was palpable. The strong perceived social acceptance caused many Representatives to allay their inner Attitudes in favor of the more socially acceptable stance.

The distinction between inner attitudes and expressed attitudes can help decipher the meaning of seemingly conflicting viewpoints. If John correctly perceives his inner attitude, has no personal motivation to lie or mislead, and perceives a social acceptance of his attitude, then John will express his inner attitude toward a potent observation. However, this is rare circumstance. John's inner attitude might negatively regard Democracy, but family acceptance of voting could cause John to express a positive attitude toward Democracy; therefore, John says that he favors “Democracy,” thus expressing a positive attitude. Suppose at the same time John expresses a negative attitude toward “public participation in government.” John may not realize that public participation is characteristic of standard theoretical conceptions of Democracy. One possible explanation for his contrasting attitudes might be that John has been socially influenced to accept Democracy, but he has not considered the public participation consequence of Democracy. John may express a positive attitude toward Democracy, but he could not truly endorse Democracy without endorsing public participation. If John also perceives strong social acceptance of Democracy, we could reason that he has been socially influenced to express a positive attitude despite a negative underlying attitude.

A person's Attitude toward their own conception (schema) of Democracy may differ from their attitude toward a behavior related to a theoretical conception of Democracy. If Jill had a different Democracy schema from John that precluded Jill from considering a behavior to be democratic, then Jill's attitude regarding that behavior would be triggered differently. Jill does not relate voting to Democracy, whereas John immediately associates voting with Democracy. Jill's attitude toward voting would be a result of only her attitude toward “voting behavior” and not her attitude toward Democracy since she does not relate voting and Democracy. John’s attitude results from the behavior's triggering his attitude toward Democracy, since voting behavior triggers democratic thoughts. Similarly, a schema that does not regard one behavior as democratic could differ from a theoretical conception that regarded the same behavior as democratic. Therefore schemas are related to Attitudes. In order to trigger an attitude toward Democracy, one must conceive of Democracy. Jill's Attitude toward Democracy was never triggered because she did not think about Democracy when she thought about voting. This would explain why a person might have different attitudes about a schema of Democracy and democratic behaviors of a traditional theoretical conception.