“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”
--The Declaration of Independence

The Declaration of Independence had at least one problem. If all mankind were created equal, then why would the unalienable right of Liberty be harder to recognize in, say, Arab countries? After nine years in the Gulag, Natan Sharansky might have conclusively refuted any self-evident nature of Liberty in the USSR. Instead, he emerged triumphant, voicing the universal appeal of freedom in his seminal book, The Case for Democracy (2004). With the moral clarity of America at stake, Sharansky writes about the inevitable rise of freedom and Democracy with moral authority like President Andrew Jackson spoke about Manifest Destiny and like Karl Marx wrote about Communism: people in every country yearn to be free, and non-democratic governments prohibit this freedom. Were all people created equal in the USSR? Sharansky believes history proves this true. Are people created equal in the Arab nations? If so, is their Liberty self-evidently unalienable? Do people everywhere really yearn for freedom? The future of mankind’s Liberty is at stake in the answers to these questions.

Tugging at the heartstrings of the West, Sharansky convincingly argues that Democracy promotion is in the best interest of the entire world’s people. Even according to Scott McClellan’s recent critique of the Bush administration’s approach to War in Iraq, President Bush chose to war with Saddam to spread Democracy to Iraq (McClellan, 2008). The President claims that The Case for Democracy inspired his foreign policy decisions. The Case for Democracy was published in 2002; McClellan claims that President Bush made up his mind to go to war with Saddam Hussein in the same year. Perhaps this is a coincidence; but whether or not Americans believe in the unalienable right of Liberty for all mankind, expending American resources to bring Democracy to foreign countries deserves careful consideration. With growing resentment toward the War in Iraq, criticisms of the expenditures of the United States on democratizing foreign countries have unified a vociferous outcry. Now it seems that the United States is past due for an overhaul of policy: Americans want to maximize the impact of every precious resource allocated to democratization initiatives.

John Prados’s Safe for Democracy distinguishes five tools that the United States has utilized to promote Democracy: behavior examples, diplomacy, economic sanctions, covert operations (propaganda), and military force (2006). Each of these tools relies on Sharansky’s argument in large measure for their success; each tool requires that people yearn for their own Democracy. Without citizens yearning for Democracy, exporting Democracy will be much more difficult, if not impossible. The five tools that Prados describes shape policy with the assumption that people have an innate yearning for Democracy. But with the growing outcry against continued expenditures, policy-makers have a responsibility to ensure that every resource in this toolbox works successfully. “Conditioning Democracy” proposes “Democratic Propensity Theory” to shape the crucial policy overhaul. With a unique focus on individual endorsement of Democracy, “Conditioning Democracy” relates psychological principles to Democracy initiatives. The United States is missing a sixth tool from its toolbox: conditioning people for Democracy. If policy-makers consider the evidence that I will present in “Conditioning Democracy,” new policy should both more efficiently use resources and perhaps also save lives. The following paragraphs in “Introducing Democratic Propensity” illuminate a platform for Democratic Propensity by examining the War in Iraq.

The United States has for years promoted its democratizing agenda: from France's revolution in the 18^th century to the diplomacy of the Cold War, the United States has demonstrated interest in Democratic coups. Iraq has now become a proving ground for modern America's democratizing power. Lorne Cramer, president of the International Republican Institute, scrutinized the democratization element of the Iraq War (2006), but America's role as a democratizing force was expressed from the onset of the war. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld outlined specific goals of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 21, 2003 at the very onset of the War in Iraq (Garamone, 2003). The final goal Rumsfeld outlined for the coalition was to “create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government.” Although those specific “conditions” and how they could be created remain elusive, President Bush later delved more deeply into the issue.

President Bush characterized the January 2005 elections in Iraq as “a major milestone in the march to democracy.” But who is it that is marching? That remark came well after the President’s speech on May 24, 2004 at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, when he laid out a five-step plan “to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom.” The plan included: handing sovereignty to an Iraqi government, providing security assistance, restoring infrastructure, encouraging international assistance, and a timeline for a national election. Certainly this plan suggests that Bush has a vision for a Democratic Iraq. Later in the speech, Bush remarks that he “sent American troops to Iraq to make its people free”--perhaps he is leading the march? He also made it clear that the United States has a vested interest in promoting democracy in Iraq in order to secure the United States “by removing a source of terrorist violence and instability in the Middle East.” Perhaps Iraq and the United States are marching together toward democracy? But even President Bush acknowledged that some people question whether Iraqi people want Democracy, and if they want it whether they could handle it. Essentially, would Iraqis accept Democracy? This question was largely ignored in favor of implementation of the five-step plan.

The President was not alone in democratization spending, and neither was democratization spending limited to the Iraq War. Politicians have justified spending billions of taxpayer dollars in the name of spreading Democracy, and the practice continues unabated today. One report showed that the United States invested $106 million (adjusted for 2003 inflation) in 1990 in one agency—the United States Agency for International Development—for the purpose of democratizing foreign countries (Finkel, Perez-Linan, & Seligson, 2003). That number steadily increased through 2003 (the most recent data available to the study) to $830 million. Estimating the cost of the Iraq War to Americans has been much more difficult, but Harvard's Linda Bilmes and Nobel-prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz estimated a price tag at about $3 trillion, and the spending is not over yet (Stiglitz &Blimes, 2008). Spreading democratic ideals and participation has not been limited to foreign countries, either. Domestic initiatives aimed at increasing civic engagement and participation in democratic processes have been gaining momentum and appeal (APSA, 2004; Carprini, 2003, pp. 14–15; Crosby, 1995; Dienel & Renn, 1995; Fagotto & Fung, 2006; Fishkin, 1997; Gastil, 1993; Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Hastie et al., 1983; Jennings, 1993; Luskin & Fishkin, 1998; Lynn & Kartez, 1995, 88; MacRae, 1993, pp. 310-311; Mansbridge, 1983; Shapiro, 1999; Vari, 1995; Williams & Matheny, 1995; Wright, 1992). Clearly, people in the United States pay dividends to “spread democracy,” and yet the effectiveness of these programs is questionable.

Policy-makers have surely realized since the beginning of the war in Iraq that spreading Democracy is by no means a simple procedure, but still the Iraqi people now have opportunities to participate in democratic affairs like never before. The replacement of the tyrannical leader Saddam Hussein with a constitution and a "democratic, federal, representative republic" (Constitution of Iraq, art. 1) instituted an overwhelming democratic reform. The United States spearheaded the creation of these opportunities without examining whether Iraqis would support individually these new democratic reforms. It seems irresponsible to assume that denizens of such a major revolution in a culture that had survived thousands of years in the absence of Democracy would immediately accept new democratic ideals. The administration assumed that Iraqi people would participate in free elections, given the opportunity. It turns out that participation was high, but so was opposition to Democracy.

The administration of the U.S. issued the five-step plan to create environmental conditions for the rapid transition to the new government with the belief (or hope) that people would both participate in and support a Democracy. Liken the mindset to “If you build it, they will come.” In the end, however, it is the individuals within Iraq that will ultimately have to live with their new government, elect officials, and abide by its rule of law. And as Scott Ritter, U.N. chief weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991-1998 and author of Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of America's Intelligence Conspiracy, pointed out, elections themselves do not bring democracy (Ritter, 2005). Among the totalitarian regime leaders that held “democratic elections” are Stalin, Hitler, and (even) Saddam Hussein. No matter how overwhelming the turnout in elections, Ritter concludes:

The Iraqi people may have pined for an improvement in their condition, but would they find confidence in the democratic solution that the United States offered? The administration largely ignored this question, but this question has serious implications for the success of democratization. The people of Iraq must unite in their desire for democratic government, in their desire for the rule of law for Democracy to truly take hold. Any Democracy initiative must also win the hearts and minds of the people to trust in a system that “guarantees the rights of all.” The initiative must build confidence. The invasion of Iraq was in essence a large-scale democratic initiative in that it increased the opportunities for people to participate in Democracy. The U.S. can help Iraq create a stable environment for participation in democratic affairs, but without the support of individual Iraqis, the democratic initiatives will not be wholly successful.

The plan of the United States did not belie any indication to create conditions for individual Iraqis to transition to a representative government, however. The United States is marching toward Democracy in Iraq by improving security, seeking international assistance, and setting timelines for elections. But the Iraqis themselves must choose to march as well if Democracy is to take root. Although President Bush brushed off the question of whether Iraqis would individually accept Democracy, this question deserves examination. Although Westerners might think it natural for people to choose to be free and participate in government and accept other democratic ideals, it might be the case that this assumption is based on Western experience of Western culture. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi declared Muslim support of Democracy “the very essence of heresy, polytheism, and error” (Raphaeli, 2005). Whatever credence we give to his word, it is certainly possible that other factors (like religion) might affect the willingness of an individual to accept Democracy. Likewise it seems reasonable that some conditions might be altered to increase a person's likelihood to accept Democracy.

In this chapter I begin to explore Democratic Propensity theory. Democratic Propensity theory borrows from other theories in social science to explain the two main components: 1) the Democratic Proclivity Scale and 2) the Democratic Propensity Model. Specifying the meaning of each component in the theory, the purpose of this chapter is to conceptualize the terminology in the theoretical construction of Democratic Propensity. Later chapters in this section operationalize concepts in the theory and propose methods of both measurement and modeling of concepts. The theory provides the tools that President Bush might have put to use for the conditioning of Iraqis for Democracy. Creating conditions to improve an individual’s proclivity to accept democracy could have been a critical component in the five-step plan, but President Bush’s plan left out how individuals in Iraq might become more inclined to participate in Democracy. Democratic Propensity provides a basis for understanding the factors that should be involved in the missing sixth step. To broaden the audience for this book, I present each concept in such a way that scholars in any field should be able to understand.