 “Strategies of political control and party adaptation in reform-era China” Dissertation Committee: Jean C. Oi (chair), Michael McFaul, Beatriz MagaloniHow does a ruling party maintain the relevance of its political organizations in the midst of a transition to a market economy? My dissertation considers organizational changes taking place within contemporary China’s ruling communist party to understand how institutions of party control over political elites are adapting to economic and social change. Specifically, this project seeks to account for the party’s renewed emphasis on an understudied but core set of party organizations: a national network of party-managed training schools which offer the organizational framework for exerting political control over the knowledge, skills, and careers of central and local bureaucrats. In recent decades, this school system has undergone dramatic reforms. Drawing on a dataset of cadre career histories and in-depth field research, including over 200 interviews with cadres at all administrative levels, findings suggest that party schools present an organizational means to screen and control bureaucrats’ career trajectories, while market-based reforms in the party school system have generated new revenue streams as well as a more diverse menu of training programs. Together, these findings contribute to understanding how the incorporation of market mechanisms within the organizational strategy of a ruling party contributes to authoritarian resilience and the shift to particular forms of bureaucratic control in a reforming, single party authoritarian context. Publications "Toward a professional civil service in post-transition Romania," 2009. Public Administration and Development 29(4): 274-88 Abstract: To what degree and under what conditions can a young democracy build a competent, politically neutral public bureaucracy? A crucial component of the transition from communist party rule to democracy is the creation of a professional civil service. Success along this dimension of state-building generates administrative capacity: non-elected public officials ensure the implementation of reforms initiated by political leaders. In the communist party-led regimes of Eastern Europe, forging this new administrative class from its highly politicised predecessor took place as new democracies sought to overcome historical legacies and integrate with the European Union. A case study of administrative reform in Romania during the post-1989 period suggests the importance of external influences in forming a civil service more closely adhering to the Weberian ideal of an expert, rules-based bureaucracy. Through analysis of survey data from a nationally representative sample of the Romanian civil servants, the public bureaucracy has professionalised insofar as educational and training credentials rather than political affiliation are significant predictors of salary levels. Working Papers "Democracy and culture matter: A test of threat perception, trust, and foreign policy opinion formation in the U.S." (with Bethany Lacina) Survey experiment implemented by TESS (Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences, NSF Grant 0094964) to determine U.S. citizens' response to regime type and cultural cues in foreign policy opinion formation "Evaluating the impact of Chinese village elections on village leadership" Analysis of nationally representative village-level survey data to determine the effect of village elections on village leader responsiveness to citizen demands "Elections in non-democracies: When and why?" Analysis of panel data on elections in non-democracies and the relationship of this institution with regime duration |