ResearchI study problems of cooperation in international politics. My current project is on the role of scientific and policy experts in international organizations, with an application to negotiations over cooperation to address climate change. Previous projects addressed federations and capital controls. (CV.)FederationsFederations: The Political Dynamics of Cooperation, Cornell Univ Press, 2009. My book contrasts federal unions with international organizations such as alliances and customs unions. Common theories of why states form federations and IOs both point to the potential for gains from cooperation in general, since states that pool their economic and military resources can be wealthier and more secure than those that do not, and the gains that come from institutionalized cooperation in particular, since states the cooperate through regular institutions can reduce the transactions costs of recurring bargains. However, these existing theories cannot account for why states choose federations instead of IOs, and vice versa. I develop a new theory that states federate when their leaders expect benefits from closer military or economic cooperation but also expect that cooperation via an international organization would put some of the states in a vulnerable position, open to extortion from their erstwhile partners. The potentially vulnerable states hold out, refusing to join alliances or customs unions, and only agreeing to military and economic cooperation under a federal constitution. I examine several historical cases: the making of a federal Australia and the eventual exclusion of New Zealand from the union; the decisions made within Buenos Aires and Prussia to build Argentina and Germany largely through federal contracts rather than conquests; and the failures of postindependence unions in East Africa and the Caribbean.
A new project in progress applies a version of the argument to Korean unification. The first paper in the series is about the strategic logic underlying South Korea's various approaches to the North over time. Cowritten with Jai Kwan Jung.
MiscBuying Treaties with Cigarettes: Internal Side-payments in Two-level Games. International Interactions 2001. A hawkish, or bad-cop, domestic player such as a legislature has more influence over treaty negotiations when foreign governments know that the executive cannot buy off the legislature via unrelated, domestic-policy side-payments. Domestic divisions over foreign policy therefore matter most when veto groups are relatively unified over other salient issues; domestic divisions over foreign policy matter least when there are also domestic divisions other other issues, as during periods of divided government. US ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate.
My very short man-on-the-street interview on power-sharing in Afghanistan starts at the 1:01 mark on this video.
| TeachingOffice hours in room 417 Monroe: Wednesdays and Fridays 10:30 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. and by appointment
Syllabi for all courses I have taught at GWFall 2009 - PSC 003: Introduction to International PoliticsSyllabus (pdf). Lecture meets Wednesdays and Fridays, 12:45 p.m. - 1:35 p.m., room 113 in the ESIA building. Sections meet at various times, one hour per week. All discussion sections will meet the first week of class, including those scheduled to meet before the first lecture. The Blackboard site for the fall semester is now active and has the syllabus as well as information about the assigned books, readings, writing assignments, and exams. Fall 2009 - PSC 341: Advanced Theories of International PoliticsSyllabus (pdf). Fridays 4:10 p.m. to 6 p.m. Restricted to Ph.D. students. Information about assigned books is posted on my 341 page and on Blackboard. Spring 2010 - PSC 003: Introduction to International PoliticsSyllabus. Lecture meets Wednesdays and Fridays, 12:45 p.m. - 1:35 p.m. Sections meet at various times, one hour per week. All discussion sections will meet the first week of class, including those scheduled to meet before the first lecture. See the course page on Blackboard for general information as well as information on ordering assigned books. Spring 2010 schedule is being revised.
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