Chad Rector


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Research

I study problems of cooperation in international politics.  My current project is on the role of scientific and policy experts in international organizations, with an application to negotiations over cooperation to address climate change.  Previous projects addressed federations and capital controls.  (CV.)

Federations

Federations: The Political Dynamics of Cooperation, Cornell Univ Press, 2009. My book contrasts federal unions with international organizations such as alliances and customs unions.  Common theories of why states form federations and IOs both point to the potential for gains from cooperation in general, since states that pool their economic and military resources can be wealthier and more secure than those that do not, and the gains that come from institutionalized cooperation in particular, since states the cooperate through regular institutions can reduce the transactions costs of recurring bargains.  However, these existing theories cannot account for why states choose federations instead of IOs, and vice versa.  

I develop a new theory that states federate when their leaders expect benefits from closer military or economic cooperation but also expect that cooperation via an international organization would put some of the states in a vulnerable position, open to extortion from their erstwhile partners. The potentially vulnerable states hold out, refusing to join alliances or customs unions, and only agreeing to military and economic cooperation under a federal constitution.  I examine several historical cases: the making of a federal Australia and the eventual exclusion of New Zealand from the union; the decisions made within Buenos Aires and Prussia to build Argentina and Germany largely through federal contracts rather than conquests; and the failures of postindependence unions in East Africa and the Caribbean.


National Unification and Mistrust: Bargaining Power and the Prospects for a PRC/Taiwan Agreement.  Security Studies 2008. This paper applies elements of the theory to China and Taiwan.  Tacit negotiations over reunification may yield an agreement if Beijing can structure an offer to Taipei that allows Taiwan to maintain (or expand) external ties, via independent representation at the UN, WTO, and an alliance with the United States, in the context of a formally unified confederal state.  Cowritten with Scott Kastner

A new project in progress applies a version of the argument to Korean unification.  The first paper in the series is about the strategic logic underlying South Korea's various approaches to the North over time.   Cowritten with Jai Kwan Jung.

Capital controls

To explore the relationship between domestic institutions and international and economic factors, Scott Kastner and I coded a new dataset of all capital controls policy changes for OECD countries since 1950.  Here is the raw data in plain text, excel, and spss, and a codebook in pdf or text.

International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability.  ISQ 2003. Parliamentary veto players and government ideology correlate with policy changes, but these effects disappear after the mid-1980s when systemic constraints tighten.  Replication file in Stata 7Stata do-fileReplication file in tab-delimited textReplication file in excel.

Partisanship and the Path to Financial Openness. CPS 2005.  European states were more likely to liberalize financial controls within four months of a changeover from left to right governments.Replication file in Stata 8Stata do-file.

Misc

Buying Treaties with Cigarettes: Internal Side-payments in Two-level Games. International Interactions 2001.  A hawkish, or bad-cop, domestic player such as a legislature has more influence over treaty negotiations when foreign governments know that the executive cannot buy off the legislature via unrelated, domestic-policy side-payments.  Domestic divisions over foreign policy therefore matter most when veto groups are relatively unified over other salient issues; domestic divisions over foreign policy matter least when there are also domestic divisions other other issues, as during periods of divided government.  US ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate.  

My very short man-on-the-street interview on power-sharing in Afghanistan starts at the 1:01 mark on this video.

Teaching

Office hours in room 417 Monroe:
Wednesdays and Fridays 10:30 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. and by appointment

Syllabi for all courses I have taught at GW

Fall 2009 - PSC 003: Introduction to International Politics

Syllabus (pdf).  Lecture meets Wednesdays and Fridays, 12:45 p.m. - 1:35 p.m., room 113 in the ESIA building. Sections meet at various times, one hour per week.  All discussion sections will meet the first week of class, including those scheduled to meet before the first lecture.  The Blackboard site for the fall semester is now active and has the syllabus as well as information about the assigned books, readings, writing assignments, and exams. 

Fall 2009 - PSC 341: Advanced Theories of International Politics

Syllabus (pdf).  Fridays 4:10 p.m. to 6 p.m.  Restricted to Ph.D. students. Information about assigned books is posted on my 341 page and on Blackboard.   

Spring 2010 - PSC 003: Introduction to International Politics

Syllabus.  Lecture meets Wednesdays and Fridays, 12:45 p.m. - 1:35 p.m. Sections meet at various times, one hour per week.  All discussion sections will meet the first week of class, including those scheduled to meet before the first lecture.  See the course page on Blackboard for general information as well as information on ordering assigned books.  

Spring 2010 - TBA

Spring 2010 schedule is being revised.