My dissertation Determinants of Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries:
A Two-Level Theory In my dissertation, I present a theory of the interplay between domestic and international incentives for central bank independence (CBI) and central bank reform. First, I explain under what conditions international determinants of CBI take precedence over domestic determinants. I argue that foreign investors and lenders demand CBI in developing countries as a signal of commitment to sound economic policy. As the need for capital increases, so do the incentives for countries to comply with foreign demands for CBI. However, the capacity of a government to respond to international incentives through CBI is conditioned by the domestic institutional context. The second level of my theory explains what factors affect a country’s elasticity to international demands for CBI. After explaining why the institutional hurdles imposed by presidential and parliamentary systems are of a nature that is not fully captured by the logic of veto points, I focus on presidential systems. Based on formal models of delegation, I argue that two factors condition governments’ responses to international incentives for central bank reform: the capacity of the president and the congress in the inter-institutional bargaining, and the distance between the president’s and congress’ preferences. Therefore, I analyze three variables to explain central bank reform in presidential systems: (1) the extent of the president powers; (2) the quality of the legislature, both indications of the institutional actor’s capacity; and (3) the preference distance between the executive and the legislative powers. To test my theory I gathered data on central bank reform and CBI in all countries with central banks, from 1970 to 2008, and I have conducted fieldwork in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. I present three kinds of evidence to support my theory. In Chapter 4, I use a global sample to analyze the impact of growth, FDI loss and debt on the likelihood of reforming central banks. I show the distinctive behavior of developing presidential countries, which justifies the study of Latin American countries as a sub-sample. In the following chapter, I offer a quantitative test of the domestic argument on sample of all Latin American countries, between 1970 and 2008. In Chapter 5, I show the cross-country and within-country impact of the strength of presidential powers, the professionalization of the legislatures, and the distance between the preferences of both branches of government. Finally, I present qualitative evidence collected in my fieldwork in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (Chapter 6). Research projectsInternational political economyObjetivos, Instrumentos Y Resultados De Política Monetaria. México 1980-2010 [Mexican Monetary Policy (1980-2010): Objectives, Instruments and Results]. Overview: This
paper presents a stylized description of Mexican monetary policy’s main
objectives, instruments and results, between 1980 and 2010. Three
distinct phases are analyzed in this period: (1) Before the 1982 crisis,
an expansive monetary policy was subordinated to the achievement of
economic growth. (2) Between 1982 and 1994, Mexican monetary authorities
use exchange rate stability as a means to attain economic growth
without inflation. (3) Between 1995 and 2010, monetary policy is
oriented to the single goal of price stability. This framework is used
to analyze Mexican monetary policy’s internal consistency, as well as
its integration with different governments’ development strategies (In Spanish). Documento de Trabajo/Working paper
A Quest for Capital: Foreign Incentives for Central Bank Reform. Overview: What are the international determinants of central bank independence (CBI)? More specifically, how are international determinants conditioned by the domestic institutional context? This paper analyzes the interplay of international incentives and domestic constraints for politicians to give up (or recover) control over monetary policy by changing the levels of CBI. I argue that the need for capital is a crucial and generally overlooked determinant of CBI. Foreign investors and lenders demand CBI in developing countries as a signal of commitment to sound economic policy. As the country’s need for capital increases, so do the country’s incentives to comply with foreign demands for CBI. However, the governments’ capacity to respond to these demands (the “elasticity” of their response) is constrained by the domestic institutional context. In this paper, I explain and show the mediating effects of regime type and separation of powers on the response to foreign incentives. Preliminary tests on a new data set of central bank reform from 1970 to 2008 provide support for my argument.
Foreign Aid as Signal to Investors: Predicting FDI in Post-Conflict Countries. With Brian J. Phillips. Overview: We argue that post-conflict international aid operates as a signal that attracts foreign investors. This effect is independent from aid’s indirect and long-term effect on FDI through other channels such as economic growth or democratization. Abstract
Determinants of USAID in the Post-Cold War Period (1990-2004). With Andrea Castagnola, Steven Finkel and Anibal Perez Linan Overview: In this paper, we concentrate on the determinants of the U.S. allocation of aid for democratization in the post-Cold War period. International cooperation and intra-Latin American relations Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Soup? Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 5, 698-726 (2009). Paper Article
Overview. How does domestic regime type affect bilateral cooperation, and one of its most visible manifestations, bilateral treaties? This paper explains how domestic political regime affects bilateral cooperation and, contrary to the expectations of some scholars, why autocracies should be expected to be more likely than democracies to enter into bilateral treaties. If the preferences of a pair of states are not identical, the sets of agreements that each party would consent to (win-sets) need to overlap for a bilateral treaty to be acceptable. Because additional domestic constraints reduce the size of a country’s win-set, autocracies should have broader win-sets than democracies. Therefore, autocratic dyads should be more likely to formalize bilateral treaties than other pairs of states. Based on an original dataset, I present empirical evidence showing that pairs of autocracies are more likely than other pairs of states to enter into agreements formalizing bilateral cooperation.
Proving Existence: Inter-Latin American Relations as International Subsystem. Presented at the 49th ISA Annual Convention. San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008. Paper Overview: Is Latin America a distinctive subsystem within the international system? Do Latin American countries behave differently toward other Latin American countries than toward the rest of the world? I theorize what differences one should expect between the determinants of bilateral intra-Latin American cooperation and the determinants of bilateral cooperation with countries outside the region. I found that a number of factors that are correlated with intra-Latin American cooperation show no relationship with cooperation beyond the continent: distance from the U.S., affinity with the U.S., and Spanish heritage are positively related with intra-Latin American cooperation, whereas the level of previous cooperation with the U.S. is negatively associated with current intra-Latin American cooperation. These determinants have no significant impact on bilateral cooperation with third countries.
Signing for Support: Regime Type and Treaties of Cooperation. Evidence from Latin America (1950-1979). Paper presented to qualify as a PhD candidate. Approved by the Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh (2007). Overview: I present a theory to understand the incentives to use foreign policy to achieve political objectives in the domestic arena: governments choose cooperative foreign policies as a substitute for their lack of legitimacy of origin to retain office. In the argument I propose, treaties perform as a means of legitimation for governments whose support is weaken because their legitimacy is contested (autocracies). Furthermore, the influence of time on legitimacy (and therefore, on the government’s propensity to choose cooperative foreign policies) is conditional on the regime type.
Comparative politics: Executive-legislative relations, Delegation and Latin American politicsDelegation and Legislative Professionalization: Central Bank Independence in Strong Presidentialisms. Presented as a poster at the 104th APSA Annual Meeting. Boston, August 28-31 2008. Overview: The literature on delegation expects that the larger the distance between the preferences of the congress and of the president is, the narrower the margin of discretion that the central bank receives will be. Furthermore, if that distance is large enough, the central bank should receive no discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). My model shows that this affirmation is conditional on the quality of information that the congress has. Low quality committee systems result in less professionalized legislatures. The least professionalized the congress is, the least able it is to identify the possible range of outcomes of different levels of discretion. A minimum level of risk aversion makes preferable a less desired certain outcome, over an uncertain outcome.
Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: The Effect of Strong Presidents and Weak Congress on Delegation to the Central Bank. Presented at the 66th MPSA Annual Conference. Chicago, April 3-6, 2008.
“Unite and reign.” When do presidents ask for delegated decree authority? With Juan Negri. Presented at the 65th MPSA Annual Conference. Chicago, April 12-15, 2007. Overview: Why do Presidents ask for delegated decree authority (DDA) when they already have a majority in Congress that will allow their legislation to pass? This paper analyzes the presidents’ incentives for asking DDA using data from Latin American countries
“To promote the general welfare…”? Social Spending and Clientelism in Argentina. Presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico March 15-18, 2006. Session: Social Policy and Welfare in Latin America Overview: What are the determinants of spending on social welfare programs (‘social spending’) by central governments within democratic regimes? By analyzing the case of the Argentinean Plan Jefes de Hogar Desocupados, this paper highlights existent linkages between social spending and electoral interests. I analyze the factors that influence the allocation of social spending across provinces (what explains regional variance on national social expenditure in democratic regimes?). My results show that political alignment between local governors and the national government is the most significant and consistent predictor of social spending allocation across districts. The impact of political alignment seems strengthened when considering the interactive effects of political alignment and protest. My first steps: Regional integration, Mercosur and the EUI spent my first years of research (1997-2004) studying regional integration. I focused on Mercosur and the EU, from an institutional perspective. Most of these projects ended up published. These are some of the projects I worked on:
Institutional analysis of MercosurWhat interactions does Mercosur's institutional design foster (other than increasing trade by lowering trade barriers)? What informal channels of participation does Mercosur open? How does Mercosur affect the capacity of subnational actors to participate in international relations? “Institutional Analysis of Mercosur” (2005) in Studia Politicae. Otono-Invierno . Pp. 79-109. Cover. Article
“Integration in Mercosur” (2003) in Revista Direito Mackenzie. Ano 4, n. 2. São Paulo: Ed. Mackenzie. Pp. 21-38.
“Institutional Forms of Participation for Sub-National Bodies in Mercosur. Perspectives for Cordoba Province” Digital Library of Agencia Córdoba Ciencia. Available since April 2003.
“Alternatives for Sub-national Body Articulation in Mercosur” (2003) in Anuario VI (2001-2002) del Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Córdoba: Ed. Lerner. Pp. 601-606. Policies in MercosurI have studied the perspectives for social policies in Mercosur, and environmental policies in Mercosur. In the Centro de Investigaciones Juridicas y Sociales, I participated in the research on non-trade barriers with environmental purposes.
Social policies in Mercosur
Environment and trade in Mercosur
Territory management
The European UnionI was also interested in how supranational law influenced one of the only areas that European member states kept under their jurisdiction, namely, criminal law. “European Communitarian Law Incidence on Criminal Law” (2001) in Revista de Derecho del Mercosur. Año 5, Nº 2.Buenos Aires: Ed. La Ley – Sintese Editora. Pp. 246-254.
Research assistantships and previous research experienceI have worked with very interesting people in different research projects:
2009 Graduate Research Assistant. Prof. Barry Ames and Prof. Julia Gray (Spring)
2007 Graduate Research Assistant. Prof. Michael Goodhart (Fall). Assistance with structural adjustment programs and trade governance.
2006-2007 Graduate Research Assistant. Prof. Anibal Perez Linan (Fall and Spring). Research Project: Cross-National Research on USAID's Democracy and Governance Programs. Financed by the USAID
2005 Graduate Research Assistant. Prof. Anibal Perez Linan (May). Creation of an indicator of priority in American foreign policy for Latin American countries.
2005 Graduate Research Assistant. Prof. Nita Rudra (July-August). Assitance with Brazil for her book Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries: Who Really Gets Hurt? (2008)
2002-2003 Principal Researcher. “Regional Social Funds. Models for Mercosur.” National University of Cordoba
2002-2004 Researcher. “Non-tariff Barriers with Environmental Purposes.” National University of Cordoba
2001-2002 Principal Researcher. “Institutional Forms of Participation for Sub-national Bodies in Mercosur. Perspectives for Cordoba Province.” Cordoba Science Agency (June)
2001 Researcher. “Institutional Proposals for Social Policies in Mercosur.” National University of Cordoba
2000- 2001 Principal Researcher. “Sub-national Body Articulation in Integrated Spaces. Perspectives for Cordoba.” National University of Cordoba
2000 Researcher “Routes of Participation for Intra-national Regions’ in Integration Processes. Institutional Aspects.” Secretariat of Technology, Science and Productive Innovation. National Agency for Scientific and Technological Promotion. |
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