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What are EU trade preferences worth for Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing Countries?
Published in Trade Preference Erosion: Measurement and Policy Response edited by Bernard Hoekman, William J. Martin and Carlos A. Primo Braga (2009) World Bank and Palgrave-Macmillian series. (Working paper available at the World Bank website) Abstract : This study shows that EU preferences to developing countries were fairly well utilised in 2001, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. For several sub-Saharan African countries, the value of EU tariff preferences, even without accounting for tariff rate quota rents, is worth a significant proportion of their world exports. For non-African Least Developed Countries, in contrast, we find that the EBA initiative was only half-utilised approximately, although it is the only preferential regime available to most of them. It is difficult to reach a firm conclusion since 2001 was the first year of enforcement of Everything But Arms (EBA), and figures for 2002 show utilisation is on the rise, but rules of origin appear to limit significantly the value of this scheme. This also likely explains why the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme is significantly under-utilised in the manufacturing sector, even when the receiving country is not eligible to any other preferential regime.
Good Governance, Trade and Agglomeration Published in Papers in Regional Science (2008). Vol 87 Issue 4, pp 483-504. pdf  This paper has won the Martin Beckmann Prize 2009 that is awarded for the best paper published in 2008 in Papers in Regional Science. The Jury: Masahisa Fujita, Jean Paelinck, John Quigley and Jouke van Dijk. Abstract : We develop a model for developing countries that investigates the factors behind agglomeration of activities in urban giants. Firstly we show that relatively easier market access to external demand provided in huge cities tends to attract entrepreneurs to these places. Secondly we find that the attractive power of the urban giant can be linked to a lack of democracy. Indeed we demonstrate that democracy acts as a dispersive force in the sense that by reversing the cost of living effect, it allows to reduce the spatial inequality and then the tendency of agglomeration. Lastly we analyse how the funds embezzled by a bad government vary according to internal and external trade liberalisation. We show that a decrease in the disadvantage of the periphery to trade with the external market can limit the amount embezzled by a Leviathan.
Concerning Papers in Regional Science, its impact factor (according to ISI Journal Citation Reports) in 2008 is 1.259 (l'AERES a donné un "A" à cette revue).
Location Choice and Public Policies, a Survey of the New Economic Geography Published in Journal of Economic Surveys (2008), Vol. 22, Issue 5, pp. 909-952, December 2008.  Abstract : The aim of this paper is to survey what has been done by the New Economic Geography (NEG) on a regional scale in order to answer the three following questions: what are the predictions of the NEG concerning the future of regions in the triad? Are these predictions robust? What can be the optimal public policy on a regional and national scale in a world characterized by agglomeration, trade liberalization and mobility of entrepreneurs? In surveying the most recent contributions in this area, the paper sheds light on several shortcomings of the NEG literature in order to point out new directions for further research, with particular reference to studies concerning welfare and tax competition.
Concerning Journal of Economic Surveys, its impact factor (according to ISI Journal Citation Reports) in 2008 is 0.732 (l'AERES a donné un "A" à cette revue).
Urban costs, Trade Costs and Tax Competition Published in Revue d'Economie Politique (2008). Volume 118, 5, p. 625-661 pdf here
Abstract : This paper revisit the links between tax competition, location of firms and trade integration proposed by Baldwin and Krugman (2004, EER). Contrariwise to these authors we find, in a new economic geography model with urban features, that trade liberalization only leads to a race to the bottom in terms of taxation, and that a tax floor set at the level of the small country may be detrimental to it. Lastly two extensions are done in order to show that i) even under a partial agglomeration of activities, the race to the bottom in terms of taxation is still verified ii) even in a multi-regions model, international trade liberalization generates a race to the bottom when regional trade costs are low enough.
Public Policies, Economic Geography and Trade PhD thesis (2006). U. Pau. Jury: Marc Fleurbaey (CNRS, U. Paris V), Lionel Fontagné (U. Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, CEPII), Carl Gaigné (INRA), Jacques Le Cacheux (U. Pau, OFCE), Frédéric Robert-Nicoud (London School of Economics, CEPR), Jacques Thisse (U. Louvain). |
