New Papers

1. Seeing mathematics: perceptual experience and brain activity in acquired synesthesia (this paper is almost done).
2. A Case of Acquired Synesthesia and Savant Syndrome Following a Brutal Attack, CAS Grant Report, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 2011.
3. Perception without Awareness: Blindsight, Higher Synesthesia and Vision for Action
4. Degrees of Consciousness
5. “Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?” (old version. I am currently in the process of revising the paper). Provides a linguistic analysis of 'looks' reports and then offers an argument for the hypothesis that 'looks' reports reflect representational contents of perception.

Books

1. Transient Truths, Oxford University Press, March 2012.

Articles

1. Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception, Journal of Philosophy, 2012.
2. “What do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel?” Philosophers Imprint, 2012 (old version. Send me an email for a new version). Provides a linguistic analysis of 'feels' reports and then, drawing on the argument of the above paper, it argues that 'feels' reports reflect representational contents of bodily experience, tactile experience and emotions.
3. Seeing as a Non-Sensory Relation: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery, forthcoming in: Richard Brown (ed.), Phenomenology and the Neurophilosophy of Consciousness, Neuroscience Series, Synthese Liberary, 2012.
4. Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight, Consciousness and Cognition, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.003
5. Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?, Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2011): 449-63. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.002.
6. Conscious Vision for Action Vs. Unconscious Vision for Action, Cognitive Science 35 (2011),1076–1104.
7. Color Experience in Blindsight? Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2011):767 - 786.
8. "Perceptual Reports", forthcoming in Mohan Matthen, ed. Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
9. “Do we Perceive Natural Kind Properties?“, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
10. The Status of Consciousness in Nature, in ed Steven Miller, The Constitution of Consciousness, volume 2, S. Miller, ed. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012
11. Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism, forthcoming in C. Tucker, ed. Seemings and Justification, Oxford University Press, 2012.
12. “Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves?, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
13. “Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth”, forthcoming in David Sosa, ed. Analytical Philosophy.
14. “ 'Stupid People Deserve What They Get': The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, (2010), 332-334.
15. “Strong Representationalism and Centered Content”, Philosophical Studies 151 (2010), 373–392. DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9437-z.
16. “Context and Content: Pragmatics in Two-Dimensional Semantics”, Keith Allan and Kasia Jaszczolt, eds. Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics (2012). Context and Content: Final Version of Manuscript. Abstract: Context figures in the interpretation of utterances in many different ways. In the tradition of possible-worlds semantics, the seminal account of context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals and demonstratives is that of Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics (the content-character distinction), further pursued in various directions by Stalnaker, Chalmers, and others. This paper introduces and assesses the notion of context-sensitivity presented in this group of approaches, with a special focus on how it relates to the notion of cognitive significance and whether it includes an intuitively plausible range of expressions within its scope.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects of using two-dimensional semantics to account for context-sensitive expressions in dynamic discourse.
17. "Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology", forthcoming in: Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology, Synthese Library, 2012.
18. Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm, in ed. C. Littejohn and J. Turri, Epistemic Norms, 2012, Oxford University Press.
19. “Colour”, in D. Pritchard, ed. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2011).
20. “Disjunctivism”, in D. Pritchard, ed. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2011).
21. “Descriptions”, in D. Pritchard, ed. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2011).
22. "Presentism, Primitivism and Cross-Temporal Relations: Lessons from Holistic Ersatzism and Dynamic Semantics", in Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller and Giuliano Torrengo, eds. New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag, 2011.
23. "An Emotion Ontology Based on the Perceived Response Theory", Proceedings of the fourth Annual Interontology Meeting, Tokyo, Feb 23-24, 2012.
24. “Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception”, Blackwell Companion to Relativism, Steven Hales, ed., Oxford: Blackwell (2011): 137-158. Presents four arguments in favor of the view that perceptual content possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world, viz. the argument from primitive colors, the argument from the inverted spectrum, the argument from dual looks, and the argument from duplication.
25. “Knowledge-How: A Unified Account”, Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, J. Bengson and M. Moffett eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011): 136-160. There are two competing views of knowledge-how: intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. According to the varieties of intellectualism defended by Stanley, Williamson, Brogaard, Bengson and Moffett knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. According to anti-intellectualism, as defended by Ryle and others, knowledge-how requires the possession of a practical ability. Here I argue for a conciliatory position: knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. But, I argue, there are knowledge states that are not justification-entailing and knowledge states that are not belief-entailing. Both require the possession of practical abilities. I conclude by arguing that the view defended naturally leads to a disjunctive conception of abilities as either essentially involving mental states or as not essentially involving mental states. Only the former kind of ability is a kind of knowledge-state.
26. “Perspectival Truth and Color Primitivism”, C. Wright and N. Pedersen, eds. New Waves in Truth (2010), Palgrave Macmillan.  Color Primitivism: Short Version.
27. “Color in the Theory of Colors? Or: Are Philosophers' Colors All White?”, The Center Must Not Hold: White Women on The Whiteness of Philosophy, George Yancy, ed. (2009).
28. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Philosophical Issues, 2011.
29. “Fitch's Paradox of Knowability,” with J. Salerno, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2009 Edition). Survey of proposals to resolve the knowability paradox. 
30. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78.2 (2009), 439-467.  Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that 's knows-wh' (e.g. 'John knows who stole his car') is reducible to 'there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  Anti-reductionists hold that 's knows-wh' is reducible to 's knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  I argue that both of these positions are defective.  I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge. 
31. “Introduction to Relative Truth”, in Relative Truth, Special Issue of Synthese, Brogaard, ed. (2009).  Contributors: David Capps, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, Steven Hales, Max Kolbel, Peter Lasersohn, Michael Lynch, John MacFarlane, Daniel Massey, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Duncan Pritchard, Brian Weatherson and Crispin Wright.
32. “The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism.  Or How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth”, In A. Haddock, A. Miller and D. Pritchard, ed. Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), 284-308. Abstract: Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals.  But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemi goal.  I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism.  After formulating the argument, I look at three possible ways to refute it.  I then argue that two of these are unsuccessful and defend the third, which involves denying that there are genuinely relative truths.
33. “Descriptions”, The Encyclopedia of the Mind, (2009). Hal Pashler, ed. Editorial Board: Tim Crane, Fernanda Ferreira, Marcel Kinsbourne, Rich Zemel.  “Descriptions", the short version that will actually appear in the encyclopedia.
34. “On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay. A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox”, in J. Salerno, ed. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press, (2009. The paper develops a Fitch-like paradox for strong modal fictionalism. It is argued that the most promising strategy to avoid paradox is to reject the claim that modal claims are to be analyzed in terms of the contents of the fiction of possible worlds. It is hoped that by looking at the parallel case of modal fictionalism light can be shed on the threat posed by Fitch's paradox to semantic anti-realism. 
35. “Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment”, Philosophical Studies 141 (2008), 21-42.
36. “Fitch's Paradox of Knowability,” with J. Salerno, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2008 Edition). Survey of proposals to resolve the knowability paradox.
37. “Sea Battle Semantics” The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 326-335.  The final version is available for subscribers on Blackwell Online Early.  Abstract: MacFarlane has argued that our intuitions about future contingents motivate a shift from standard semantics to relativistic semantics. In this paper I defend standard semantics against MacFarlane's criticism. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Pacific Meeting of the APA in San Francisco 2007.  Peter Ludlow was commenting.  Uncorrected pre-proofs. 
38. “Knowledge-The and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions”, in F. Lihoreau, ed. Knowledge and Questions (2008).Determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb have traditionally been taken to denote answers to implicit questions.  For example, 'the capital of Vermont' has been thought to denote the proposition which answers the implicit question 'what is the capital of Vermont?'  Thus, where 'know is treated as a proposition attitude verb rather than as an acquaintance verb, 'John knows the capital of Vermont' is true iff john knows that Montpelier is the capital of Vermont.  The traditional view lost its popularity long ago, because it was thought to rest on the controversial assumption that determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb function semantically in the same way as the corresponding wh-clauses.  Here we defend the traditional assumption against objections.  We then argue that wh-clauses are not to be given a uniform treatment as indirect questions.  When occurring under a propositional attitude verb, wh-clauses are better treated as having a predicate-type semantic value.  We conclude by considering some possible objections to the predicate view.
39. “In Defense of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know' ”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 439-459. Uncorrected Proofs.  The paper defends a kind of relativism with respect to 'know' and replies to Jason Stanley's objections to relativism which appeared in Chapter 7 of his book Knowledge and Practical Interests.
40. “Counterfactuals and Context”, with J. Salerno, Analysis 68 (2008), 39-46. We discuss what we take to be a contextual fallacy in the standard understanding of the logic of counterfactuals.
41. “Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism”,Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 385-409. The paper was presented at the moral contextualism conference, Aberdeen, July 2006.  It defends perspectivalism, a new version of MacFarlane's non-indexical contextualism.
42. “Remarks on Counterpossibles”, with J. Salerno, in J. van Bentham, V. Hendricks, J. Symons, and S. A. Pedersen (eds.) Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy, Synthese Library, forthcoming, (2008). We provide reasons in support of a non-vacuity treatment of counterpossibles.  We then raise a problem for Nolan's treatment and argue that the problem requires for its solution a theory of subjunctives that treats subjunctive contexts as opaque.  We conclude by offering such a theory.
43. “Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?”, Philosophy Compass: Epistemology 3 (2008), 93-118, Tamar Szabo Gendler, topic ed.  Editor-in-chief: Brian Weatherson.  The paper discusses belief and knowledge reports and raises some objections to traditional analyses of such reports.   Blackwell Online Early.
44. “That may be Jupiter: A Heuristic for Thinking Two-Dimensionally”, American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 315-328.  The paper develops an heuristic for understanding two-dimensionalism non-descriptively.  This heuristic employs a version of David Lewis' counterpart theory in place of the standard theory of canonical descriptions.  Uncorrected Proofs.
45. “The But Not All: A Partitive Account of Plural Definite Descriptions,” Mind and Language 22, 4 (2007), 402-426. The paper argues against the view that the semantic import of plural descriptions is existential quantification. It then argues that plural descriptions have the semantic import of partitive constructions with variable quantificational force. A shortened and slightly different version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Meeting of the APA in D.C. December 2006.  Zoltan Szabo was commenting.  Uncorrected proofs.
46. “Span Operators”, Analysis 67 (2007): 72-79. The paper argues that Lewis and Sider are too quick to deny the presentist the right to employ span operators.  Official published version. 
47. “Number Words and Ontological Commitment”, The Philosophical Quarterly 57, 1 (January 2007), 1-20. The paper examines a recent anti-Fregean line with respect to number discourse.
48. “Descriptions: Predicates or Quantifiers?”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007), 117-136. Here I examine the thesis that descriptions are predicates, which Delia Graff Fara has recently defended.
49. “A Puzzle about Properties,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXIV, 3 (May 2007), 635-650. The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid.  But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic values of predicates.  Uncorrected proofs.
50. “Sharvy's Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007), 160-180. The paper revisits Sharvy's theory of plural definite descriptions. An alternative account of plural definite descriptions, building on the ideas of plural quantification and non-distributive plural predication is developed. Finally, an application of the general account of plural definite descriptions in an account of generic uses of definite descriptions is provided.
51. “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” with J. Salerno, in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard (eds.) New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan (2007), 270-299. Quantified expressions play a special role in modal contexts. On the account of this special role articulated by Stanley and Szabo, we propose a solution to the knowability paradoxes.
52. “Two Modal -Isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism,” Philosophical Perspectives 20, Metaphysics, John Hawthorne, ed. (2006), 77-94. The paper presents some problems for holistic Erzatzism and defends timid modal fictionalism against charges.
53. “Tensed Relations,” Analysis 66 (2006), 194-202. Here I try to make sense of irreducibly tensed properties and relations.Official published version.
54. “Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle”, with J. Salerno, American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006), 261-270. This is a study of an alleged incompatibility (proposed by Sven Rosenkranz) between normal modal logic and factive conceptions of knowability. 
55. “Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006), 335-354.  In translation in Philosophical Alternatives 3 (2008).  The paper develops the RR line that final value can make for a difference in value between knowledge and mere true belief.  It then argues that there is a further problem, viz. that of accounting for the difference in value between knowledge and mere justified true belief.  Finally, it offers a solution to the secondary value problem. 
56. “The 'Gray's Elegy' Argument, and the Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts” Synthese 152 (2006), 47-79. Critical discussion of the arguments of “On Denoting”.  Includes a new interpretation of the 'Gray's Elegy' argument.
57. “The Moral Status of the Human Embryo”, Howard B. Rades, ed., Biomedical Ethics: Humanist Perspectives of Humanism Today, Prometheus Books, 2006.  The article first appeared in the magazine Free Inquiry. It argues that 4-5 days old embryos do not have the moral status of human beings and was cited in A Report of the President's Council on Bioethics -- Washington D.C. 2004.  Apparently, President Bush wasn't convinced.  The Government Citations to the article can be found here and here.
58. “Anti-Realism, Theism, and the Conditional Fallacy,” with J. Salerno, Nous 39 (2005), 123-139.  Here we disagree with Plantinga and Rea that the best way to be an anti-realist is to be a theist. We argue, however, that without a massive revision of classical logic, the anti-realist will have to embrace an unwelcome form of idealism.
59. “On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life”, with B. Smith, Philosophical Papers 34 (2005), 443-58, special issue edited by Thad Metz, featuring solicited papers on the meaning of life.  We argue that final value can contribute to the meaning of your life.
60. “Fitch's Paradox of Knowability,” with J. Salerno, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2002 and Summer 2004 Editions. Survey of proposals to resolve the knowability paradox.
61. “Species as Individuals", Biology and Philosophy 19/2 (2004), 223-42. 
62. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem,” Synthese 139 (2004), 367-386.   Reflections on contextualism, sensitivity, safety, and all that.
63. “Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003), 371-83.  The paper argues that a form of moral contextualism solves the problem of moral luck.
64. “Sixteen Days”, with B. Smith, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (2003), 45-78. In translation: "Die Ontologie des Embryos: Wann beginnt menschliches Leben?" Ludger Jansen, Barry Smith, eds. Biomedizinische Ontologie.  Eine Kooperative Einfuhrung.
65. “A Unified Theory of Truth and Reference,” with B. Smith, Logique et Analyse 169-170 (2003), 49-93, special issue edited by Peter Forrest, featuring solicited papers on truth.  The paper deals with the problem of the many and other issues which threaten to undermine substantial theories of truth and reference.  When I co-authored the paper with Barrry in 2000, I was rather sympathetic to substantial theories of truth.  Since then I have been more sympathetic to less substantial theories.  In translation: J.-M. Monmoyer, ed. La Structure du Monde: Objets, Proprietes, Etats du choses, Paris, Vrin, (2001)
66. “Adhoccery in Epistemology”, Philosophical Papers 32 (2003), 65-82. 
67. “Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant,” with J. Salerno, Analysis 62 (2002), 143-150. The paper develops some new paradoxes of knowability that, unlike Fitch's original paradox, are not blocked by the restricted brands of semantic anti-realism advocated by Dummett and Tennant.
68. “Quantum Mereotopology”, with B. Smith, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 35/1-2 (2002), 153-175.
69. “Living High and Letting Die", with B. Smith, Philosophy 76/297 (2001), 435-42. 
70. “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism.” The Monist 83 (2000), 341-356.   An attempt to combine two theses I rather liked back in 1999, viz. presentism and perdurantism.  I still find presentism exceedingly intuitive and have spent some of my time defending it in print and elsewhere. 
71. “The Coup de Grace for Mechanistic Metaphysics”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 36/1 (2000), 75-108.
72. “A Peircean Theory of Decision”, Synthese 118/3 (1999), 383-401.
73. “Peirce on Abduction and Rational Control”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35/1 (1999), 129-155. 
74. “Mead's Temporal Realism”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35/3 (1999), 563-593. 
75. “Glucagon and glucagon-like peptide 1: selective receptor recognition via distinct peptide epitopes”, with S.A. Hjorth, K. Adelhorst, O. Kirk and T.W. Schwartz, J. Biol. Chem. Vol. 269, Issue 48, (1994), 30121-30124. Glucagon and glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) are homologous peptide hormones that are recognized by likewise homologous, but highly selective receptors.  We argue that the selective recognition of the glucagon and GLP-1 receptors is determined by residues located at opposite ends of the homologous peptide ligands.

Edited Collections

1. The Language of Consciousness, Oxford
2. Special Issue of Philosophical Studies on High-Level properties (for Stew Cohen).
3. Philosophical Issues, A supplement to Nous, the Epistemology Perception (for Ernie Sosa), volume 2011.
4. Does Perception have Content? Edited volume (Oxford University Press, under contract).
5. Special Issue of Synthese on Relative Truth.  Spring of 2009.  Contributors include David Capps, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, Steven Hales, Max Kolbel, Peter Lasersohn, Michael Lynch, John MacFarlane, Daniel Massey, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Stephen Neale, Duncan Pritchard, Brian Weatherson and Crispin Wright.
6. Rationality and Irrationality, with Barry Smith, Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, (2001), including contributions by David Armstrong, Michael Beaney, Herbert Hochberg, Nicholas Rescher, John Searle, Barbara Tversky.
7. Rationality and Irationality (Constributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 8), Kirchberg: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, (2000), 2 Vol.
8. The Ontology of Fields: Report of the Specialist Meeting held under the auspices of the NSF Varenius Project, Bar Harbor, Maine, June 1998, with D. Peuquet and B. Smith, Santa Barbara: NCGIA.

Short Notes and Reviews

1. Review of Jonathan Cohen and Mohan Matthen,eds. Color Ontology and Color Science, MIT Press, 2010, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
2. Review of Francois Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, 2010, Analysis Reviews. 
3. Subjective Consciousness Reduced? Review of Uriah Kriegel. Subjective Consciounsess: A Self-Representational Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, ProtoSociology.
4. Article Review of Patterson, "Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, for Philosopher's Digest.
5. Book Review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:  Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting", Routledge, 2009, 384 pp. Contributors: Urquhart, Stevens, Pelletier, Linsky, Klement, Makin, Nasim, Bostock, Marek, Jacquette, Griffin, Loptson, Contessa, Landini, Nelson, Salmon.
6. “Milic Capek”, in Nicholas Rescher, Johanna Seibt and Michael Weber, eds, A Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt. 
7. “Commentary on Philippe Schlenker's 'Be Articulate!  A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection' ”, The Rutgers Semantics Workshop October 2007.
8. “A Counterfactual Account of Essence”, with J. Salerno, The Reasoner vol. 1, no. 4 (2007).  Jon Williamson, ed.
9. “Williamson on Counterpossibles”, with J. Salerno, The Reasoner vol. 1, no. 3 (2007).  Jon Williamson, ed.  We discuss Timothy Williamson's defense of the vacuous treatment of counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents) and reply to Alan Baker.Official Version.
10. “Why Counterpossibles are Non-Trivial”, with J. Salerno, The Reasoner vol. 1, no. 1 (2007).  Jon Williamson, ed. Subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) are standardly treated as vacuously true, the lore being that if an impossibility were to obtain, anything would follow.  Daniel Nolan (1997) and others have argued that there are several good reasons to steer clear of the standard reading.  In this note we provide further reasons.  Official Published Version.
11. Book Review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:  Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies (eds.), Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic, Ontos, 2006, 237 pp. Contributors: Mulligan, Raspa, Kroon, van Inwagen, Varzi, Reicher, Barbero, Orillo, Spolaore.
12. Book Review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Thomas Sattig, The Language and Reality of Time, Oxford UP, 2006

Talks, Travel, etc.

1. Attention conference, Antwerp, September 1-2, 2012.
2. Relativism and Contextualism, jointly sponsored OSU/Maribor/Rijeka
3. Philosophy Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, June 11-16, 2012.
4. "Visual Imagery in the Absence of V1 Activation", Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, April 9-14, 2012.
5. Relativity Symposium, Victoria, Canada, April 9 - 11, April 2012.
6. "Varieties of Synesthesia and Implications for the Philosophy of Perception", Invited Symposium on Synesthesia, Pacific Division Meeting of the APA, Seattle, April 4-7, 2012.
7. Feminist metaphysics panel, The Society for Analytic Feminism in conjunction with the 2012 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, April 4-7, 2012.
8. "The Role of Vision for Action in Cognitive Task Performances", Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Savannah, GA, March 22-24, 2012.
9. Seeing mathematics: perceptual experience and brain activity in acquired synesthesia, Department of Mathematics/Department of Physics/Center for Neurodynamics, University of Missouri, St. Louis, March 15, 2012.
10. TBA, Color and Philosophy, Auburn University, March 2-3, 2012.
11. "The Status of Consciousness in Nature", Department talk, Union College, March 1, 2012.
12. TBA, Department of Philosophy, Keio University, Tokyo, February 22-25, 2012.
13. Department talk, Colorado, Boulder, February 3, 2012.
14. Department talk, University of Vermont, January 27, 2012.
15. TBA, Philosophy Salon, University of Missouri, St. Louis, January 20, 2012.
16. The Ethics of Love and Sex, with John Brunero and Eric Wiland, Symposium, University of Missouri, St. Louis, November 15, 2011.
17. Unity of Consciousness Panel, Brown University, November 5-6, 2011.
18. "Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm", Presidential Address, The Annual Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association, St. Louis, September 16, 2011.
19. "Writing for Publication", Annual Graduate Student Professional Development Conference, UMSL, August 15, 2011.
20. "Conscious Color Processing in Blindsight?", Cortical Color Workshop and Conference, Vancouver, August 3-7, 2011.
21. "Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?", The Language of Consciousness workshop, ANU, Australia, July 28-29, 2011.
22. "Degrees of Consciousness", Consciousness at the Beach, ANU Coastal Campus at Kioloa from Friday July 22-25, 2011.
23. "A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness", Annual Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, New Zealand, July 3-8, 2011. 
24. "A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness", Workshop, Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, June 5, 2011.
25. "Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?", Department talk, Munich, Germany, May 19, 2011.
26. "Degrees of consciousness", Workshop on the Ontology and Epistemology of Consciousness, Southern Danish University, May 13, 2011.
27. "The Status of Consciousness in Nature", Department Talk, Southern Danish University, May 12, 2011.
28. Brain Research Unit, Low Temperature Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland, May 8 -11.
29. "The Superhuman Mind: From Synesthesia to Savant Syndrome", with Jason Padgett, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Stockholm, May 2 - 8, 2011.
30. "The Superhuman Mind: From Synesthesia to Savant Syndrome", Synesthesia symposium, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Stockholm, May 1, 2011. 
31. Pacific APA, April 20-24, 2011.
32. "Color in Blindsight", BBOB Presentation, Psychology, UMSL, April 6.
33. "A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness", Joint PNP/Medical School talk, East Building of Medical School Campus, Washington University St. Louis, March 9, 2011
34. "A Case of Acquired Synesthesia and Savant Syndrome after A Brutal Assault", Med school talk, Washington University St. Louis, March 7, 2011.
35. "What Does it Mean to be Human? From Neanderthals to the Technological Singularity" Big History Lecture, University of Missouri, St. Louis, February 28, 2011.
36. Commentary on Nemira Gasiunas's "Grapheme-color synesthesia as perception without awareness", The Third Online Consciousness Conference, Feb 18 - March 4, 2011.
37. Perception workshop, Harvard Dec 4, 2010.
38. "Does Color Synesthesia Differ Phenomenally from Visual Imagery", NYU, New York, Nov 20, 2010. Abstract: Color synesthesia differs from visual imagery along a number of dimensions, for example, in terms of how it is triggered. But how does it differ in phenomenal quality from visual imagery? Neuro-imaging has found that both color synesthesia and visual imagery activate areas in striate (V1) cortex and the V4/V8 color complex. Studies from blindsight and achromatopsia have provided suggestive evidence that V1 is systematically involved in computing brightness, brightness contrast and chromatic contrast, whereas the V4/V8 complex is involved in computing hues and saturation. Since current neuro-imaging results show that both color synesthesia and visual imagery activate these two major color areas of the brain, the current data from neuro-imaging do not provide us with any good insight into the question of whether there is a phenomenal difference between synesthesia and visual imagery. In a series of studies we asked lower color synesthetes, in which the trigger is sensory, higher color synesthetes, in which the trigger is cognitive, and non-synesthetes to compare their synesthetic experiences or visual imagery to photographs that varied in brightness or brightness contrast. We found that the synesthetic experiences of lower synestetes differ from the visual images of non-synesthetic subjects in having a greater brightness and brightness contrast than the visual images of non-synesthetes. No such difference was found in higher color synesthesia. As V1 is involved in computing brightness and brightness contrast, the studies provide suggestive evidence that lower synesthesia involves greater V1 activation than visual imagery.
39. “Degrees of Consciousness”, SpaWN conference, Metaphysics, Syracuse, July 25-27, 2010.
40. Color Experience in Blindsight?, department talk, Aarhus University, May 20, 2010. 
41. “What is an Unconscious Mental State?”, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Tuscon April 12-18, 2010.
42. Comments on Uriah Kriegel's Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Author Meets Critics Session, Pacific Division Meeting of the American philosophical Association, San Francisco, April 1, 2010.
43. “Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?”, Colloquium talk, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 31, 2010.
44. Hawthorne & Cappelen author meets critics session, Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, February 20, 2010. 
45. “An Alternative to Color Relationalism”, Colloquium talk, Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, New York, Dec 29, 2009.  Commentator: Jonathan Cohen.
46. Perception Beyond Vision, Perception workshop, Harvard University, Nov 14, 2009.
47. “Towards a Theory of the Long-Lasting Emotions”, Department Talk, University of Missouri-Columbia, Nov 6, 2009. 
48. “Kaplan's Paradox and the Semantic Values of Predicates”, Issues in Contemporary Semantics and Ontology: Predicates and Properties, org. Eleonora Orlando, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Ezequiel Zerbudis, Bueno Aires, Argentina, August 26-28, 2009.
49. “Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust”, Feldman workshop on disagreement, org. Klemens Kappel, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, August 14, 2009. 
50. “Some Kind of Seeing", AAP, Melbourne, July 6, 2009. 
51. “Do We Perceive High-Level Properties?”, Philosophy Program, Australian National University, May 14, 2009.
52. “Disjunctivism and Primitive Knowledge”, Pacific Meeting in Vancouver, April 8, 2009. 
53.  “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Kansas State University, March 26, 2009.
54. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Russell V Workshop, The Bishop's Ranch, Healdsburg, CA, March 12-15, 2009.
55. “Propositions as Hyperintensions”, Hyperintensionality and Impossible Worlds Workshop, org. David Chalmers, The ANU, November 25-26, 2008.
56. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Univeristy of Aarhus Oct 24, 2008. 
57. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, University of Copenhagen Oct 24, 2008. 
58. “Knowledge-How: A Unified Account”, Epistemology Workshop, Copenhagen Oct 23, 2008. 
59. “Disjunctivism and Primitive Knowledge”, The Second Annual Midwest Epistemology Workshop, October 17-18, 2008, The University of Nebraska in Lincoln, Nebraska.
60. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Philosophy RSSS, ANU, September 2008. 
61. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Auckland, NZ, August 2008. 
62. “On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life", Wellington, NZ, August 2008.   
63. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Otago, Dunedin, NZ, August 2008. 
64. “Knowledge without Belief”, Australian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne 2008.
65. “On the Knowledge Argument”, The Epistemology at the Beach Conference, Feb. 15-18, 2008, ANU's Kioloa Coastal Campus, hosted by Dave Chalmers' Centre for Consciousness and and Daniel Stoljar's Basic Knowledge grant and organized by Declan Smithies.
66. “Counterpossibles, Impossible Worlds, and Essence”, with Joe Salerno, Arizona Ontology Conference, Arizona, January 2008.  Organizer: L. A. Paul.  Commentator: Gillian Russell.
67. “An Extensional Approach to Quantifier Domain Restriction”, The Eastern Meeting of the APA, Baltimore, December 27-30, 2007.  Commentator: Jason Stanley.
68. “Making Sense of Ontological Commitment”, Ontological Commitment Conference, Sydney, November 30 - December 1, 2007.
69. Perceptual Reports and Intensional Verbs, PhilSoc, Philosophy RSSS, Australian National University, October 23, 2007.
70. Comments on Philippe Schlenker's "Be Articulate!", Rutgers Semantics Workshop, October 5-7, 2007.  Organizers: Lepore and Stanley. 
71. “Remarks on Counterpossibles”, with Joe Salerno, Synthese Annual Conference: Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy, Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen, October 3-5, 2007.  Program Committee: Johan van Benthem, Vincent F. Hendricks, John Symons, and Stig Andur Pedersen.
72. “Structured Content”, Philosophy RSSS, Australian National University, September 13, 2007. 
73. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Remarks on Knowledge-wh,” Copenhagen Epistemology Conference, May 26-26, 2007, organizer: Klemens Kappel and Danish Epistemology Network.  Speakers: Duncan Pritchard, Erik Olsson, Nikolaj Nottelman, Erik Carsson, Kristoffer Ahlstrom, Berit Brogaard, and Esben Nedenskov.  Discussants (among others): Lars Bo Gundersen, Eline Busck Gundersen, Jesper Kallestrup, Klemens Kappel, and Anders Schoubye.
74. Public Lecture, Henrik Gade Jensen, org.  May 23, 2007, Palace Hotel, Raadhuspladsen, Copenhagen.
75. Adjectives Conference, St. Andrews, May 19-20, 2007, invited participant.  Organizers: Herman Cappelen and Jason Stanley.  Keynote addresses: Delia Graff Fara, John Hawthorne, Chris Kennedy, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietoski, Daniel Rothschild, Jonathan Schaffer, Gabriel Segal, and Jason Stanley.
76. “Remarks on Counterpossibles”, with Joe Salerno, Epistemology Conference, University of Edinburgh, May 15, 2007.  Organizers: Jesper Kallestrup and Matthew Chrisman.  Speakers: Berit Brogaard, Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard, Joe Salerno and Jonathan Schaffer.  Abstract: On David Lewis' theory of subjunctive conditionals, subjunctives with impossible antecedents are familiarly treated as vacuously true.  But as Daniel Nolan and others have argued, there are several good reasons to steer clear of a vacuity treatment of counterpossibles.  In this essay we provide further reasons in support of the thesis.  We then raise a problem for Nolan's treatment and argue that the problem requires for its solution a theory of subjunctives that treats subjunctive contexts as opaque.  We conclude by offering such a theory.
77. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Remarks on Knowledge-wh,” , the Linguistics and Epistemology Conference, Aberdeen, UK, May 12-13 2007, organized by Martijn Blaauw.  30 min talk.  Keynote speakers: Kent Bach, Peter Ludlow, Jonathan Schaffer, and Jason Stanley.  Abstract: reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that 's knows-wh' (e.g. 'John knows who stole his car') is reducible to 'there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  Anti-reductionists hold that 's knows-wh' is reducible to 's knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  I argue that both of these positions are defective.  I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge.
78. “Donkey Sentences and Quantifier Variability,” the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April 19-21 2007. Commentator: Jessica Rett, Department of Linguistics, Rutgers. The paper proposes an account of conditional donkey sentences, such as 'if a farmer buys a donkey, he usually vaccinates it', which accommodates the fact that the adverb of quantification seems to affect the interpretation of pronouns that are not within its syntactic scope. The analysis defended takes donkey pronouns to go proxy for partitive noun phrases with varying quantificational force. The variation in the interpretation of donkey pronouns, it is argued, is determined by the linguistic environment in which the pronouns occur. A longer version of this paper can be found in the works in progress section below.
79. “Sea Battle Semantics” the Pacific Meeting of the APA in San Francisco, April 3-8, 2007. Commentator: Peter Ludlow, University of Michigan. Macfarlane has argued that our intuitions about future contingents motivate a shift from standard semantics to relativistic semantics. In this paper I defend standard semantics against MacFarlane's criticism. A longer version of the paper can be found in the works in progress section below.
80. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh”, Philosophy Department Colloquium, St. Louis University. March 30, 2007.
81. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Remarks on Knowledge-wh”, Knowledge and Questions Workshop, 15-16 March 2007 at the Archives H.-Poincaré, Nancy, France.  Keynote speakers: Berit Brogaard, Maria Aloni, Paul Egre, Pascal Engel, Christopher Hookway, Ian Rumfitt, Jonathan Schaffer, Claudine Tiercelin.
82. Commentator on Delia Graff's "Coincidence By Another Name", Arizona Ontology Conference. Jan 18-21, 2007. Speakers: Ted Sider, Carolina Sartorio, David Chalmers, Delia Graff, Mike Rea, Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne, Sarah McGrath, and Ned Hall.  Preliminary draft of comments.
83. “The But not All: A New Account of Plural Definite Descriptions,” the Eastern Division of the APA in Washington D.C., December, 2006. Commentator: Zoltan Szabo, Yale University.  The paper argues against the view that the semantic import of plural descriptions is existential quantification. Then it argues that plural descriptions have the semantic import of partitive constructions with variable quantificational force. You can find a longer version of the paper in the works in progress section below.
84. Rutgers Semantics Workshop, Sep 29-30, 2006, invited participant.  Speakers: Mark Baker, Sarah Jane Leslie, Martin Hackl, Peter Lasersohn, Richard Larson. 
85. “In Defense of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'”, Philosophy department colloquium. Syracuse. September 22, 2006
86. “In Defense of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'”, NAMICONA Epistemology Workshop, University of Copenhagen, August 22, 2006.
87. “The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism.  Or How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth”, Stirling Conference on Epistemic Value, August 2006. Commentator: Mikkel Gerken, University of California, Los Angeles.  Invited speakers: Jason Baehr, Berit Brogaard, Pascal Engel, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Mark Kaplan, Martin Kusch, Alan Millar, Christian Piller, Wayne Riggs, Matt Weiner, W. Jay Wood.
88. Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism", Aberdeen Conference on Moral Contextualism, July 2006.  Organized by Peter Baumann and Martijn Blaauw.  Commentator: Lars Binderup, University of Southern Denmark.  Keynote speakers: Berit Brogaard, John Greco, John Hawthorne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Alan Thomas, Ralph Wedgwood.  The paper argues that a version of non-indexical contextualism is preferable to genuine moral relativism.
89. “Adverbs and Quantifier Domain Restriction,” the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April, 2006. Commentator: Andy Egan, University of Michigan.
90. “Knowability, Possibility and Paradox”, with J. Salerno. Book launch event for V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard's New Waves in Epistemology. Pacific Division of the APA. March 24, 2006.
91. “Russell's Theory of Descriptions vs. the Predicative Analysis: a Reply to Graff,” the Eastern Division of the APA in NY, December, 2005. Commentator. Delia Graff Fara, Princeton University.  A longer version of this paper has been accepted for publication in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
92. “Anti-Realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy,” with J. Salerno, the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April, 2003. Commentator: Michael Rea, Notre Dame.  A longer version of this paper appeared in Nous 2005.
93. “To Be is to Be Considered”, with J. Salerno, the Society for Realist and Anti-Realist Discussion, Pacific Division of the APA in Seattle, WA March 29 - March 30, 2002.
94. “The Meaning of Life”, with Barry Smith, Philosophy Department, SUNY Brockport, April 12, 2001.
95. “Elusive Reference, Grounded Truth”. The 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, August, 2000.
96. “Quantum Mereotopology”, American Association for Artificial Intelligence-2000 Workshop on Spatial and Temporal Granularity. The American Association for Artificial Intelligence, Austin, Texas, July 30, 2000
97. “Should We Be Afraid of Human Cloning?”, Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, April 27, 2000.
98. “Brain Death and Technological Development”, Brain Death and Human Identity - An Ad Hoc Symposium, University of Hamburg, Germany, March 9, 2000.
99. “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”, the Hamburger Kreis, University of Hamburg, Germany, February 10, 2000.
100. “Mereology and Causation”, Winter Symposium, University of Aarhus, Denmark, January, 2000.
101. “The Ontology of Fields”, NCGIA Annual Meeting 1999, Santa Barbara, CA, December 3, 1999.
102. “The Ontology of Species”, Technical University of Dresden, Germany, October 8, 1999­.
103. “Spaces of Representation”, in the round-table discussion: Catastrophe Theory Based Models of Meaning, The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, Mass, August 10, 1998.
104. “Language and Time”, University at Urbino, Italy, July 1998.
105. “The Ontology of Fields”, The Ontology of Fields, Specialist Meeting of the NSF Varenius Project, Bar Harbor, Maine, June 1998.
106. “Intentionality”, 6th Congress of the IASS-AIS, Guajadelaja, Mexico, July 15, 1997.
107. “An Aristotelian Approach to Animal Behavior”, 6th Congress of the IASS-AIS, Guajadelaja, Mexico, July 14, 1997.

 Unpublished Works

1. “I Know. Therefore, I understand” (2005)
2. “Donkey Sentences and Quantifier Variability” (2006)