 Baptiste Massenot Postdoctoral researcher, University of Lausanne Baptiste.Massenot@unil.ch +41 21 692 34 72 CV Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems, Journal of comparative economics (2011) This paper suggests an additional channel through which legal origins can affect finance. Safety traps, with Kenza BenhimaA safety trap is an equilibrium with high risk aversion, that generates a negative comovement between wealth and risky capital. It is consistent with Japan's lost decade. A simple model of law and corporate governanceThe empirical evidence on legal origins and corporate governance can be reconciled in a simple political economy model with limited enforcement. The success of reforms that aim to reduce the size of the informal sector depends on the competitiveness of the credit market. Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development This
paper studies the economic consequences of litigation. Why do some countries have so many more lawyers than others? Theory and data show that more efficient courts lead to fewer lawyers. |