I'm a philosopher living in Brazil. I currently teach at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). Before coming to UFMG, I taught at the Federal University of Paraíba (UFPB), and studied at the University of Sheffield and at the University of Lisbon.

My work is mostly focused on the Philosophy of Mind/Psychology and Epistemology. My PhD thesis was an attack on perceptual conceptualism, the view, espoused by people such as McDowell and Brewer, according to which the concepts we apply in perceptual experience determine the content of such experiences.

I'm now engaged on a research on concepts, mostly focused on issues related to the possession conditions for general concepts and demonstrative concepts. I'm also interested in exploring contextualist accounts of knowledge.

I'm one of the editors of the journal Abstracta.

Selected Publications:

Abath, A. J. Epistemic Contextualism, Semantic Blindness and Content Unawareness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Forthcoming.

Abath, A. J. Brewer's Switching Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien. Forthcoming.

Abath, A.J. (2011). Doing Without Concepts - Edouard Machery. The Philosophical Quaterly, 61:654-55.

Abath, A.J. (2011). Quine Contra a Semântica Mentalista. Sképsis, IV:6, 108-121.

Abath, A.J. (2008). Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons. Manuscrito, 31, 2, 543-571.

Abath, A.J. (2008). A Note on McDowell's Response to the Fineness of Grain Argument. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 47, 3/4, 677-86.

Abath, A.J.(2008). The Constitution Argument Against Conceptualism. Sorites, 20: 49-66.

Abath, A.J. (2007). Quine e o Behaviorismo: Herança Maldita? Do Círculo de Viena à Filosofia Analítica Contemporânea. Viana do Castelo (PT), Livros de Areia.