Published Work:

Blameworthiness and Time, with Jules Coleman, forthcoming in Legal Theory.

This paper uses considerations about the moral significance of the passage of time to argue against reactive attitude theories of blameworthiness. We consider but reject a range of potential responses to the argument, and we draw out its implications for legal theory (most importantly, for statutes of limitations). 

Multi-component Theories of Well-Being and Their Structure, forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

This paper investigates the question of how the structure of multi-component theories of well-being should be understood. I argue against a number of mathematically simple approaches, and then a go on to propose more promising alternative approach.

Internalism about a Person's Good: Don't Believe It, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 154, No. 2, June 2011

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.

Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy.pdf, Synthese, Volume 172, Issue 03, 2010

This paper argues against George Bealer's bold attempt to vindicate the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy.

What's Wrong With Megalopsychia?.pdf, Philosophy, Volume 83, Issue 02, April 2008

This paper interprets and defends Aristotle's views on the relation between being virtuous and seeking honor.