Stata ado file

csvconvert -  module for gathering multiple comma-separated values (.csv) files into one single Stata (.dta) dataset.

Available to download at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457351.html 

Book

 Airline Pricing and Competition: the J-curve of airline fares, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010
This book studies the insights driving airline fares and their time variations both in theory and in practice. Part I first explains the dynamics of airline pricing and the reasons of price dispersion; then it studies how the pattern of airline fares, which resemble the shape of a J-curve, can be affected by the extent of competition. Thereafter part II is devoted to an empirical application using posted fares of the main carriers of the UK-Ireland airline market. The author first offers a brief description of the market and then presents a graphical analysis to reproduce with real posted fares the pattern of airline pricing throughout the booking period. Finally he conducts an econometric investigation on the effect of market structure on price dispersion of airline fares. The book is written to appeal to both practitioners and readers willing to understand how airline fares evolve throughout the booking period and how their pattern can be affected by extent of competition. Furthermore, because its application focuses on the UK-Ireland airline market, this book also targets those interested in the Aer Lingus vs Ryanair competition case.

View table of contents

Published Papers

The determinants of airline alliances, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, forthcoming (joint with D. Bartolini)
In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of the determinants of airline alliances. The results of the analysis show that well established airlines with large passenger volume are more likely to participate in an alliance, and are essential for its sustainability. In line with these findings, older airlines have a higher probability of being part of an alliance. Moreover, the decision to join or form an alliance is fostered by the aggregate market share of the alliances. Interestingly, our analysis suggests that the airline's main decision is not to choose a specific alliance, but whether to join or form an alliance at all.

Regulation and Risk: a cross-country survey of regulated companies, The Bulletin of Economic Research, 2012 Vol. 64(2), 226-238
This paper tests empirically whether regulation characterized by high incentives implies more risk to firms than regulation characterized by low incentives. Using a worldwide panel of 170 regulated companies operating in electricity, gas, water, telecommunication and transportation sectors during the period 1995-2004, I find that different regulatory regimes do not result in different levels of risk to their regulated firms. This result could be driven by a higher level of development of financial markets combined with a more sophisticated diversifying behavior of regulated firms.

Airline Competition in the British Isles,Transportation Research E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2010, Vol. 46(2), 270-279, (joint with Claudio A. Piga) 
We study the relationship between pricing and market structure on the routes connecting the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Because in 2007 the European Commission prohibited the takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair, the analysis focuses on their pricing strategies in particular. We use an original dataset of fares posted on-line, which allows to control for the fares' intertemporal pattern for each specific flight and each carrier's specific yield management system. Our evidence supports the European Commission's view that the elimination of a competitor in the Irish airline market is likely to have harmful consequences for consumers.

Optimal Investment in the Presence of Investment Shock and Congestion, The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2008, Vol. 164(2), 327-342
This paper develops a dynamic overlapping generation model in the presence of investment shocks and aims to understand how social welfare is affected by the investment decision of the firm and by the time of demand of the consumers. By simulating the model, I find that to maximize social welfare a considerable proportion of consumers should postpone their demand. Rational consumers, in fact, react to congestion by shifting their demand to the next period, whenever there is a positive shock affecting the  investment function. However, policy makers should consider policies favouring investment very carefully, since investment affects social welfare via a bell-shape function.

Regulatory risk in the utilities industry: an empirical study of the English-speaking countries, Utilities Policy, 2007, Vol. 15 (3), 191-205 
The economic theory on regulation suggests that firms subject to incentive regulation, such as price cap, bear more risk than firms subject to cost plus regulation, such as rate of return regulation. This hypothesis is tested empirically using a sample of 93 regulated companies operating in six English-speaking countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and USA, during the period 1995-2004. I replicate the methodology of the existing literature and also apply panel data techniques to my sample. The results obtained do not support the hypothesis that price cap regulation imposes more risk.