Operation Deny Flight/Deliberate Force 1992-95 “Every bomb was a political bomb.” Adm. Leighton W. Smith, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, Southern Europe Precision guided weapons afforded NATO a powerful tool in assisting U.N. political and military efforts to bring peace to the Balkans during the Bosnian ethnic conflict. On August 28, 1995, an artillery shell ripped through the stalls of an open market in Sarajevo, Bosnia killing 38 civilians and injuring 85. That attack by Bosnian Serbs provoked a military response from the joint U.N./NATO force charged with protecting refugee “safe areas” like Sarajevo. During the 22 days of Operation Deliberate Force (August 30-September 20, 1995), nearly 300 NATO aircraft based in Italy launched attacks, along with a volley of Tomahawk cruise missiles from a U.S. Navy ship. Some 3,500 aircraft sorties delivered about 1,000 weapons – 70 percent precision guided – against dozens of targets. Most were strategic in nature. The use of smart weapons was so effective it prompted Lt. Gen. Michael E. Ryan, Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, to comment, “Dumb bombs are dead.” While a generalization, his statement recognized the continued shift from “dumb” bombs to “smart” ones. The attacks destroyed transportation and command infrastructures, forcing the Bosnian Serbs to end their sieges of “safe areas” and to enter negotiations aimed at creating lasting regional peace. That peace did not last long. Operation Allied Force 1999 In early1998, ethnic conflict broke out in Kosovo, resulting in the displacement of some 300,000 people. A ceasefire was called in October, enabling refugees to find shelter, but the situation worsened again in January 1999. After efforts to resolve the conflict failed, NATO launched Operation Allied Force on March 24 to compel Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to make peace. On May 2, Lockheed F-117s attacked the national power grid of Serbia using a highly secret weapon specially designed for attacking electrical power infrastructure. During the next few weeks, the 6th Fleet, the U.S. Air Force, and other Allied air forces combined to attack key strategic and tactical targets in support of ground forces in Serbia. On June 3, Milosevic finally accepted peace terms, and NATO deployed peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. NATO’s unity and resolve proved crucial in the success of Operation Allied Force. Both the precision and persistence of the air campaign were key factors in convincing Milosevic that he could not outwait NATO, and that it was time to end the fight. Precision Weapons and Strategic Bombing During the 1991 Gulf War, the character of strategic bombing began to shift. While the tactical and strategic targets were similar to the Axis targets attacked during World War II, the capabilities of airpower had changed. In 1991 about 10 percent of the munitions dropped were precision guided weapons. Armed with precision weapons, fighter aircraft assumed a strategic role that traditionally had belonged only to heavy bombers. Stealth technology, which makes an aircraft invisible to enemy radar, allowed a relative few F-117 Stealth fighters to attack key strategic targets in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. F-15E and F-111F fighter-bombers and Navy A-6s also flew strategic missions. A wide variety of aircraft thus began to replace the venerable B-52 as the Coalition’s “strategic bomber” of choice. Any aircraft that could carry a precision weapon had strategic potential. Picture captions left to right Iraqis set more than 200 oil rigs ablaze near the end of the Gulf War. These actions seriously damaged the regional ecological system. General H. Norman Schwazrkopf salutes President George Bush during the Gulf War victory parade in Washington, DC, in June 1991 Airpower and Diplomacy Operation Deny Flight/Deliberate Force proved how judicious use of airpower, coupled with hard-nosed diplomacy, can stop a ground force in its tracks and bring the worst of enemies to the bargaining table. It also showed that years of working together had made NATO an efficient fighting force, although one heavily dependent on U.S. airpower. Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt IIs like this one delivered precision and traditional firepower during the conflict. A B-2 Stealth Bomber Refuels in Flight at Night A B-2 Spirit takes on fuel from a KC-10 airborne tanker after completing a mission in Operation Allied force. A multirole bomber, the B-2 can deliver a variety of smart conventional and nuclear munitions. Aviation ordnance men attach a 2000-pound GBU-24 laser-guided bomb to an F-14 Tomcat aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which participated in air strikes in support of Operation Allied Force. President Bill Clinton visits an air base in Germany during Operation Allied Force. Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk A single F-117 carrying two laser-guided bombs can, in some cases, achieve the same destructive effects as

By Cpl. Timothy N. Oberle Photo by Cpl. Paek, Geun-wook HUMPHREYS GARRISON – Army units generally conduct training individually and seldom get enough opportunities to engage in combined exercises with other types of units. For example, aviators usually train with other aviators, scouts with other scouts and so on. In fact, training is usually even further restrictive and limited to a single unit or battalion. The problem with conducting training in this manner manifests itself when Soldiers go downrange or are engaged in a real-world conflict, and they find a need to integrate as a combined fighting force to defeat the enemy or accomplish their mission. In an effort to combat the problem here in the Republic of Korea, one brigade commander is aiming to change the norm so that Soldiers will be prepared to fight as an integrated team. Col. James T. Barker, the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade commander, believes in a more inclusive training calendar for differing units. This belief was reaffirmed while he recently attended the Infantry War Fighters Conference, at Fort Benning, Ga. While at the conference, Barker repeatedly heard stories from infantry commanders and command sergeants majors about how Army aviators had saved their lives when they were pinned down by numerically superior enemy forces. “I was amazed by the fact that not only could these infantry leaders recall their interaction with an aviation unit as though it had just happened yesterday, but that they remembered every minute detail down to the aviator’s call-sign,” Barker said. “The greatest thing I took from the conference was that there is a huge appreciation for Army aviators today, one that hasn’t been seen since the Vietnam War. It was clear that the best way to sustain this relationship was to conduct year-round, full spectrum air and ground integrated training exercises with other U.S. and Republic of Korea units from around the peninsula. “No matter what else Soldiers take from an integrated training event, at the very least they build a rapport with the other organizations and obtain the rudimentary skill-set of how to best utilize the tools that the other units possess to ensure mission success,” he added. “Because the training is integrated, ground troops get to carry out missions that they would actually do in a wartime environment, integrating aviation into their operations at all levels.” Barker went on to explain that the most important reason to conduct complex integrated training exercises is because it translates into a decrease of injuries and deaths to U.S. Soldiers on the battlefield. “Every time a leader loses a Soldier in combat he has to look himself in the mirror for the rest of his life and ask if he did everything possible to prevent that Soldier from being killed or injured,” Barker said. “The area where I have the most influence to help prepare Soldiers for those types of situations are through training. Unfortunately, going to war usually means that some people may get injured, but under my command it certainly won’t be because of a failure on my part to relentlessly push an aggressive training program.” Ironically, the timing couldn’t be any better for Barker’s epiphany to be played out. “We have learned so many effective lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and if we don’t institutionalize those techniques, tactics and procedures into our training programs, we will begin to lose them as OIF and OEF wind down,” Barker said. “The absence of real world combat interaction with other types of units will create a vacuum and all of the synergy that we have established in the last 10 years will be completely lost.” In September and October, during one of 2CAB’s annual gunnery tables, Barker’s vision began to crystallize when ground forces from the 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, from Camp Hovey, integrated with aviation assets from 2CAB. One of the tasks required during the gunnery event was for tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to pass targets to armed AH-64 Apache helicopters, using a close combat attack request. “During gunnery qualification, these targets are usually passed from a master gunner in the tower, but in combat it never happens that way,” Barker said. For 2CAB, the combination of aviation and ground forces during the gunnery exercise was just the beginning of things to come. “It is important that as leaders we stack as many training events into a single training opportunity as we can without making the scenario unrealistic,” Barker said. “For example, when it comes to gunnery qualifications, you typically only get to qualify twice a year. If all that takes place during that qualification is an individual qualification of the primary weapons system, then a huge opportunity is lost to integrate air and ground forces.” When asked what this all means, Barker stated that it is essential to adhere to the old adage of “Train as you Figh